
■Minii mi i« iy»<i 






t -t S 






?,-, 












,<> V 



c^ 







































c^v 















^ V* 






^ 









.^ v '"■':- 
























'•s* 









£ f * 






\* 






"+ & 



X' 









^ 






























XT, 







































































THE ORIGINS 
OF THE WAR 



CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS 

C. F. CLAY, Manager 

ILotrtJDtt: FETTER LANE, E.C. 

mnittimtsb: 100 PRINCES STREET 



A. 
X i 



MiBJii 

II 




#efo Ifork: G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS 
Jombag anU Calcutta: MACMILLAN AND Co., Ltd. 

^Toronto: J. M. DENT AND SONS, Ltd. 
©oftgo: THE MARUZEN-KABUSHIKI-KAISHA 



All rights reserved 



THE ORIGINS 
OF THE WAR 

LECTURES DELIVERED IN THE 
MICHAELMAS TERM, 19 14 



BY 



J. HOLLAND ROSE, Litt.D. 

Fellow of Christ's College and Reader in Modern History 

in the University of Cambridge, Corresponding Member 

of the Massachusetts Historical Society 



Cambridge : 

at the University Press 

19 1 4 



^ 



\\ 



*.«• 



WORKS BY THE SAME AUTHOR 

The Life of Napoleon I. 2 vols. 18s. Cheap Issue, 
2 vols, in 1, Sixth Edition, 6s. (Geo. Bell and Sons.) 

William Pitt and National Revival. 1 vol. Second 
Edition. 16s. (Geo. Bell and Sons.) 

William Pitt and the Great War. 1 vol. new and 
cheap edition. 7s. 6d. (Geo. Bell and Sons.) 

The Development of the European Nations 
(1870—1900). Fourth Edition. 7s. U. (Constable 
and Co.) 

The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era (1789— 
1815). Sixth Edition. 3s. 6d. (Cambridge University 
Press.) 



First Impression 14 December 1914 
Second Impression 15 December 1914 



PREFATORY NOTE 

DESIRE gratefully to acknowledge the valuable 
advice given by the following while the sheets of 
this volume passed through the Press: Sir Adolphus 
W. Ward, Litt.D., Master of Peterhouse, J. B. Bury, 
F.B.A., Regius Professor of Modern History, and J. W. 
Headlam, M.A., both of King's College, Cambridge. My 
hearty thanks are also due to the following for help in 
the arduous task of research: E. R. Adair, B.A., 
Peterhouse, P. Vos, B.A., Gonville and Caius College, 
E. la M. Stowell, Corpus Christi College, and Miss Lilian 
Whitehouse, formerly of Girton College, Cambridge. In 
so controversial a subject as this, I wish it to be under- 
stood that I take sole responsibility for the statements 
in this volume. 



J H. R. 



Cambridge. 

December 4, 1914 



CONTENTS 



LECTURE 

I. Anglo-German Rivalry (1875 — 1888) 

II. The Kaiser ... 

III. Germany's World-Policy . 

IV. Morocco: The Bagdad Railway 

V. .Alsace-Lorraine . . 

VI. The Eastern Question (1908—1913) 

VII. The Crisis of 1914 
VIII. The Rupture . 

appendix 

I. Ship-Building Programmes of England 

and France (1905 — 14) 

II. German Plans in South- West Africa 

Index ...... 



Germany 



PAGE 
1 

21 

45 

68 

91 

115 

134 

162 



189 
190 
195 



LECTURE I 

ANGLO-GERMAN RIVALRY (1875—1888) 

Qui trop embrasse mat etreint. 

(Bismarck's favourite motto.) 

German writers often assert that the British Empire 
is the result of the conscious and persistent effort of our 
people towards the achievement of World-Empire. We, 
on our part, believe that Germany has in recent times 
adopted a World- Policy which, almost of necessity, has 
brought her into conflict with the British race. Which 
of the two peoples has of late been the more expansive, 
the more aggressive, is a question which can be finally 
and decisively answered only by future historians who 
have at their disposal documents necessarily withheld 
from the present generation. But it has seemed to me 
desirable to try to bring together into these lectures as 
much evidence as is now forthcoming, for the formation 
of at least a provisional judgment on this great topic. 

At some points, notably as regards the final rupture 
with Germany, the documentary evidence is fuller than 
has ever been forthcoming on contemporary events; 
and we may approach the final stage of our inquiry with 
a feeling of confidence that the main conclusions are not 
r. l. 1 



2 LECTURE I 

likely to be reversed, but only more clearly focussed. 
May I also venture to give my experience as to the 
completeness and trustworthiness of British official 
papers presented to Parliament? After studies in our 
archives extending over the best part of twenty years, I 
can testify to the honest editing of the Papers presented 
to Parliament. In scarcely any case have important 
passages been suppressed. Rarely do documents leap to 
light that shame the memory of British Ministers, at any 
rate since the time of the Younger Pitt. I remember on 
one occasion making a remark of this nature to the late 
Dr Samuel Rawson Gardiner. I said to him that the 
more thoroughly British foreign policy was examined, 
the better it came out. He at once replied : " It always 
"does; it always does." 

I do not propose to discuss here the psychological 
question whether there is a radical and incurable hostility 
between the North German and the British nature; or 
whether a war between their two Empires was inevit- 
able. The former question is too academic for these times : 
the second question is futile. A careful study of all the 
causes leading to war must, I think, lead to the conclusion 
that scarcely any war is inevitable; and that the use of 
that epithet is merely a slipshod way of avoiding an exam- 
ination of all the causes leading to the rupture. No war 
is inevitable, unless human passion, folly and blundering 
are inevitable ; and they are not inevitable unless mankind 
is a mere puppet show jerked by blind fate. Let us clear 
our minds of all befogging notions. Let us discuss the 
evidence ; let us seek to understand the characters of the 
chief actors, and we shall, I believe, come to the con- 
clusion that this terrible war could have been avoided. 



ANGLO-GERMAN RIVALRY (1875—1888) 3 

We may leave on one side all the earlier disputes 
between Great Britain and Germany. It matters little 
now whether Bliicher did or did not save us from de- 
struction at Waterloo, as the Kaiser has vauntingly 
declared; or that the British Press sympathized keenly 
with Denmark in 1864, when she was overwhelmed by 
Prussia and Austria; or that certain British steamers 
laden with coal for the River Seine were sunk by Prussian 
cannon in 1870. All those events belong to a bygone age. 
A new order of things came about in 1871, when tri- 
umphant Germany became an Empire ; and King William 
of Prussia became Deutscher Kaiser at the palace of 
Versailles. Very many of our people rejoiced at the unity 
of Germany and the downfall of Napoleon III. No 
feeling of security was possible while he was in power. 
"Condemned to be brilliant" was the verdict acutely 
passed on him by a French thinker; and few persons 
believed it possible that a German Emperor would ever 
be open to the same charge. The Germans were a 
quiet, safe, home-loving people. The French were fickle, 
ambitious, dangerous. Central Europe, the weakness of 
which had so often tempted the aggression of Bourbon 
and Hapsburg, was now secured by the ascendancy of the 
House of Hohenzollern. "That Germany is to stand on 
"her feet henceforth, and not be dismembered on the 
"highway, but face all manner of Napoleons and hungry 
"sponging dogs, with clear steel in her hand, and an 
"honest purpose in her heart — this seems to me the best 
"news we or Europe have had for the last forty years or 
"more." Such was Carlyle's verdict after Koniggratz 
in 1866 ; and after Sedan it remained his verdict and that 
of very many Britons. 

1—2 



4 LECTURE I 

On the other hand, British sympathy with Republican 
France, when subjected to the crushing terms imposed 
by the victors in 1871, aroused great irritation in Germany. 
The tone of Bismarck and the military caste had always 
been hostile; and Sir Horace Rumbold testifies to "the 
"extraordinary ill-will towards us" which was then mani- 
fested 1 . 

The friction between the two great branches of the 
Teutonic family became acute at the time of the war- 
panic of the year 1875. Early in that year the French 
Republic gained strength by two important measures. 
That of Feb. 25 gave it the beginning of a constitution. 
That of March 28 strengthened the army by adding a 
fourth battalion to every regiment. This was enough 
for the military party at Berlin. They did not complain 
of those measures. They complained of the sharp 
censures of some of the French and Belgian bishops on 
Bismarck's anti-Papal policy. The Chancellor himself 
conjured up the spectre of a Romanist League against 
Germany, and uttered these words : " If France does not 
"throw over her papal policy, I will not defer making 
" war upon her till she is ready ; and I know that she will 
"be ready in two years 2 ." 

The frank brutality of this utterance is characteristic 
both of the man and of the Junker class whence he 
sprang. His words were echoed in all Prussian news- 
papers ; and a sharp crisis ensued. German writers have 
since endeavoured to minimise the gravity of the situation, 
by asserting that the whole affair was a trifle, due to a 

1 Sir H. Rumbold, Recollections of a Diplomatist, I. 175, II. 297. 

2 Broglie, La Mission de M. de Gontaut-Biron a Berlin, pp. 166, 182 
(Eng. edit. Part in.). 



ANGLO-GERMAN RIVALRY (1875—1888) 5 

few hot-heads at Berlin. How misleading this was you 
will judge if I read a letter from Professor Geffcken 1 to 
Sir Robert Morier (British envoy at Munich), published 
in the Memoirs of the latter. After stating that Bismarck 
was heading towards war, he continues : 

There is to be a great coup, and Belgium is the object. I do not 
say that he is positively bent upon war, because he would be obliged 
to create a situation where Germany seemed to be the attacked 
party; and this is not easy, because the Cabinets [of Europe] are 
cautioned, and there is neither a blind French nor a blind Austrian 
camarilla pushing to war ; but he is resolved to annihilate Belgium, 
which he declares to be the central government of the political 
Catholicism, and the heart of coalitional conspiracies. He would 
easily consent to a partition of that country between Holland and 
France so that the French might definitely accept the loss of Alsace 
Lorraine. He speaks contemptuously of England, because it would 
not be able to give effective military assistance to Belgium. . . . 
Might not your Queen write to him [the Emperor William] and tell 
him plainly what Bismarck aims at and that England can never 
abandon Belgium ? 

The last sentences are significant ; for they prove that 
neither Bismarck nor Geffcken doubted the binding 
character of our obligation to defend Belgium. Bismarck 
sneeringly said that we could not save Belgium, if Prussia 
attacked her; but even he, with his cynical disbelief in 
the sanctity of treaties 2 , did not doubt that we ought 
to make the attempt. GefEcken, a German constitutional 
Liberal, took it for granted that we should defend 

1 Morier, Mems. n. 333. Geffcken (1830-1896) formerly a diplomat 
a close friend of the Crown Prince Frederick William, then Professor of 
Law and Constitutional History at Strassburg (1872-1880). The letter is 
of March 27, 1875. For the fears of Belgium see Mems. of Prince 
Hohenlohe, vol. n. p. 143 (Eng. edit.). 

2 Bismarck ; Reflections and Reminiscences, vol. n. p. 270 (Eng. edit.) 



6 LECTURE I 

Belgium, as we were bound to do by the treaty of 
1839. 

Sir Robert Morier believed the danger of a German 
attack on France to be acute; and two conversations 
which he had with the German Crown Prince at Munich, 
did not allay his apprehensions. In fact, the Crown 
Prince admitted that Moltke badly wanted war 1 . Hos- 
tilities would probably have followed but for these saving 
influences — the peace-loving character of Kaiser William I 
and of the Crown Prince Frederick William, the inter- 
vention of Russia, and the personal appeals of Queen 
Victoria to Kaiser William I. 

On this last topic we have no definite information 
except that such appeals were made and had the support of 
the Crown Princess — a fact which accounts for Bismarck's 
spite against that illustrious lady 2 . Bismarck's letter of 
Aug. 13, 1875, to the Emperor also shows that Queen 
Victoria had written to the latter stating that it was 
easy for her to prove that her apprehensions were not 
exaggerated. The Queen, therefore, had good authority 
for believing in a forthcoming attack by Germany upon 
France 3 . 

As to the attitude of the British Government little is 
known. But that little is enough. Lord Odo Russell, 
then British ambassador at Berlin, informed his brother, 
Arthur, that Bismarck manifested great irritation with 
Prince GortschakofJ because of the intervention of the 

1 Sir R. Morier's Mems. n. 333-345. 

2 Hanotaux, Contemporary France, in. 242: Bismarck, op. cit. n. 
191-3, 249-253. 

3 Bismarck; Some Secret Pages of his History, ni. 325-7. Prof. 
Oncken in the Cambridge Mod. Hist. vol. xn. 141, seeks to minimise 
the incident. 



ANGLO-GERMAN RIVALRY (1875—1888) 7 

Russian Government on behalf of France, and that shortly 
afterwards he complained to Lord Odo Russell "of the 
'preposterous folly and ignorance of the English and 
'other Cabinets, who had mistaken stories got up for 
'speculations on the Bourse for the true policy of the 
' German Government. ' Then will you,' asked Lord Odo, 
' 'censure your four ambassadors who have misled us 
' 'and the other Powers'?" Bismarck made no reply 1 . 
Further, M. Gavard, charge d'affaires at the French 
Embassy in London, reports that Lord Derby, Foreign 
Secretary, uttered these words : " Such an act of aggression 
' (i.e. by Germany against France) would arouse in 
'Europe general indignation, which would nowhere be 
'stronger than in England. Germany herself would 
' not brave such a manifestation of opinion. . . . You may 
'count on me; you may count on this Government not 
'failing in its duty. I give you in this matter all the 
'assurances that can be given by the minister of a con- 
stitutional sovereign 2 ." Lord Derby went further. He 
instructed Lord Odo Russell energetically to support the 
peaceful counsels which the Tsar of Russia was then 
urging at Berlin. On May 9, M. Gavard met Lord 
Derby at the diplomatic circle at the Foreign Office, and 
pressed him for a further statement of his views, because 
mere moral considerations had never stopped Prince 
Bismarck. Lord Derby then explained that he spoke 
of moral indignation, " which forms those Coalitions under 
"which the first Emperor [Napoleon] succumbed in spite 
"of all his genius 3 ." 

x Sir M. Grant Duff, Notes from a Diary (1886-8), vol. I. p. 129. 
Bismarck's disclaimers (Reflections and Reminiscences, u. 188-193) are 
obviously insincere. 

C. Gavard, Un Diplomat* d Londres, pp. 242-3. 8 Ibid. p. 246. 



8 LECTURE 1 

In the year 1875 the attack on France desired by the 
Prussian military party did not take place, mainly owing 
to the urgent representations of the Tsar Alexander II. 
At Petrograd he saw the French envoy, General Leflo, 
and repeated his earlier assurances that France must be 
preserved in a condition of strength. He did more. He 
proceeded to Berlin; and after all the world had been 
alarmed by Blowitz's revelations made through The Times, 
he had no difficulty in inducing the Emperor William to 
discountenance all thoughts of war 1 . 

Of set purpose I have avoided details in order to bring 
out the salient facts. They are as follows: Whatever 
were Bismarck's plans, it is certain that the military 
men at Berlin were in earnest in their threats to Paris. 
It is also certain that Russia and Great Britain most 
urgently reprobated any such threats. Those Govern- 
ments made it clear that any unprovoked attack by Ger- 
many on France would bring about the most vigorous 
measures against the aggressor; and that probably all 
Europe would take up arms to repel the attack. There 
was no formal alliance between Great Britain and Russia 
on this question. But they took this course of action 
because duty and interest alike prescribed it; and all the 
more because Belgium was threatened. 

One point more claims attention. The case of 1875 is 
well known in Germany All public men, all newspaper 
editors, are aware that, from 1875 onwards, it has been 
a maxim of Russian and British policy, that France shall 
not be suddenly taken at a disadvantage and crushed. 
In fact, the German Chancellor, during his memorable 
interview with Sir Edward Goschen at Berlin on July 29, 

1 H. S. de Blowitz, My Memoirs, ch. v. 



ANGLO-GERMAN RIVALRY (1875—1888) 9 

1914, admitted that to be one of the cardinal points of 
British policy. The conclusion is obvious. We are 
bound to conclude that the German expressions of 
surprise at our intervention in this war are due either to 
unaccountable ignorance or to a flimsy pretence of 
ignorance. 

The affair of 1875 was very important in many ways. 
It enabled France to found her Republic and to recover 
strength; and it created distrust of Germany. The 
suddenness with which Russia and Great Britain inter- 
vened made Bismarck angry at the time and nervous 
for the future. Evidently his Three Emperors' League, 
formed in the year 1872, did not count for much when 
Russia's interests were nearly at stake. He longed for 
a close union with Russia, and, less so, with Great Britain. 
Now both ententes were uncertain. What wonder that 
he wrote: "The idea of coalitions gave me nightmares! 1 " 

Accordingly, he deferred action of all kinds until he 
could be sure of his ground. Thus, colonial expansion was 
postponed until after the years 1881-2. Bismarck's 
views on the colonial question are very remarkable. In 
1873 he declared that colonies would be only a cause of 
weakness, for they could be defended only by powerful 
fleets, and "Germany's geographical position did not 
"necessitate her development into a first-class maritime 
" power. . . . Many colonies had been offered him, but he 
"had rejected them and wished only for coaling-stations 
"acquired by treaty from other nations 2 ." 

Even down to the year 1883 Bismarck continued to 
discountenance the growing agitation for German colonies. 

1 Bismarck; Reflections and Reminiscences, 11. 250-3. 

2 Fitzmaurice, Life of Lord Granville, n. 337. 



10 LECTURE I 

But early in 1884 he suddenly veered round, greatly to 
the surprise of Lord Ampthill (Odo Russell) and the British 
Government. The reasons for this change of front are 
probably as follows. In 1882 a number of merchants and 
others had founded the German Colonial Society, which 
soon set on foot a formidable propaganda. Now, a General 
Election for the Reichstag was likely to occur in the autumn 
of 1884, the results of which were doubtful ; and, as Lord 
Ampthill remarked, the cry of "Colonies for Germany" 
might be very prejudicial to the supporters of the Chan- 
cellor. Thus, according to Lord Ampthill's belief, it was 
the nation which led Bismarck to adopt a colonial policy 1 . 
That fact should be remembered. 

Some such departure was natural. For the adoption 
of a protectionist regime by Germany in 1879 soon led 
to the result generally accruing from such a policy — viz. 
over production ; and this in its turn led the over- producers 
to clamour for new markets where they could sell at 
their own prices. Thus Bismarck was logically bound 
to take up the colonial policy as a result of his pro- 
tectionist policy. 

On the other hand, I believe that he was by no means 
loth to enter on that path; for in 1884 the diplomatic 
situation favoured Germany to the highest extent. In 
1879 she had framed a defensive alliance with Austria 
which decisively checked Russia's forward moves; and, 
in passing, we may remember Lord Salisbury's bene- 
diction on the Germanic alliance : " To all those who care 
"for the peace of Europe and take an interest in the 
"independence of nations, I would exclaim 'A crowning 
" 'mercy has been vouchsafed to the world.' " 
1 Fitzmaurice, Life of Lord Granville, n. p. 339. 



ANGLO-GERMAN RIVALRY (1875—1888) 11 

Three years later, this defensive league was strength- 
ened by the accession of Italy. Thus was formed the 
Triple Alliance. It is well known that the adhesion of 
Italy resulted from her intense annoyance at the seizure 
of Tunis by France ; and that seizure was first suggested 
by Bismarck at the Congress of Berlin 1 . Thus, the same 
event busied France in North Africa and strengthened 
Germany in Europe. Another event in the year 1882 was 
favourable to Germany. British intervention in Egypt 
against Arabi Pacha served to embroil us with Turkey. 
The Sultan, Abdul Hamid, never forgave us for that 
action ; and Germany, profiting by his bad temper, soon 
began that flirtation with "the unspeakable Turk" which 
led up to grandiose schemes in the Levant. 

Of those schemes more in the sequel. Here I wish 
to point out the extreme caution of Bismarck. He 
undertook nothing of moment in the colonial sphere 
until he was sure of his position in Europe and saw possible 
rivals committed to a forward policy elsewhere; France 
and Great Britain in Africa, Russia in Central Asia. 
There can be no doubt that he rejoiced at these colonial 
adventures; for they led his rivals into spheres remote 
from Germany. Bismarck and his underlings knew a 
good deal about Russia's policy; for at Berlin on March 
24, 1884, he signed a treaty with her and Austria which 
in effect revived the Dreikaiserbund of 1872. (It was 
ratified in the following September at Skiernewice.) For 
the present, then, he felt absolutely safe in Europe ; and 
he probably was aware of Russian plans of expansion 
towards India. In November 1884 his able subordinate, 
Bucher, said to Busch: "Just keep a sharp look-out on 

1 Crispi, Merits, n. 98-100; Blowitz, My Memoirs, p. 165. 



12 LECTURE I 

"the news from Afghanistan. Something will happen 
"there soon." Bucher was right. Russia soon annexed 
Merv, thereby bringing about sharp tension of feeling 
in England, which the Duke of Argyll described as 
Mervousness. 

Therefore, in 1 884, the general situation was peculiarly 
favourable to Germany. She had formed a strong alliance, 
then the only alliance in Europe. The. other Powers 
were engaged in centrifugal efforts. Thus Germany could 
safely join in the hunt for new markets. We need notice 
here only the chief of her enterprises, viz. in South Africa. 

There is no doubt that Bismarck and many other 
German patriots looked with eager interest at the Boer 
Republics of South Africa. The victory of the Boers at 
Majuba Hill (Feb. 1881) and the tame surrender of the 
Gladstone Government to their demands, spread a deep 
impression of the weakness of Great Britain and the 
power of the Boers. Nowhere was that impression so 
deep as in Germany; and the notion of German supre- 
macy in that part of the world rapidly gained strength. 
It was no new programme. Even before the Franco- 
Prussian war of 1870, merchants of Hamburg, Bremen 
and Frankfurt had urged Bismarck to found a colony in 
a temperate climate, and South Africa was suggested. 
A scientific expedition set out to view the land, and it 
received a warm welcome from President Burgers of 
the Transvaal Republic. But their report "was not so 
"favourable as to overcome the objections of Prince 
"Bismarck," who considered that Germany already had, 
as he phrased it, 'too much hay on the fork' "to make any 
"large scheme of colonization prudent 1 ." In 1875 the 

1 Sir Bartle Frere, How the Transvaal Trouble arose, p. 258, 



ANGLO-GERMAN RIVALRY (1875—1888) 13 

programme was changed. A German resident in South 
Africa urged on Bismarck the acquisition of Delagoa Bay 
from Portugal, with a view to sending a steady stream of 
German immigrants into the Transvaal "to secure the 
"future dominion over that country, and so to pave the 
"way for the foundation of a German- African Empire 
"of the future." In that time of doubt and uncertainty 
Bismarck did not take up the proposal. But he kept it 
before him, with a view to furthering some such scheme 
when Germany's position in Europe was better assured. 
In 1876 the Boers sent a deputation to Berlin to request 
protection from Germany. What passed is not known. 
But it is probable that their resistance to Britain's recent 
decree of annexation was due, in part at least, to hopes 
of assistance from Germany. Probably the Russo- 
Turkish war of 1876-7 and the subsequent friction between 
Russia and Germany postponed action by the latter; 
at any rate Kriiger and a Boer deputation which pro- 
ceeded to Berlin and other capitals, to protest against 
the recent annexation by Great Britain, met with no 
encouragement 1 . During that time of tension in Europe, 
Sir Bartle Frere annexed Walnsch Bay to the British 
dominions (1878). There can be little doubt that the 
bay had attracted serious attention from the merchants 
of Hamburg and Bremen, and that the loss of that 
harbour rankled deep. 

Early in 1883 the procedure of the German merchants 
was as follows. A Bremen merchant, Liideritz, bought 
from a chief a tract of land at Angra Pequena, a second- 
rate harbour some 200 miles north of the Orange River, 
and asked the German Government for protection. 

1 Hems, of Paul Krilyer, p. 145. 



14 LECTURE I 

Thereupon Bismarck inquired from the British Govern- 
ment whether it would protect Luderitz. Our Govern- 
ment was utterly callous as to his safety; but it had to 
consult the Cape Colony about what was behind him. 
Delays therefore multiplied, and Bismarck became 
annoyed, because the General Election was coming on, 
and his enemies would taunt him with weakness unless 
he scored a colonial success 1 . Finally, Lord Granville 
declined all responsibility, but declared that annexation 
of that district by Germany would be an act of encroach- 
ment on Her Majesty's rights. At this Bismarck was 
furious. He resented both the long delay and the 
somewhat cavalier answer. His son, Count Herbert 
Bismarck (then at London), had also been nettled by 
Lord Granville's question whether Germany was not 
contemplating an extension inland from Angra Pequena 
towards the Transvaal. Young Bismarck replied hotly 
" That is a question of mere curiosity . . . that does not 
" concern you 2 ." Of course it did concern us very nearly, 
and his display of temper was more illuminating than 
the fullest reply. 

Finally, a settlement was reached. We needed to 
buy off German opposition to our occupation of Egypt; 
and we did so, virtually, by giving up Angra Pequena 
and nearly all the coast as far north as the Portuguese 
possessions. Bismarck was greatly pleased with the 
surrender. It came just in time to enable him "to bowl 
over" his enemies in the Reichstag, and the conclusion 
of the affair produced a most excellent impression through- 
out Germany — of course exactly the reverse in Cape 

1 Lowe, Prince Bismarck, n. 241. 

2 Bismarck ; Some Secret Pages of his History, m. 120. 



ANGLO-GERMAN RIVALRY (1875—1888) 15 

Colony, which had annexed that coastline, and now had 
to witness the reversal of its patriotic act 1 . Thus was 
laid the foundation of German South- West Africa. Thus 
began the friction between the British and German 
Empires in colonial affairs. 

Friction was equally acute on the eastern side of 
South Africa. The chief point in dispute was St Lucia 
Bay, in the north of Zululand. Germany laid her schemes 
for securing that bay outright (it was before Tongaland 
was British). Herr Luderitz tried to repeat there the 
same device as at Angra Pequefia, viz. purchase and then 
a claim for protection. But Germany was too vigorous. 
She had some dealings with envoys of the Boer Republics 2 ; 
and at the same time she discussed with Portugal the 
purchase of Delagoa Bay. This was too much even for 
the long-suffering Gladstone Ministry. Fortunately, it 
hunted up an earlier purchase of that same land from a 
former chieftain; and, what was far more important, it 
sent H.M.S. Goshawk to hoist the British flag at St Lucia 
Bay with an intimation to Berlin that that flag would 
be kept flying (October 4, 1884) 3 . 

Even after the annexation of the St Lucia Bay district, 
a large party of Boers protested against that action and 
attempted to found there the "New Republic," while 
the ubiquitous Luderitz asserted his claim to 60,000 acres 
in that neighbourhood. When the "New Republic" got 
into difficulties, Piet Joubert, a Minister of the Transvaal, 
came thither and suggested that its founders should give 

1 Fitzmaurice, n. 353-5. 

2 Ibid. 369. Bucher put down the German failure to Lord Rose- 
bery's sharpness and Count H. Bismarck's want of astuteness (Bismarck ; 
Some Secret Pages, in. 144). 

3 Govt. Blue Book C.-4587, p. 13. 



16 LECTURE I 

their country to the Germans " on the understanding that 
"the latter would bring pressure to bear on Her Majesty's 
"Government to allow of this departure from the Con- 
"vention." The British Commissioner, hearing of this 
proposal, reported it to the Home Government, which 
remained firm. The British flag therefore continued to 
fly at that important point, despite the annoyance of the 
German colonial party at the complaisance of Bismarck 
on this question 1 . 

Here, then, as elsewhere, German merchants were far 
more pushing than their Government. But its policy of 
"peaceful penetration" towards the Transvaal was so 
far threatening as to cause an important British move in 
the autumn of the year 1884. Sir Charles Warren was 
then despatched to South Africa with a small expeditionary 
force. Strengthened by loyal colonists, it proceeded to 
Bechuanaland, drove out the parties of Boers who were 
raiding or half settling that land, and annexed the whole 
territory to the British Crown. The results were epoch- 
making. Great Britain secured the highway leading 
northwards to the Zambesi; and she also drove a solid 
wedge of territory between the Boer Republics and 
German South- West Africa. The importance of that 
success will be obvious if you can imagine German 
territories coterminous with the Transvaal Republic 
during the Boer War 2 . 

Kriiger did much to keep open the hopes of the 
German colonial party. On one occasion he spoke as 
follows to a party of Germans at Pretoria: "As a child 

1 Govt. Blue Book C.-4587, pp. 87, 91, 110, 119; Bismarck ; Some 
Secret Pages, m. p. 144. 

2 For the Bechuana Question see John Mackenzie, by W. D. Mackenzie, 
chs. xi.-xiv; also his articles in the Contemporary Beview for 1884-5. 



ANGLO-GERMAN RIVALRY (1875—1888) 17 

"grows up, it requires bigger clothes, the old ones will 
" burst ; and that is our position today. We are growing 
" up, and although we are young, we feel that, if one nation 
" tries to kick us, the other will try to stop it. ... I feel 
"sure that, when the time comes for the Republic to 
"wear still larger clothes, you will have done much to 
"bring it about." The meaning of these words is fairly 
clear. The Boer Republics hoped to acquire the whole 
of South Africa ; and in that adventure they confidently 
expected the help of Germany. 

In other regions Germany gained enormously. The 
Cameroons (1885), German East Africa (1886-1890), 
German New Guinea (1884-5), were the three spheres 
where she acquired large tracts at the expense of British 
firms. Samoa and other islands fell to her later, Samoa 
not fully till 1900. In the prosecution of some of these 
designs German actions were at times signally un- 
scrupulous. The acts of Dr Nachtigal on the Guinea 
coast and of Dr Peters in East Africa showed with 
what dexterity 'scientific' expeditions could be used for 
the purpose of stealing many marches on the British 
Government and securing many thousands of square miles 
from native chiefs. As a piece of diplomatic cunning, the 
revelations of Bucher respecting a German scheme to 
seize Zanzibar, are almost unique. It failed only because 
the German agent, Rohlfs, bragged about his mission at 
Cape Town 1 ; and consequently Kirke, our Consul at 
Zanzibar, was able to take precautionary measures. 
Even so, however, he was unable to save British interests 
in the Hinterland, which now forms German East Africa. 

1 Bismarck ; Some Secret Pages, m. 145 ; Pari. Papers, Africa, 
No. i. For Samoa see R. L. Stevenson, A Footnote to History. 

R. L. 2 



18 LECTURE I 

Another curious episode concerns the Kiel Canal. It 
is not generally remembered that Bismarck was the first 
seriously to propose the cutting of that canal and the 
cession of Heligoland by Great Britain 1 . This appears 
from a Memorandum of Lord Granville in the spring of 
1884. Count Minister, the German ambassador at 
London, broached the subject of Heligoland to Lord 
Granville in the following terms : 

It was a place of no importance to us in its present state, whereas 
it would be of immense importance to Germany, to ourselves, and 
the whole world, if it was made into a good harbour of refuge. This 
would be an expensive work for us to undertake. We could not 
be expected to go to such an expense, whereas Germany would be 
quite ready to undertake it. Prince Bismarck wished to cut a 
canal into the Baltic, which also would be a great advantage to 
us as the most powerful nation of the world. But Heligoland, 
which of course would be always open to our ships, would be a 
necessary key to such a plan. 

Count Miinster said it was as good as impossible that Germany 
and England should ever be at war ; but the cession of Heligoland 
would strengthen the good feeling of Germany towards this country 
to an extraordinary degree. 

Lord Granville here interjected the remark that, doubt- 
less, the surrender of Gibraltar to Spain would strengthen 
the good feelings of Spain towards us in an extraordinary 
degree. After this damping comment, Count Miinster 
was more reserved, and begged Lord Granville not to 
mention the matter to any of his colleagues. 

There, then, the affair ended for the present. But, 

1 He proposed the canal in 1873, but was successfully opposed by 
Moltke and the military party. Bismarck ; Reflections and Reminiscence*? 
(vol. n. pp. 32-4). The scheme met with more favour in 1885 (ib. p. 34). 
On the value of Heligoland to Germany see Count Reventlow, Deutsch- 
lands qusw&rtige Politik (1888-1913), pp. 44-9. 



ANGLO-GERMAN RIVALRY (1875—1888) 19 

in recent times, William I and Bismarck, not the present 
Kaiser, originated the notion of the Kiel and North 
Sea Canal. That Bismarck shrouded the scheme with a 
philanthropic glamour, and, with the same specious 
professions, sought to wheedle us into the cession of 
Heligoland, only marks his sense both of the gullibility 
of the British public and of the good nature of Lord 
Granville 1 . In this case he somewhat overshot the mark. 
It is worth noticing that the colonial expansion of 
Germany occurred at a time when she had no fleet adequate 
to cope with the British fleet. In truth, the British 
Government, both that of Mr Gladstone and that of 
Lord Salisbury, looked upon that expansion as a natural 
and commendable development. Mr Gladstone went so 
far as to utter these words of benediction : " If Germany 
"is to become a colonising Power, all I can say is, God 
"speed her. She becomes our ally and partner in the 
"execution of the great purposes of Providence for the 
"advantage of mankind. I hail her in entering upon 
"that course, and glad will I be to find her associating 
"with us in carrying the light of civilization, and the 
"blessings that depend upon it, to the more backward 
"and less significant regions of the world." Mr Joseph 
Chamberlain, though less benevolent, was equally specific. 
On January 5, 1885, he said — " If foreign nations are 
" determined to pursue distant colonial enterprises, we 
" have no right to prevent them " ; but he added that 
we would protect our colonies if they were seriously 
menaced 2 . 

1 See Prince Hohenlohe's Memoirs (Eng. edit.), n. 311 : "Gladstone 
may remain in office. It will be good for us, bad for England " (Nov. 2, 
1884). 

2 Mr Chamberlain' s Speeches (1914), i. p. 136. 

2—2 



20 LECTURE I 

Lord Salisbury also was friendly to Germany, regarding 
her as a possible check on Russia 1 . After 1886 she became 
so to some extent, a fact which probably explains the 
extreme complaisance of the Salisbury Cabinet to that 
of Berlin in 1890. 

This topic must be dealt with later. Here I have 
sought to show that the German mercantile class pushed 
on its Government to a colonial policy; that Bismarck 
(the incarnation of prudence after 1875) entered reluct- 
antly on that new and doubtful path ; and that German 
colonial aims met with no opposition from Great Britain, 
except where her vital interests were at stake. 

1 Bismarck ; Some Secret Pages, in. 143. 



LECTURE II 

THE KAISER 

Principes pro victoria pugnant, comites pro principe. 

(Taoitus, Germania, ch. 14.) 

Among no people has the leader and ruler counted 
for more than among the Germans. With them personal 
influence has prevailed over the dictates of law and of 
a constitution. Tacitus noticed that peculiarity among 
the ancient Germans. In the tribal assembly the chief 
carried his proposal more by his individual influence than 
by the authority of his office. So also in Beowulf, the 
chief is the designer of plans, the comrades are merely 
his followers, led by his forethought, nerved by his 
example, and rarely, if ever, questioning his decision. 

The same is true of recent times. The Great Elector 
and Frederick the Great made Prussia. Under the two 
un warlike successors of Frederick, the Kingdom declined 
in strength and, in fact, nearly perished, until Bliicher 
and Gneisenau arose to lead the Prussians once more to 
victory. The contrast between that "King Waverer," 
Frederick William IV, and the victor of Sedan, William I, 
is startling; but look at the trio surrounding Kaiser 
William — Bismarck, Moltke, Roon — and the riddle is 
solved. In ordinary times the German is home-loving, 



22 LECTURE II 

passive. Under a great leader he displays the old 
Berserkir rage. 

This dependence of Germans on their leaders may be 
explained thus. Their geographical situation was weak; 
for they had no well-defined natural boundaries. There- 
fore a vigorous lead had to make up for the lack of natural 
advantages. Also their laws and institutions were never 
thoroughly Romanized. Accordingly, until a recent 
time the Germanic State has been weak, and the idea of 
law has not dominated life as it has among the Latin 
peoples. The Germans have therefore depended more 
than any people on their great men. On the appearance 
of an inspiring leader, their docility is phenomenal. 

In the present age, a leader, who is also ruler, has called 
forth to utmost tension all the energies of the German 
race. He has accomplished this feat, owing to the con- 
ditions of German national life and the charms of his 
personality. 

His character is more complex and enigmatical than 
that of any sovereign of our time, indeed, since that of 
the first Napoleon. There are very diverse strains in 
his nature. Its basis is Hohenzollern ; and he seems to 
have forced to the front this side of his being ; for he is a 
man of strong will-power, as nearly all the Hohenzollerns 
have been. Occasionally, as in the case of Frederick 
William II (1786-1797) there have been sovereigns 
remarkable for love of vicious pleasures ; but in the main 
the Prussian Kings have worked hard and lived simply. 
They have been energetic Commanders-in-Chief, not 
remarkable for width of view or variety of attainments. 
Macaulay has thus trenchantly described Frederick 
William I, father of Frederick the Great: "The business 



THE KAISER 23 

"of life, according to him, was to drill, and to be drilled. 
" The recreations suited to a prince were to sit in a cloud 
"of tobacco smoke, to sip Swedish beer, to play back- 
" gammon for three half-pence a rubber, to kill wild 
"hogs, and to shoot partridges by the thousand." The 
Macaulay touch is always too staccato. Still, it is true 
that the life of the old Hohenzollerns was rough, almost 
boorish. 

There were, however, two prominent exceptions — 
Frederick I (1688-1713) and Frederick William IV (1840- 
61). The latter, the great-uncle of the present Kaiser, 
was a man of varied attainments; and to him we must 
pay attention ; for it is clear that the Kaiser inherits, in 
the main, two sets of tendencies. The former of these is 
derived from his grandfather, William I (1861-1888), a 
man of simple, rigid, and yet not unkindly nature, of 
the usual Prussian type; while his predecessor, his 
brother, Frederick William IV, was a man of singularly 
versatile genius, but utterly deficient in steadfastness of 
aim. In conversation he pleased, in action he disgusted, 
everybody. Quick to speak, overflowing in ideas, roman- 
tic in his outlook on life, he was the ornament of every 
social circle, but the despair of every Cabinet. That 
cosmopolitan statesman, Baron Stockmar, saw him 
during a royal visit to the British Court in 1842 for the 
purpose of acting as godfather to His late Majesty, 
Edward VII. In a confidential interview the King 
exhibited his powers of speech and his restless ambition. 
During an hour he dilated on the precarious position of 
Belgium. He felt certain that, in case of a Franco- 
Prussian war, France would at once seize the Belgian 
fortresses. Even in time of peace, he said, Belgium 



24 LECTURE II 

tended to gravitate towards France. This was dangerous 
for Germany, and, as the natural protector of Germany, 
he suggested that the best course of action for Belgium 
would be to enter the Germanic Confederation. He set 
forth his views enthusiastically and eloquently, and 
seemed somewhat surprised when Stockmar maintained 
that Belgium was resolved to uphold its independence. 
Stockmar found him a man of sentiment, poetical, in- 
clined to mysticism, a dreamer in politics, and by no 
means a statesman 1 . 

In fact, his lack of statesmanship was always apparent. 
Thus, after instituting a Prussian United Landtag in 1847, 
he read it an extremely irritating lecture at the opening 
Session — They were not representatives of the people. 
He derived his kingly authority from God alone, and he 
would never allow a sheet of paper (i.e. a constitution) to 
come between "the Lord God in Heaven and his subjects." 
The same thought led him to reject the crown of a demo- 
cratic German Empire founded in 1849. He referred 
scornfully to the new imperial crown as "the iron fetter 
"by which the descendant of four and twenty sovereigns, 
"the ruler of 16,000,000 subjects, and the lord of the 
"bravest and most loyal army in the world, would be 
"made the mere serf of the Revolution." 

This unfortunate King possessed many fatal gifts. 
He frequently wove plans which it was beyond his power 
to carry out; for he let his faculties run hither and 
thither and never concentrated them on one practicable 
object. After seeing all his plans miscarry, he, in the 
year 1857, showed symptoms of lunacy; and the last 
four years of his life were marked by hopeless madness. 

1 Mems. of Baron Stockmar. n. pp. 78-85. 



THE KAISER 25 

His younger brother, William I, was far less imagin- 
ative and sensitive. A plain man, who never saw far 
ahead, he often made mistakes; but, as he never talked 
much, no one saw that they were mistakes; and he 
generally had the good sense to retrace his steps before 
it was too late. After his death, in 1888, Bismarck went 
so far as to say of him : " When anything of importance 
"was going on, he usually began by taking the wrong 
"road; but in the end he always allowed himself to be 
"put straight again 1 ." 

Now, that is literally true at many points of his career. 
Probably his reign would have ended in disaster but 
for the singularly able guidance of Bismarck and his co- 
adjutors. We must, however, add that Kaiser William I 
had a good eye for character; and when he found a 
trusty counsellor, he never dismissed him, however trying 
the times. He supported his Ministers steadfastly; and 
he himself ran straight towards a well denned goal. 
Distrusting his own abilities, which were slight, he heark- 
ened to good counsel; and therefore the reign of that 
plain, unassuming soldier ended amidst a galaxy of glory. 

Striking the mean between the two brothers, we 
should arrive at an interesting compromise — a man rest- 
less in habit and romantic of speech, yet also possessing 
great power of organization ; a weaver of daring schemes, 
yet also patient and persistent in preparing for their 
execution; an orator, yet also a man of action; a lover 
of the arts, but pre-eminently a soldier. Such a man is 
Kaiser William II. 

He is, I believe, an example of atavism, that is, his 
nature recurs to that of the previous generations. In few 
1 Bismarck ; Some Secret Pages, in. 176. 



26 LECTURE 11 

traits of his character does he resemble his father or 
mother, except in fondness for literature, art, and music ; 
and those characteristics he shares with his great-uncle. 
As is well known, his mother, formerly Princess Royal of 
Great Britain, was very clever — far too clever for the 
Prussian Court of her days; and her sharp ironical 
remarks, no less than her decidedly English ways, often 
brought her into difficulties. Further, the almost demo- 
cratic views of the father, the Emperor Frederick, were 
extremely unpopular in Court circles, witness the brutal 
remark of Busch, after his death, at his relief of the 
removal of that "incubus." 1 Such was the general feeling 
among the governing classes; and the present Kaiser 
seems to have displayed very little filial affection during 
the long drawn-out agony of that winter and spring of 1888. 
With his mother he had previously been on strained 
terms owing to her rather too open expression of pro- 
gressive views and her fondness for England. His 
annoyance came to a head, early in the year 1888, owing 
to the ardent love of his sister, Victoria, for Prince 
Alexander of Battenberg, a noble and chivalrous character, 
beloved by nearly everybody except his uncle, the Tsar 
of Russia. Because that marriage would have offended 
the Tsar, besides introducing one more ally of England 
into the Court circle, the present Kaiser and Bismarck 
bitterly opposed it. The Empress Victoria no less firmly 
advocated it; but, finally, for reasons of State, she and 
her daughter had to give way. Bismarck's Journal shows 
that it was our Queen, who, during a visit to Berlin, 
counselled the surrender of the happiness of her grand- 
daughter in order to restore peace in the Imperial family 

1 Bismarck; Some Secret Pages, ill. 190. 



THE KAISEK 27 

at Potsdam. Queen Victoria did more: she brought 
about a reconciliation between Prince William and his 
mother. There, doubtless, is the reason for the veneration 
which he has always felt for the Queen-Empress. Her 
death in 1901 inaugurated a period of greater strain 
between Great Britain and Germany. At this point, 
again, the atavism of his nature is well marked ; and this 
peculiarity, together with the special reason for gratitude 
to his grandmother, acted as a check on his anti-British 
feelings. How strong they were may be judged by a 
trifling incident. On one occasion his sister, Victoria, 
talked about being "at home" in England. At once he 
flung at her an epithet which is semi- officially reported 
to have been either "goose" or "sheep." 1 

Opposition to parents and to brothers and sisters is 
often a trait of very decided natures ; and it was therefore 
traditional in the House of Hohenzollern, which is nothing 
if not decided and determined. We think of Frederick 
the Great in his youth, caned, starved, and once all but 
shot, by his bullying father. And the course of the 
Hohenzollerns has generally been one of sharp zigzags 
during successive reigns. The revolt of the present 
Kaiser against the peaceful and progressive tendencies 
of his father early became evident. He was always a 
soldier. At the age of eight he exacted a military salute 
from a somewhat negligent sentinel 2 ; and at the age of 
23 his portrait was thus limned by Bismarck: "He 
" wishes to take the Government into his own hands : he 
"is energetic and determined, not at all disposed to put 

1 Bismarck; Some Secret Pages, m. 184, 188. M. Harden, Monarchs 
and Men, pp. 16, 99. 

2 Maurice Leudet, The Emperor William at home (Eng. edit. p. 27). 



28 LECTURE II 

"up with parliamentary Co-regents — a regular Guardsman. 
" Perhaps he may one day develop into le rocher de bronze 
" of which we stand in need." A little later the Chancellor 
received from the young prince a curious present — his 
portrait with the ominous words written underneath — 
"Cave, adsum 1 ." 

The groundwork of the Kaiser's character is therefore 
stiffly and aggressively old-Prussian. Apart from his 
artistic leanings, he exhibits a recurrence to the earlier 
type. His patriotism is intense, almost furious; and 
therein lies the secret of his power. He has evoked a 
storm of patriotic fervour such as the world has not seen 
for a century past. Against such a man it is childish 
merely to rail. To insult him. is far worse. Our duty 
should be to try to understand him; to find out the 
secret of that influence which he has exerted upon his 
people; to absorb the best elements of German national 
strength into our more torpid and ill-organized society. 

Firstly, then, let us notice his phenomenal activity. 
He is one of the hardest workers in that nation of hard 
workers. By example, as well as by precept, he requires 
the utmost amount of efficient toil in every grade of lif e ; 
and the motive everywhere is the same: it is for the 
Fatherland. Germany tolerates no drones. The hive 
swarms with workers; and sport, though it has gained 
ground of late, does not absorb the large, the dangerously 
large, share of the nation's energies which it unfortunately 
does in these islands. In Germany the welfare of the 
nation comes first, the pleasure of the individual comes 
second; and neither the Kaiser, nor the public opinion 

1 "Take care: I am near yo a." M. Harden, p. 96 ; Bismarck; Some 
Secret Pages, m. 56. 



THE KAISER 29 

which he has trained, would tolerate, in times of grave 
national crises, the holding of great football matches for 
the sake of the gate-money which they bring in. The 
Kaiser's career has been a constant appeal for national 
efficiency; and hence the prodigious strength which 
Germany is now putting forth. 

Kaiser William could not have exerted his phenomenal 
influence, had he not been endowed by nature with 
considerable personal charm. After the reign of the 
stiff and severe William I, and the concentrated tragedy 
of the three months' reign of Frederick III, the advent of 
the young War-lord was hailed with enthusiasm. His 
bearing betokened the guardsman, his varied accomplish- 
ments dazzled the Court, his words set the blood tingling. 
He resembled Henry V after the cautious Henry IV, as 
limned by Shakespeare: 

Ely. We are blessed in the change. 

Cant. Hear him but reason in divinity, 

And, all- admiring with an inward wish, 

You would desire the King were made a prelate. 

Hear him debate of commonwealth affairs 

You would say it hath been all in all his study: 

List his discourse of war, and you shall hear 

A fearful battle rendered you in music: 

Turn him to any cause of policy, 

The Gordian knot of it he will unloose 

Familiar as his garter. 

Here is a very favourable account of the Kaiser 
penned by the late Mr Edward Dicey, just before the 
State visit to London in the spring of 1911. 

No one can be in his company for long without feeling the charm 
of his presence and learning something of the breadth of his mind. 
He seems to be able to converse on anything, and to converse equally 



30 LECTURE II 

well on all subjects; nor is the knowledge he shows superficial. 
He always goes to the root of the question ; and it would be unwise 
for anyone not armed at all points to seek an audience with His 
Imperial Majesty. He talks quite openly, and in a way which gives 
confidence; and he quickly turns from one subject to another 
just as the conversation leads him. Courteous and kind, he makes 
you feel at home at once ; and, while his bearing and mien command 
respect, he in no way demands homage 1 . 

This natural and impulsive manner he inherited from 
his mother, who could rarely resist the temptation of 
saying a clever thing. But there again the Kaiser's 
eloquence and love of oratory is akin to that of bis great- 
uncle. He is one of the ablest impromptu speakers of 
his Empire. Two examples of his art must suffice. In 
November 1901 at a meeting of the Institution of Naval 
Architects in Charlottenburg he was present at a lecture 
followed by a discussion. At the end of the discussion, 
to the utmost surprise of the audience, he rose from his 
seat, and, ascending the rostrum, delivered a speech 
which well summed up the whole of the question in 
debate. Never losing himself in technicalities, he made 
the question live, lightening it once with a touch of 
humour 2 . 

The other occasion was even more remarkable. It 
occurred during a festivity at the University of Berlin. 
Arndt's patriotic song of 1813, 

"Der Gott der Eisen wachsen lieJB, 
Der wollte keine Knechte," 

had raised enthusiasm to a high pitch, and that en- 
thusiasm bore the Kaiser to the rostrum. The opening 
sentences were somewhat forced and nervous; but his 

1 The Empire Review, May. 1911. 

2 L. Elkind, The German Emperor's Speeches, pp. 251-3. 



THE KAISER 31 

will soon banished all nervousness. The full, sonorous 
voice began to fill the great hall and dominate the 
situation, until at the end the audience spontaneously 
burst forth into the patriotic song — " Heil dir im Sieger- 
kranz 1 ." 

Kaiser Wilhelm possesses the imaginative gifts which 
add dignity to oratory. His love of Germany's richly 
storied past enriched the speech which he delivered in 
1902 at Aix-la-Chapelle, the city of Charlemagne. After 
dwelling on those historic associations, he launched out 
on a wider sphere. 

So powerful and so great a figure was that mighty Germanic 
Prince, that Rome herself offered him the dignity of the Roman 
Caesars, and he was chosen to enter upon the heritage of the 
Imperium Romanum — assuredly a splendid recognition of the 
efficiency of our German race, then entering on the stage of history. 
. . . But to unite the office of the Roman Emperor with the dignity 
and burdens of a Teutonic king was a task beyond the power of man. 
What he, with his mighty personality, was able to accomplish, fate 
denied to his successors; and in their anxiety to gain the Empire 
of the World, the later Imperial dynasties lost sight of the German 
nation and country 2 . 

Would that Kaiser William had learnt that lesson ! 

There is in his nature a decided vein of romanticism. 
It appears in his love of old German literature — its sagas 
and mythology. As an instance of the Kaiser's skilful 
handling of Norse mythology for the furtherance of his 
maritime designs, let me cite part of his speech at the 
launching of the ironclad, Heimdall, at Kiel in 1892 : 

We are now called upon to give the ship a name. Its name 
will be taken from the earliest history of our forefathers in the 

1 Lampreckt, Der Kaiser (Berlin, 1913), pp. 74-6. 
« Ibid. p. 71. 



32 LECTURE II 

north. Thou shalt receive the name of the god to whom was 
entrusted, as his main function, the duty of defence: of that god 
whose bounden duty it was to protect and keep the golden gates 
of Walhalla from every base intruder. As the god, when danger 
was afoot, blew a far-sounding blast on his golden horn and sum- 
moned the gods to battle in the twilight of the gods, so may it be 
with thee. Glide down into thy element. Be thou ever a faithful 

warden of the seas And if ever the day comes when thou art 

called upon to do battle, deal destruction and devastation in the 
ranks of thy enemies 1 . 

A ruler whom the gods wish to destroy they endow 
with eloquence. It is a fatal gift, especially in a con- 
tinental potentate. In the main, the successful monarchs 
have been plain, tactful, silent men. From the time of 
Maximilian I to that of Napoleon the Great, and down to 
William II, rhetoric has kindled enthusiasm in the people, 
but it has also alarmed neighbouring Powers. Never 
has it been more fatal than with Kaiser William. A 
careful and sympathetic observer admits that he 
"becomes intoxicated with his own words 2 ." This is 
undoubtedly the case; and during many years all peace- 
loving Germans trembled when it was rumoured that 
the Emperor was about to speak or had fired oil a political 
telegram. Finally, his Chancellor had to insist that both 
speeches and telegrams should be subjected to some 
measure of official supervision. After that, Europe was 
much duller during many a long month. 

His worst enemies admit that he is a very interesting 
man; and, like the great Napoleon, he hides under a 
pleasing surface that reserve of strength which, by 



1 Elkind, p. 257. 

2 As at Doberitz in 1903 (Lamprecht ibid. pp. 69-77). 



THE KAISER 33 

imposing respect and a certain secret fear, doubles the 
present witchery. A sharp nod of the head, a flash of 
the eye, a ring in the tone of the voice, and you are 
reminded that under feline charm lies feline hardness. 

For the stern Hohenzollern nature is there, enriched 
though it was by the Guelph-Coburg strain. Those old 
Hohenzollern Electors and Kings, who thrashed their 
sons and dragooned their subjects, bequeathed to him a 
nature which no civilian training could wholly modernize. 
Kaiser William's parents had sought to bend his nature 
towards industrial and economic studies, and therefore 
sent him to school at Cassel, with an instruction that 
the artistic side of his nature was to be developed. He 
was to visit museums, factories, and mines 1 . He would 
have none of them. There and at the University of Bonn 
his chief interest was in the army and navy. At Bonn 
his student's room was full of photographs of German 
warships, the description of which he knew by heart. 
Voyages of adventure and discovery were his favourite 
study; and he longed to visit Egypt 2 . By way of pre- 
paration, perhaps, for that visit, he encouraged the 
fighting spirit among the students. M. Amedee Pigeon, 
who knew him well at Bonn, writes of his passion for 
witnessing the students' sword-duels: "He would stand 
"for an hour around the combatants. How often have 
"I seen him pale, nervous, attentive, watching the 
"play of the duellists.. . .He was happy in witnessing 
"those spectacles where blood flows, where often a bit 
" of a nose or a cheek is taken off by the sword, . . . and his 

1 G. Hinzpeter, Kaiser Wilhelm II (Bielefeld, 1888). 

2 Leudet, ch. n. ; Reventlow, pp. 57-65, 100-2, " Reichsgewalt ist 
Seegewalt und Seegewalt Reichsgewalt." 

R. L. 3 



34 LECTURE II 

"pleasure was redoubled in eluding the police, who are 
"supposed to discountenance these duels,. . .but who, in 
"fact, tolerate and wink at them 1 ." 

Everyone agrees that he was always extremely self- 
willed. Even his tutor, Hinzpeter, in an almost official 
panegyric, admits that, while outwardly obedient to 
University discipline, he went his own way entirely in 
the mental domain — witness the following. His first 
tutor in matters religious belonged to the progressive 
school; but he was suddenly replaced by an extremely 
orthodox tutor. The change made no difference whatever 
to the pupil's religious beliefs 2 . The incident does not 
necessarily prove imperviousness at all parts of the 
brain ; but it may be taken as symptomatic. 

A man possessed of great will-power and personal 
charm can generally dominate others; and the Kaiser 
has exercised a uniquely fascinating and controlling 
power over the German people. As an American writer 
has said, wherever you touch the German people, you 
touch the Kaiser 3 . Here we may cite as witness one 
of the most prolific and patriotic of the German pro- 
fessors. Dr Lamprecht of Leipzig has written the most 
careful and life-like study of the Kaiser that has yet 
appeared. It was founded on personal knowledge, and 
on information procured from the men about him. It 
contains two companion portraits, one drawn in 1901, 
the other in or just before 1913. A desire for exactitude, 
with which there were doubtless mingled considerations 
of a prudential nature, led Herr Lamprecht to submit 
the former effort to his illustrious sitter; and it was 

1 Leudet, ch. 21. 2 G. Hinzpeter, pp. 8-7. 

3 P. Collier, Germany and the Germans, p. 106. 



THE KAISER 35 

approved. The picture may therefore be regarded as a 
full-length royal portrait of the standard Royal Academy 
type. 

Lamprecht lays great stress on the Kaiser's powers 
of persuasion. He writes: "When one listens to Min- 
isters, one is again and again amazed at the extent to 
"which they merely repeat the Emperor's ideas; and 
"whoever has seen opponents coming from an interview 
"with him must have been equally struck by the way in 
"which they were dominated by the charm of his person- 
ality, at all events so long as the immediate effect of 
"his words lasted." 

Professor Lamprecht points to certain defects in the 
Kaiser's character. He instances his impulsiveness, his 
hasty resolves and his everlasting restlessness 1 . He also 
remarks on the curious dualism of the Kaiser's nature; 
that reason and ambition are pushing him forward to 
daring enterprises; that sentiment and family associa- 
tions link him with the past. This is undeniable. An- 
cestor-worship the Kaiser carries almost to Chinese 
lengths. He calls his grandfather's palace in Unter den 
Linden "a sacred spot." He speaks of "the sacred 
feet" of that Emperor, and asserts that William I, if he 
had lived long ago, would have been canonized, and 
pilgrims would have come to pray to his bones 2 . 

As to the Kaiser's religion, the professor does not say- 
much ; and it is peculiarly difficult now to dilate on that 
topic without generating irrational heat. It is well, 
however, to remember that Kaiser William I was a pious 
man; but his piety was coloured by his early associa- 
tions and ingrained ideas. It was a compromise between 

1 Lamprecht, pp. 32-3. 2 Ibid. pp. 39-40. 

3—2 



36 LECTURE II 

Christianity and Prussian militarism. Outwardly, he 
professed the creed of the New Testament; but his 
guiding spirit was that of the Old Testament — the 
Prussian army was the chosen people in arms, smiting 
the Canaanites hip and thigh. In one of his last public 
utterances he said to the present Kaiser: "If ever a 
"Government was visibly directed by Providence, the 
"German Government has been during these late years." 
That is the feeling also of the grandson. His Christianity 
has somehow stopped short at the Book of Kings. 

In hazarding this statement, I am in general agreement 
with Professor Lamprecht, who asserts that the Kaiser's 
religion is of a primitive type, and has its roots in ancestor- 
worship. There is much of truth in this statement. 
Indeed, a loyal subject of the Kaiser has set on foot an 
ancestor hunt and has compiled volumes containing 
descriptions of 2096 of them. 

As we shall soon see, the Kaiser's conception of the 
future state is that of a kind of Walhalla, where his 
ancestors occupy the foreground and anxiously watch his 
exploits. Lamprecht admits that at Potsdam the Chris- 
tian Deity figures as the Lord of Hosts, whose kingdom 
must be extended as far as the bounds of the yellow 
races 1 . 

Evidently, then, religion and Weltpolitik merge into 
one another and become almost convertible terms. The 
close connection between them was clear in the year 1897, 
when the murder of two German missionaries in Kiao- 
Chao led to the immediate seizure of that important 
district. 

The importance of religion as an instrument of govern- 

1 Lamprecht, p. 42. 



THE KAISER 37 

ment has never been more frankly stated than by the 

Kaiser. The following words to recruits are an example : 

"He who is not a good Christian is not a good Prussian 

"soldier; and in no circumstances can he fulfil what is 

"required of a soldier in the Prussian army." Again: 

"Your duty is not easy: it demands of you self-control 

" and self-denial — the two highest qualities of the Christian; 

"also unlimited obedience and submission to the will 

"of your superiors." And again: "As I, Emperor and 

"ruler, devote the whole of my actions and ambitions to 

"the Fatherland, so you must devote your whole life 

"to me 1 ." He is excited by martial display and large 

assemblies; and it is confidently affirmed by Germans 

that too much importance need not be ascribed to his 

after-dinner speeches 2 . In short, his temperament is at 

times almost neurotic. The symptoms of that nature 

are perhaps due to a disease in the ears which at one time 

seemed serious. Some sixteen years ago, Dr Bucheron, a 

French specialist, wrote concerning this complaint, that 

it could be cured partially but never completely eradicated. 

In an acute form it caused excessive irritability, which 

manifested itself in outbreaks of rage, with relapses into 

gloom. Another symptom of the disease was lack 

of due affection for parents 3 . Whether this furnishes 

the explanation for the peculiar conduct of the Kaiser 

in 1888, I will not venture to say. Perhaps that unfilial 

conduct had its roots in an instinctive physical repulsion. 

Both his parents died of cancer. 

1 Larnprecht, p. 43. 

2 W. von Sciiierbrand, Germany: the Welding of a World-Powe 
(London, 1902), p. 19. 

3 M. Leudet (Eng. edit.), p. 55. Even Hinzpeter (p. 8) says he was 
accused of heartlcssness and obstinacy. 



38 LECTURE II 

Outwardly the Kaiser appears a strong and healthy 
man; and he seems to have recovered from the ear 
trouble. But there is certainly something wrong with 
him, as, for instance, his excessive liability to catch 
cold. The question arises whether his ailments, be they 
mental or physical, do not account for the peculiarities 
of his conduct. His actions, both in private and in 
public, display an almost febrile restlessness. It is an 
open secret that he often takes morphia, doubtless in 
order to procure intervals of calm for himself and his 
subjects. But the restless symptoms recur, and drive 
him forth to review garrisons, inspect ships, make speeches, 
and act as a general stimulus to the world. Professor 
Lamprecht asserts that the Kaiser becomes calmer in 
crises, and that those who know declare that he will 
show himself at his best in great emergencies 1 . That 
remains to be proved. 

A restless nature is nearly always self-assertive; 
and a self-assertive ruler is certain to be an autocrat. 
Louis XIV and Napoleon never uttered more autocratic 
dicta than the Kaiser. Witness these: "One only is 
"master within the Empire, and I will tolerate no other." 
"Those who oppose me in my work I will crush" (March 5, 
1890). "My course is the right one, and I shall continue 
"to steer it" (Feb. 1892). In 1893 to the recruits: 
"There is but one law and that is my law." Finally, 
under his portrait presented to the Ministry of Public 
Worship at Berlin he wrote the motto: "Sic volo, sic 
"jubeo." 

His son takes after him in this respect. Hence the 
opposition to parents, traditional in the House of 

1 Lamprecht, p. 72. 



THE KAISER 39 

Hohenzollern, is once again acute ; and the imperial palace 
has been the scene of open quarrels, often followed by the 
departure of the Crown Prince for the sake of health, and, 
in one instance, by his transference to a distant garrison 
town. It may, perhaps, finally transpire that the crisis 
of last July ended fatally owing to the interference of 
that hot-headed young prince. 

From the outset, the autocracy of the Kaiser was 
seen to be a danger to the peace of the world. His first 
proclamation to the army ended thus : " You are about to 
"take the oath of allegiance and obedience; and on my 
"part I solemnly vow always to be mindful of the fact 
"that the eyes of my ancestors are looking down upon 
"me from the other world, and that one day I shall have 
"to render to them an account both of the glory and 
"the honour of the Army " (June 15, 1888). 

The distrust aroused by this debut of the young war- 
lord did not vanish wholly ten days later when he assured 
the Reichstag: "I am determined to keep peace with 
"everyone so far as it lies in my power." He added that 
he would not use for aggressive purposes the army, which 
had been strengthened by the Army Bill of Feb. 6, 1888. 
Before long, the Kaiser's policy became more and more 
expansive, and his utterances more and more threatening. 
Here are some of them : " Our future lies upon the water" ; 
"I will never rest until I have raised my Navy to a 
"position similar to that occupied by my Army" ; "Ger- 
"man colonial aims can only be gained when Germany 
"has become master on the ocean." 

The imprudence of these remarks is almost Bernhardi- 
like. Or rather, we may put it thus: that both the 
Emperor and Bernhardi have carried to excess the rule 



40 LECTURE II 

of frank speech long practised with success by Bismarck 
on the mendacious diplomatic circles of Frankfurt and 
Vienna. The British people would not have paid much 
attention to these utterances but for two important 
considerations. Already, by the year 1888, Germany 
had a large colonial Empire, sufficient for her present 
needs and her administrative energies. Why, then, 
should the young Kaiser proclaim his land-hunger, still 
more, his devouring thirst ? Again, if he intended to make 
both his army and his navy supreme, such a policy 
implied the adoption of plans dangerous to France, 
Russia, and Great Britain. Would these Powers allow 
such a policy to be pushed on to its natural conclusion? 
For that conclusion was nothing less than supremacy 
over the rest of the world. Thenceforth attention was 
ri vetted on the actions of William II. Would he, as he 
often professed, aim at a peaceful ascendancy, in the 
realms of science, manufacture and commerce? Or 
would that mercantile power be only the spring-board from 
which Germany would leap to world-supremacy in the 
sphere of arms ? That has been the question of questions 
from 1890 to 1914. 

The personality of a great man is the more interesting 
because it can rarely be fathomed, or because its impulses 
result from the clash of opposites, the triumph of which 
can never be accurately gauged. On several occasions the 
Kaiser has acted as a friend of peace. That fact must 
never be forgotten. But whether it resulted from a 
fixed resolve, or from the temporary restraint of pru- 
dential motives, can at present only be conjectured. 
We do not know whether this war had its origin in his 
fixed convictions and resolves; or, on the other hand, 



THE KAISER 41 

whether his earlier peaceful tendencies were overborne 
by external pressure at Court. There is a third alter- 
native — that his own impatience at an admittedly trying 
situation led him to force a way out at a time which he 
deemed exceptionally favourable. 

These alternatives we shall consider later. Mean- 
while, we have seen that the Kaiser is a man of stimulating 
personality and tremendous energy. He has energised 
the German people to a degree never before known in 
their history. Never before have they undergone sacri- 
fices of man and treasure so appalling; and it is certain 
that they have made those sacrifices, in part, for the 
Kaiser, who to them embodies the Fatherland. 

In this power of calling forth devotion, as also in the 
riddle of his personality, he may challenge comparison 
with Napoleon I. True, he is a smaller man at nearly 
every point, except in regard to music and the arts. He 
is not so successful an organiser, so acute a legislator, so 
profound a strategist, as the Corsican. But in several 
respects he resembles him. In both men we notice a 
union of imaginative faculties and practical gifts. They 
could dream dreams of a world-wide Empire and also 
do much to prepare for their realization. To William as 
to Napoleon there came the call of the Ocean; and both 
felt the glamour of the Orient. Egypt, India, and parts 
of America exercized a fascination on them ; and alliances 
and fleets, science and engineering, were pressed into their 
service with feverish haste in order to be able to face the 
Island Power which stood in their way. The vastness 
of the resources at their command exercized a baneful 
influence upon minds which were equally despotic and 
unbending; while the neurotic strain in their natures led 



42 LECTUKE II 

them to insist on immediate and unquestioning obedience 
both in trifling matters and in questions of high policy. 
With Napoleon's sudden insistance that his architect 
should on the very next day begin the construction of 
the Carrousel Arch, of which as yet there was no plan, 
compare the following account of William's fussy pre- 
cipitation in regard to the conduct . of foreign affairs 
(1890) : 

The Emperor wants to settle every detail, orders the Secretary 
of State, who has spent half the night at his desk, to submit the 
latest telegrams and advices to him in the very early morning, and 
then directs at once how everything must be arranged. Such a 
system leaves no room for the quiet consideration which should 
precede every decision. It is another bad feature that His Majesty 
so often deals privately with envoys 1 . 

The mania for control, natural to proud and restless 
natures, told adversely both on the Corsican and the 
Hohenzollern. The wider the domain over which it 
ranges, the more imperious becomes the craving for 
command, until what began with nervous interference 
in details ends in megalomania fatal to a mighty Empire ; 
for, while the mind of the ruler revolves enterprises on 
an ever vaster scale, his pedantic interferences reduce 
counsellors to the level of clerks, thenceforth unable to 
moderate the impulses of a diffuse and unbridled ambition. 

Such a character, moreover, tends to excite and madden 
a whole people; for men are thrilled not less by great 
enterprises than by the alluring genius which appeals for 
their accomplishment. Both Napoleon I and William II 
had the power of firing all about them with their own 
feverish energy and of interpreting the half-conscious 

1 M. Harden, p. 114. 



THE KAISER 43 

desires of the multitude. Each leader professed at times 
to work for peace; yet each led his nation to the brink 
of disaster without foreseeing the dangers ahead. In 
truth, both of them possessed greater energy than fore- 
sight, greater driving power than steering power. They 
were good engineers but poor pilots. Now and again they 
were obsessed by fits of passion that aroused fear and 
distrust; so that we may apply to the Kaiser the sage 
remark of Talleyrand about Napoleon: "He has never 
"had but one dangerous conspirator against him — 
"himself 1 ." 

If we test these men by comparing their position in 
the periods of their rise and of their decline, we shall 
find suggestive analogies. By their thirtieth year they 
ruled as unquestioned masters over the greatest military 
States in the world; and their neighbours looked to see 
whether they would rest contented. As is well known, 
the Peace of Amiens was, on the part of British Ministers, 
an experiment. They wished to see whether the First 
Consul would not be satisfied with the natural frontiers 
and the development of the great France which his 
genius had called to being. Similarly, the world has been 
waiting to see whether the magnificent patrimony of the 
German Empire and its many colonies would suffice for 
William II; or whether he would challenge other States 
of wide-spreading lands, notably the British and Russian 
Empires and the vast domains of France. 

There was much to give him pause. The career of 
Napoleon, ending in ruin when he challenged both Russia 
and Great Britain at the same time, should have pre- 
scribed caution. But, just as Napoleon in 1812 hacked 

1 Mdms. de Talleyrand, n. p. 135. 



44 LECTURE II 

his way through to Moscow, though he had of late been 
studying the disastrous Russian Campaign of Charles XII 
of Sweden, so, too, it would seem, Kaiser William has 
in him that overweening pride, that perverse obstinacy, 
which brooks no advice and scorns all difficulties, even if 
he has to bridge chasms with the corpses of his devoted 
followers. He, too, has challenged Russia and Great 
Britain at one and the same time, despite the warnings 
of his grandfather never to break with Russia, despite 
the advice of Bismarck not to offend needlessly the 
Island Power. Probably the Kaiser did not see whither 
his vague and grandiose schemes were leading him; for 
he comes of a family which prospered of late not so much 
by innate genius as by the genius of its counsellors. 
But surely ordinary prudence should have warned him 
that he was courting defeat in all quarters, at Paris and 
Petrograd, at London and Tokio. 

His mistakes, or those of his Ministers, are more 
astounding than those of Napoleon. For the disaster 
of 1814 ought to have flashed a danger-signal, warning 
the Imperial watchman of 1914. But now and again 
there arise rulers on whom experience is thrown away. 
In them self-will is a disease; and their social charms 
serve but to spread broadcast the contagion of their 
warlike enthusiasm. From them and their paladins half 
a Continent catches the fatal frenzy ; and, under the plea 
of national honour or national necessity, rushes to its 
doom. 



LECTURE III 

GERMANY'S WORLD-POLICY 

"Das Schicksal Deutschlands ist, also, England." 
(Rohrbach, " Der deutsche Gedanke in der Welt." Preface.) 

The tremendous energy recently put forth by the 
German people may be ascribed to various causes. The 
Kaiser has during many years exerted upon them a 
uniquely stimulating force, which has raised to blood heat 
the political temperature of that people, the result being 
that human energies of all kinds are pressed into the 
service of the State to a degree which elsewhere is unknown. 
Consequently, the nation is a fighting organism of un- 
equalled efficiency, which, almost single-handed, has held 
at bay three Great Powers. 

This outburst of national energy is also due to the 
German Universities. During many years there has 
prevailed in those bodies an intensely patriotic feeling, 
which may be traced largely to the teachings of Treitschke. 
Saxon though he was, he, somewhat like young Korner 
before him, became an enthusiastic Prussian; and his 
lectures on History at Berlin (1874-1896) helped on the 
growth of the new German Chauvinism. He idolized 
Prussia because she embodied the ideal of power. Apart 



46 LECTURE III 

from her, Germany was backboneless. With her, Germany 

could become, nay, must become, a World Power. Strength 

was the supreme political virtue. Weakness the supreme 

political vice. In Bk I. of Die Politik he defines the 

State as — "the public power of offence and defence." 

He dismisses at once Hegel's notion of the State as the 

totality of the people. According to Treitschke, the 

State is something over and above the people: "The 

'State protects and embraces the life of the people, 

'regulating it externally in all directions.. . .It demands 

'obedience: its laws must be kept, whether willingly or 

' unwillingly. . . . The State says : ' It is quite indifferent 

' ' to me what you think about the matter, but you must 

''obey.'" And again: "The renunciation of its own 

'power is for the State in the most real sense the sin 

'against the Holy Ghost." 

Treitschke asserted emphatically that Germany ought 
to expand. The triumph of 1870 must not satisfy her. 
All great States, he says, will continue to develop by an 
inflexible law of Nature : " He is a fool who believes that 
"this process of development can ever cease." 

At whose expense must Germany expand ? Treitschke 
left it in no doubt. A new world, that of the non-European 
peoples, is coming within the scope of our activities ; and 
the European States must subdue them, directly or 
indirectly. England was first in the race for W'orld- 
Empire ; and by force or fraud she seized the best lands : 
"England, while posing as the defender of Liberalism, 
"egged on the European States against one another, 
"kept Europe in a condition of latent unrest, and mean- 
" while conquered half the world. And if she continues 
"to be successful in maintaining this condition of unrest 



GERMANY'S WORLD-POLICY 47 

"on the Continent, she will put many more countries 
"into her big pocket." 

Treitschke, it will be seen, furbishes up the romances 
of the pre-scientific chroniclers, who tried to prove that 
Louis XIV and XV, even the Great Napoleon himself, 
were the agents provocateurs of England. The insatiable 
islanders set the world in a turmoil in order to colour red 
new lands beyond the seas. Treitschke and his many 
followers, if they were logical, would affirm that Germany's 
annexation of Alsace-Lorraine was due to perfidious 
Albion, because it kept Germany and France at enmity. 
The Eastern Question would also prove to be a happy 
hunting-ground for mares' nests of the same general 
description. 

Nevertheless, his work claims careful attention. For 
he pointed the Germans towards a World-Empire. He 
also urged them to develop political strength in order to 
found that Empire on the ruins of that of Great Britain. 
Some German professors, notably Paulsen, have combatted 
his teaching, but with little success. The spirit of 
Treitschke has for some few years past dominated the 
German Universities, and through them the schools of 
that land. Therefore young Germans have grown up to 
believe that they must one day fight Great Britain. 

Further, the population question pushes Germany 
on. For the most part it is inland peoples that have 
most severely felt the pressure of a growing population. 
Islanders and coast-dwellers can expand over the seas. But 
when inland peoples outgrow their bounds, they must burst 
them. Tacitus in his Germania noted this tendency among 
the Teutons of his day, and observed that their young 
champions frequently swarmed off from the parent hive. 



48 LECTURE III 

In olden times, as today, the fertility of that people has 
been very marked. Consequently, it has become scattered, 
and political unity has been more and more difficult to 
attain. These are the dominating facts of German life. 
The population-problem often recurs ; and yet it is with 
difficulty solved because the nation has with difficulty 
acted as a whole. 

After the war of 1870 Germany attained political 
union; but, even so, she could not escape the cramping 
conditions of her life. Nay, they fettered her more and 
more, as her prosperity increased. Note the following 
figures of her population: 

1871 .. .. 41,000,000 

1890 .. .. 49,400,000 

1900 .. .. 56,400,000 

1913 .. .. 66,000,000 (?) 

Only one European people increases faster, viz. the 
Russian; and the Russians can overflow into Siberia. 
In earlier times our population-problem was serious ; but 
our people migrated to new lands across the seas, which 
could be had almost for the asking. Germany, pressed 
by the same problem, has had to put up with the less 
desirable lands. Is it surprising that she feels land- 
hunger? Endowed with a keen sense of national pride, 
she was certain to experience some such feeling ; and we, 
who have expanded partly by force of arms, partly by a 
natural overflow of population, shall be foolishly blind if 
we do not try to understand the enemy's point of view. 
The militant German of today is consciously or uncon- 
sciously harking back to the primitive times when the 
young Teutonic bloods persuaded the tribal meeting to 



GERMANY'S WORLD-POLICY 49 

let them lead forth a band of warriors to a land of plenty. 
The mythical Hengists and Horsas, with their longboats 
girt about with shields, foreshadowed Kaiser Wilhelm 
sending forth his legions, his warships, his submarines, his 
Zeppelins. The events of today are a hideous recurrence 
to the primeval state. Viewed in regard to its innermost 
causes, the present war is an attempt at a Volkswanderung ; 
and the atrocities that mark its course may perhaps be 
ascribed, in part at least, to a superabundant national 
energy, which, finding itself cramped, forces its way out on 
the line of least resistance towards the coveted maritime 
outlets, Salonica on the South East, Antwerp and Ostend 
on the North West. The longing for World-Policy 
(Weltpolitik) is merely a modern expression of an old 
Teutonic instinct. 

In this sense, our war with Germany is one of people 
against people. The fact must be faced. It has been 
asserted that the war was due to the Kaiser or to a few 
wicked persons at Berlin. That is incorrect. At least, 
it is only half the explanation. At bottom, the war is 
a determined and desperate effort of the German people 
to force its way through to more favourable political 
conditions. They refuse to see the great majority of 
their emigrants for ever lost to the Fatherland. They 
are resolved at all costs to conquer some large part or 
parts of the world where German colonists can live and 
bring up families under the black-white-and-red flag. 
They have definitely rejected the Free Trade ideal, which 
looks on the world as potentially a single economic unit. 
They have adopted with ardour the narrowly national 
ideals set forth by the Kaiser and Treitschke. They laugh 
at Free Trade theories as good only for college lecture- 
it. l. 4 



50 LECTURE III 

rooms. They also reject the notion of economic spheres 
of influence, which might possibly have satisfied them if 
they had not become obsessed by the new gospel of power. 
But they are obsessed by it ; and they intend to become 
the great World-Power. 

Early in the reign of the present Kaiser it was clear 
that German policy would take a far wider and higher 
flight. The policy of Bismarck was deemed antiquated. 
The old Chancellor had sought by a careful system of 
alliances to secure the position of Germany in Europe. 
He succeeded. He built up the Triple Alliance; and 
France and Great Britain and Russia were politically 
isolated. He had secured many colonies ; but not enough 
for the young Kaiser. The colonial movement was to be 
accelerated and form part of a system of World-Policy 1 . 
The quarrel between the Kaiser and Bismarck in 1890 
must have arisen owing to some question of more than 
personal import; for the latter at once ordered his 
secretary, Busch, to sort his papers and send them away 
for fear that the Kaiser might seize them. He also said 
that spies had been set to watch him 2 . 

The Kaiser did not plunge heedlessly into the new 
policy; for. indeed, in conduct he is generally more 
prudent than in speech. In 1890 he framed an agreement 
with Great Britain whereby Germany definitely secured 

1 The Germans are generally unfair to Bismarck, forgetting that 
most of their colonies were acquired by him. Thus, Prince von Biilow 
says {Imperial Germany, Eng. edit. pp. 9, 10) : " It is certain that 
"Bismarck did not foresee the course of this new development of 
"Germany." And again: "If the course of events demands that we 
"transcend the limits of Bismarck's aims, then we must do so." 

2 Bismarck ; Some Secret Pages, m. 309 ; M. Harden, Monarchs and 
Men, ch. m. The general explanation is that the Kaiser disliked 
Bismarck's anti- socialist measures. 



GERMANY'S WORLD-POLICY 51 

possession of the large domains now known as German 
East Africa and German South- West Africa. On the 
other hand, we acquired Nyassaland and Somaliland, 
which, in reality, ought not to have been in dispute. 
And, in order to clinch this not very satisfactory bargain, 
we surrendered to Germany the long coveted island, 
Heligoland. It is well to recall the terms in which Count 
Minister first proposed the transfer of Heligoland to 
Germany in the year 1884. He assured our Foreign 
Minister, Lord Granville, that the transfer of Heligoland 
would be deemed a most friendly act, and he skilfully 
represented it as furthering the cause of peace (see 
Lecture I.). As at that time the colonial rivalry of the 
two lands was very keen, the British Government waved 
aside the proposal. But the Kaiser in 1890 renewed his 
offers; and they were favourably received at London, 
because Lord Salisbury's Government wished to clear 
up all outstanding disputes. Now, we may admit that 
it was an extremely important matter to arrange the 
" partition^ of Africa" without a war. Considering the 
rivers of blood that have flowed for the possession, say, 
of the Spice Islands in the East Indies, and Cuba and 
Hayti in the West Indies, it was a triumph of the cause of 
peace to arrange a friendly partition of the centre and 
south of a mighty Continent. The previous decade had 
bristled with contentious questions; and it was well to 
get three-fourths of them settled in a friendly manner, 
as we endeavoured to do. 

Then, again, Heligoland was worth far more to 
Germany than it was to us ; and in such a case the amicable 
course was to barter it away in return for concessions by 
Germany. Further, the island could have been fortified 

4r— 2 



52 LECTURE III 

only at enormous cost, which an eminent authority has 
placed at £2,000,000; and it was quite certain that 
Parliament would have refused any such sum for an 
islet which was then deemed certain to disappear beneath 
the waves. 

At the same time, it must be admitted that the transfer 
was a serious blunder; for it brought within the range 
of possibility the vast maritime schemes of the Kaiser. 
Thereafter, he pushed on the Kiel Canal; and it is sig- 
nificant that the opening ceremony, on June 18, 1895, 
became what a German writer has termed " a magnificent 
demonstration in favour of peace." The Kaiser himself 
described the canal as "this new link for the blessing 
"and peace of the nations." But, as he also referred to 
the squadrons of ironclads of various Powers there present 
as "a symbol of peace," the exact nature of the mission 
to be fulfilled by the canal remained matter for doubt. 

The year 1895 witnessed a notable extension of the 
activities of Germany. She opposed strenuously the 
British proposals respecting the Congo Free State, which 
was then becoming a standing disgrace to civilization; 
and sharp friction ensued in the Press on this question. 

Far more important was the Kaiser's action in the 
Far East. Early in the year 1895 China was hopelessly 
beaten by Japan; and the victorious islanders prepared 
to retain their chief conquest, viz., the Liao-tung Penin- 
sula, with its commanding fortress, Port Arthur. Russia, 
backed up by both France and Germany, vigorously 
opposed this acquisition; and the Kolnische Zeitung in 
an evidently inspired article, declared that Japan was 
obviously bent on encircling China and cutting her off 
from commerce with the outer world. The three Powers 



GERMANY'S WORLD-POLICY 53 

on April 23 demanded that Japan should withdraw 
from Port Arthur and the whole of the Peninsula; and 
Japan, exhausted by the war, had to give up the chief 
fruits of her triumph. Ever since, she has remembered 
that Great Britain took no share in that act of coercion. 
But she has remembered the part then played by Germany ; 
and in August 1914 she tasted the sweets of an ironical 
revenge. In her ultimatum to Germany, bidding her 
hand back the Shantung Peninsula to China, she made 
use of the same haughty terms employed by Germany 
towards her in 1895. 

In the year 1897 Germany took a notable step for- 
ward in World-Policy by the seizure of Kiao-Chao. That 
act was due to the Kaiser himself. It was carried through 
against the protests of the German Chancellor, Prince 
Hohenlohe, and was therefore a breach of the German 
constitution 1 . As is well known, the murder of two 
German missionaries furnished the pretext for that high- 
handed action. However, Mr Skertchley, a mining 
prospector, has stated that he had recently published 
a metallurgical map of that peninsula which showed 
it to be rich in minerals. We may therefore conjecture 
that the motive of the Germans was subterranean rather 
than celestial. 

At that time the break up of the Chinese Empire 
seemed imminent, and England in 1898 secured Wei- 
hei-wei as a counterpart to Germany's late acquisition. 
The would-be partitioning Powers were disappointed; 
for China displayed an obstinate vitality. After the 
Boxer Rising, Great Britain did much to check all schemes 
of the Western Powers by concluding the very important 
1 W. von Schierbrand, p. 31. 



54 LECTURE III 

agreement of January 30, 1902, with Japan. Not only did 
it proclaim the entry of Japan into the circle of the Great 
Powers, but it served to check the inroads of the white 
race upon the yellow race which the Kaiser and others 
sought to justify by descanting upon " The Yellow 
Peril." Thenceforth schemes of partition of China fell 
into the background, and so did the Yellow Peril. When 
the whole truth is known, it will probably be found 
that the Anglo-Japanese alliance gave pause not only 
to Russia but also to Germany. Her World-Policy, so 
far as concerned the Far East, must have aimed at 
prizes far vaster than Kiao-Chao; but, as things have 
turned out, it began with Kiao-Chao, and it ended with 
Kiao-Chao. 

Herr Rohrbach, one of the exponents of German 
World-Policy, especially in the Levant, has observed 
that that ideal is characterized by vagueness, and that 
with difficulty it concentrates on any one aim 1 . Its 
difTuseness will be apparent in this lecture and the follow- 
ing. Indeed, this must be my excuse for making here 
an abrupt transition from China to South Brazil. The 
latter country has long attracted the attention of the 
German colonial party. Its clima^te, though sub-tropical, 
is not unhealthy; the material resources are immense; 
and during many years there has been a large influx 
of German immigrants. Their numbers have been 
variously estimated from a million to as low as 350,000. 
The German immigration does not equal the Italian. 
But the Teuton scorns both the native Portuguese 
element and the Italians, still more the half-castes. He 
is conscious of superior vigour; and he feels the power 
1 P. Rohrbach, Deutschland unter den Weltvolkern, p. 55. 



GERMANY'S WORLD-POLICY 55 

of the Fatherland behind him. The German settlements 
in Brazil are compact: their schools are supported 
from home; 10,000 German school-books have of late 
been sent out; and the teaching of Portuguese is for- 
bidden. The poverty of the Brazilian exchequer has 
long warranted the hope that the country would come 
under German control. But American opinion, grounded 
upon the Monroe Doctrine, defies Germany to interfere 
in any part of South America ; and there is in the States 
a wide-spread conviction that, if the Kaiser succeeds 
in this war, he will next attack them. 

It is difficult for a Briton to form an unbiassed judg- 
ment on the Brazilian Question; but of all Germany's 
colonial aims (and they are surprisingly wide and diffuse) 
those which centre in Southern Brazil seem the most 
reasonable. The land is enormous ; the inhabitants are 
inferior to those whom Germany sends out ; and a German 
Southern Brazil would add to the productivity of the 
world and to the welfare of mankind. But to this 
scheme the United States oppose an invincible opposi- 
tion. Probably they are right; for, with the spectacle 
of European armaments before them, they naturally 
dread the incoming of German militarism into the New 
World, the southern part of which, including Argentina, 
would in that case fall to the Teuton. 

In April, 1897, the journal, Die Grenzboten, naively 
stated — " The possession of South Africa offers greater 
" advantages in every respect than that of Brazil." The 
assertion may serve to remind us of the clash of German 
and British interests in that land from 1895 to the present 
year. There was much to recommend South Africa to 
the Germans. Possessing a splendid climate, in which 



56 LECTURE III 

the white race attains to physical perfection, holding 
the keys of the Indian and Southern Oceans, peopled, 
also, mainly by Dutch, and dowered by Nature with 
the richest stores of gold and diamonds in the world, 
South Africa was for the Pan-Germans the new Deutsch- 
land of the South, a home for myriads of Teutons, a 
source of endless wealth, the key to the Orient. The 
dealings of Germany with the South African Republic 
and the Orange Free State are, of course, not fully known. 
We therefore must fall back on the British Blue Books, 
which, however, are at points very suggestive. 

In the year 1895 the condition of South Africa was 
alarming. The discontent of the Outlanders in the 
South African Republic (Transvaal) was on the increase. 
Debarred from all political rights, though their energy 
and wealth filled the once empty Exchequer, they 
demanded the franchise and other reforms which would 
render their position bearable. As is well known, Presi- 
dent Kriiger resisted their demands. He also openly 
proclaimed his reliance on Kaiser William. At an 
official banquet given at Pretoria on the Kaiser's birth- 
day (January 27, 1895) he said, "I shall ever promote 

"the interests of Germany The time has come to 

" knit ties of the closest friendship between Germany 
" and the South African Republic — ties such as are 
" natural between father and child 1 ." 

These ties were very profitable to both parties. Ger- 
mans and Hollanders acquired the dynamite monopoly, 
the spirit monopoly, and many others, of course for 
large sums of money ; and the Berlin Government showed 

1 Fitzpatrick, The Transvaal from Within, p. 106; Reventlow, 
Deutschlands auswartige Politik, pp. 69, 70. 



GERMANY'S WORLD-POLICY 57 

its gratitude by sending to Kriiger decorations galore, 
until his quaint farmer-figure was a very Christmas- 
tree of gewgaws. In the autumn of 1895 his right-hand 
man, Dr Leyds, visited Lisbon and Berlin; and lie is 
known to have ordered quantities of arms in Germany. 
Everything seemed to portend a German Protectorate 
over the Transvaal. The Germans and Dutch supported 
Kriiger against the Reform party, which was therefore 
driven to desperation. On December 24, 1895, the 
German Consul notified to the Kaiser that the Outlanders 
and their British supporters were hatching a plot to 
overthrow the Government. On the 30th the German 
residents begged the Kaiser to protect them; and on 
that day the Consul asked .permission to order up from 
Delagoa Bay a detachment of German sailors and marines 
from the warship, Seeadler. They would have been sent 
if the crisis had not passed by very quickly, before the 
Portuguese Government gave permission for their des- 
patch through its territory 1 . When Dr Jameson's Raid 
ended in utter failure, the Kaiser promptly sent a telegram 
of congratulation to Kriiger (January 3, 1896). This act 
was unfriendly to us ; but far more unfriendly was the re- 
solve to send German sailors and marines up to Pretoria. 
In case Dr Jameson's Raid had succeeded, we should 
soon have been face to face with a German contingent 
at that capital. This, perhaps, explains the phrase in 
the Kaiser's telegram to Kriiger, congratulating him, 
" that you and your people have succeeded by your own 
energy, without appealing to the aid of friendly Powers, 
in defeating the armed forces," etc. If we look at the 
telegram in the fight of this fact, it is less provocative 

1 F. Rachfakl, Kaiser und Reich (1888-1913), Berlin, 1913, p. 144. 



58 LECTURE III 

than appears on the surface. Indeed, the Kaiser's words 
probably express a sense of relief that war would not 
ensue between Great Britain and Germany 1 . Further, 
when the British Press broke forth into unmeasured 
protests against the Kaiser's interference in matters 
which did not concern him, the German Government 
declared that they were concerned about their important 
commercial interests in the Transvaal, and that no offence 
was meant by the Emperor's telegram at the defeat 
of " a lawless armed band," organized by the Chartered 
Company. Technically, we were in the wrong; and 
Mr Chamberlain promptly disavowed the raiders. 

On the whole, it seems unlikely that the Kaiser 
then desired war, though he would have accepted war 
if his forces and ours collided at Pretoria, as would have 
happened if the Jameson Raid had succeeded. It must 
be remembered that the German fleet was not in a condi- 
tion to face the British fleet; and further, the relations 
between Paris and Berlin were somewhat strained since 
the month of November 1895, when the Radical Ministry 
of M. Bourgeois came to power. It was an energetic 
Ministry. " We demand your confidence, not to exist, 
" but to act " — such were his first words to the Chamber 
of Deputies. He also assured Great Britain that France 
had only one enemy, of course, Germany 2 . Thus, at 
the time of the Jameson Raid the policy of Berlin was 
dominated by two considerations, weakness at sea, and 
the renewed hostility of the French, who by then felt 
sure of the support of Russia. At that period, apparently, 

1 I came to this conclusion before reading the arguments of Reventlow, 
pp. 73-5. 

2 Rachfahl, p. 145. 



GERMANY'S WORLD-POLICY 59 

Germany and Austria (for Italy was of little account 
after her colonial disasters) did not feel equal to a war 
with Great Britain, France and Russia, a combination 
which was then within the bounds of probability. But, 
undoubtedly, the friction between Britons and Germans 
first became acute at the time of the Jameson Raid. Crispi 
in his Memoirs states that, previous to that event, Kaiser 
William referred jocularly to a passing tiff with England, 
" Bah ! it's a lovers' quarrel 1 ." But Count Reventlow 
significantly asserts that the crisis of 1895-6 would not 
have ended as it did if Germany had been strong at sea 2 . 
She felt her weakness ; and in the year 1897 the Kaiser took 
steps which portended a great advance. He appointed 
Count (afterwards Prince) .Biilow Secretary of Foreign 
Affairs, and Admiral von Tirpitz, a man of great energy, 
Secretary of the Admiralty. Both men were actuated 
by anti-British feelings, though Billow naively confesses 
that it was needful to conceal them until the new fleet 
was ready. In 1898, then, came the first German Navy 
Law providing for a great increase in warships of all 
classes ; but, to his annoyance, the new fleet was not 
ready by the time of the Boer War 3 . 

Before that struggle curious events happened at Jo- 
hannesburg, notably the so-called British plot of May, 1899. 
It was probably trumped up by the Kriiger Government. 
Three of the alleged conspirators were agents provocateurs 
of that administration. A man named Bundy, one of 
the more reputable of the persons arrested, was privately 

1 Crispi, Mems. ni. p. 328 (Eng. edit.), ''Bah! was sich liebt. neckt 
sich." 

2 Reventlow, p. 96. 

8 Bulow, Imperial Germany, pp. 19-31 (Eng. edit.). 



60 LECTURE III 

told, after the first examination, that his evidence was 
very unsatisfactory because it did not implicate the 
Reformers ; and Kriiger's son, chief of the Secret Service, 
said to him in private, "Do all you can to prove this 
"to be a case of conspiracy on the part of the British 

" Government, as it will strengthen my father's hand 

" I will give you £200, and you shall get a good billet 
" in the Secret Service." The Transvaal Government 
thereupon telegraphed both to Paris and Berlin its 
version of the trial. 

Now, all this happened just before the Bloemfontein 
Conference, from which the British Government expected 
a peaceful and satisfactory settlement of the Transvaal 
Question. It is clear, then, that Kriiger placed great 
hopes in Germany; and he was bitterly disappointed 
during the war, when that Government did not accord 
the armed support for which its people clamoured. He 
proceeded to Germany, in the hope, doubtless, of forcing 
the Kaiser's hand; but the Kaiser, alleging a previous 
hunting engagement, declined to receive him. Rarely 
has the German Press been so outspoken against their 
sovereign; and its protests were renewed when, after 
the war, Generals Botha, Delarey and De Wet also met 
with no official countenance. The Pan-Germans lauded 
the Generals to the skies ; and their Press dubbed Botha 
the organizer of victory ; Delarey the actual victor ; and 
De Wet the Bliicher of South Africa. The attitude of 
the official world at Berlin was, however, quite correct; 
and the moral of the situation was pointed by a leader 
of the German National Liberals. He asked what was 
the use of all this fuss? Why did not Germans leave 
Great Britain alone until their navy was stronger ? Also 



GERMANY'S WORLD-POLICY 61 

the Kolnische Zeitung, an official organ, even went so 
far as naively to ask — -Why had the Boer Generals come 
to Germany, of all countries, in order to stir up trouble? 
The events of October, 1914, supply the answer. 

The Boer War roused to fury the anti-British feeling 
already strong in Germany; or, as Professor Mommsen 
mildly phrased it, " The war accentuated the antagonism, 
" but did not produce it." Very noteworthy, too, was 
the influence of the struggle on the agitation for a larger 
Navy. The sense of irritation at the inability of Germany 
to cope with the British fleet was skilfully exploited both 
by the Kaiser and by the German Navy League. In 
1900, during that conflict, the naval programme of 1898 / 
was accelerated. Many branches of the Navy League 
were founded; and every new foundation, every launch 
of a battleship, evoked a stirring speech from the Kaiser. 
These orations were not, as a rule, threatening to Great 
Britain; but now and again came a sentence, such as 
" The trident must pass into our hands." The meaning 
was clear enough. Kaiser William was bent on forcing 
into a practical channel the foaming flood of Anglo- 
phobia; and in this he showed statesmanship of a high 
order. Had he been merely the garrulous and impression- 
able creature of our comic papers, he would have let 
the Germans froth and foam. Instead of that, he built 
a larger navy. 

These events did not escape the keen eyes of His 
late Majesty, Edward VII. He knew full well the perils 
of those years. He must have discerned the danger 
ahead if the Boer War were prolonged. The Pan-Germans 
strove might and main to lengthen out that war. The 
Deutsche Zeitung went so far as to say, " Every work 



62 LECTURE III 

" of civilization [in South Africa] built with English 
" money must be destroyed. The land must be devastated 
" in such a way that only the Boer farmer can live in it.' : 
The aim of all that devastation was, so far as we can 
judge, to prolong the Boer War until the year 1904 
when the new German navy would be ready. But that 
unhappy struggle ended in 1902, partly owing to the 
success of the British arms, partly owing to the generous 
terms offered by the victors. The policy of conciliation 
had the approval of King Edward; conciliation towards 
the Boers helped both to end that war and thereafter to 
weld South Africa into an almost united whole. 

Further, we probably owe to him the friendly under- 
standings with other Powers which ended the period 
of what was pompously termed " splendid isolation." 
The danger of that makeshift policy having been suffi- 
ciently obvious during the Boer War, it was desirable 
to come to an understanding with some Power or Powers. 

With whom should it be? With Germany? That 
was a possibility. On dynastic and racial grounds there 
was much to recommend an Anglo-German alliance. Or 
should it be with our old enemy, France ? King Edward 
clearly believed that an Anglo-French Entente was more 
feasible. Whatever the motives that prompted the 
choice, King Edward advocated a rapprochement towards 
France; and, as is well known, he did very much to 
further it. The reasons for not making the experiment 
at Berlin doubtless were that the Kaiser displayed 
increasing eagerness in regard to World-Policy; and 
parliamentary considerations led him throughout the 
years 1895-1904 to rely more and more upon the agrarian 
party, the party of the Junkers, which was furiously 



GERMANY'S WORLD-POLICY 63 

anti-British. The questions directly at issue between the 
two countries were less serious than those which divided 
England from France; but the trend of German politics 
rendered it more difficult to come to an understanding 
with our Teutonic kinsmen than with our affable and 
democratic neighbours across the Channel. Efforts were 
made both in the British a ad German Press to cultivate 
friendlier relations; but they failed, and largely owing 
to the growth in Germany of the Pan- German movement. 
To this we must now advert. 

The Pan-Germans aim at some form of union of all 
peoples speaking German or certain of its dialects. It 
is not a new notion. Generations of students had 
enthusiastically intoned the famous line at the end of 
Arndt's national song of 1813, 

Das ganze Deutschland soil es sein. 
And for a brief space in 1848-9 it seemed that a greater 
Germany might come to being. The miscarriage of 
democratic Imperialism in that land is one of the greatest 
misfortunes of the Nineteenth Century ; for the federation 
then contemplated would have harmonized the claims 
of national unity with those of the sovereignty of the 
people. Further, the German race, when fitly organized, 
could then have shared in the new lands beyond the 
seas which were then easily obtainable. In that case 
the British Empire might not have been quite so large; 
but probably we should not have had this war, which, 
on its colonial side, is the deliberate attempt of the 
Kaiser and his people to seize lands appropriated by 
earlier competitors in the race for Empire. As Bern- 
hardi says : " All which other nations attained in cen- 
" turies of natural development — political union, colonial 



64 LECTURE III 

" possessions, naval power, international trade — was de- 
" nied to our nation until quite recently 1 ." 

The grievance was a real one; and therein lay the 
strength of the Pan- German movement. The clubs which 
adopted the colours of the old Empire — black, red, 
gold — sought to band together all their kindred in some 
kind of organism. The first sentence of the manifesto 
is as follows : " The Pan-German Federation has for 
object the revival of German national sentiment all 
over the earth: the preservation of German thought, 
ideals and customs in Europe and across the ocean, 
and the welding into a compact whole of Germaus 
everywhere." Obviously, the crux of the whole question 
lies in the last clause; for nobody could possibly object 
to the preservation of German thought and ideals. But 
what is meant by " the welding into a compact whole 
" of the Germans everywhere " ? It must mean the 
inclusion in a Greater Germany of the 12,000,000 Germans 
in the Austrian Empire, and the million or so of Germans 
in the Baltic Provinces of Russia. But does it include 
the Dutch, the Flemings, and the Scandinavian peoples? 
Many enthusiastic Teutons assert that all those peoples 
are branches of the great stock. Thus, the geographical 
manual of Herr Daniel declares that the natural limits 
of Germany are the River Narova, in Esthonia, on the 
North-East, the Baltic on the North, the North Sea on 
the North- West, on the West the hills separating the 
Rhine and Seine basins, and on the South and South-East 
the Bernese Alps and the Carpathians. Up to the month 
of August, 1914, there were a few prominent citizens 
of Antwerp who desired to see the fulfilment of the Pan- 

1 Bernhardi, The Next War, ch. 4. 



GERMANY'S WORLD-POLICY 65 

German scheme of making that city the chief Teutonic 
port. 

The Pan-German movement suffers from the defect 
which has always clogged the German polity, namely, in- 
definiteness. No definition of Pan-Germanism has appeared 
which brought it within the region of practical politics, 
except as the result of a terrific war. For the German 
people is not a compact entity. It spreads, octopus-like, 
from the Alpine, Tyrolese, and Styrian valleys to the 
mouth of the River Ems, and from the banks of the middle 
Moselle to the Gulf of Finland. Therefore, the welding 
of these outlying portions into the main body implies 
the break-up of the Austrian Empire, the annexation o{ 
Luxemburg and nearly half of Switzerland, as well as 
the acquisition of the best part of Russia's all too scanty 
seaboard. With the exception, perhaps, of the Swiss 
part of the menu, which might come as dessert after 
the main repast, all these questions are, or may be, at 
stake in the present war. An All-German Empire would 
involve as terrible a political upheaval as the formation 
of a Pan-Slav Empire to which it is a Teutonic retort. 

But there is even more than this behind the Pan- 
German Movement. For practical purposes it has adopted 
the programme of Weltpolitik. This again suffered 
from the defect of haziness. So far as I know, the 
Kaiser, who coined the phrase, has never defined it. 
He took refuge in vague statements like this (July 3, 
1900), " The wave-beat knocks powerfully at our gates 
: ' and calls us as a great nation to maintain our place 
" in our world — in other words, to pursue world-policy. 
" The ocean is indispensable for Germany's greatness ; 
" but the ocean also reminds us that neither on it nor 

R. L. 5 



66 LECTURE III 

" across it in the distance can any great decision be again 
" arrived at without Germany and the German Emperor." 

He uttered these words during the Boer War. They 
are open to two explanations. Either the Kaiser may 
not have meant as much as he said ; that is, in Disraeli's 
historic phrase, " he was carried away by the exuberance 
" of his own verbosity." Or else he meant that Germany 
was going to interfere in every great occurrence all over 
the world. And those who noted the Kaiser's skill 
as a speaker and his feverish activities were bound to 
take this explanation. Of the same order were these 
utterances : " The trident must pass into our hands " ; 
and " Our future lies upon the water." They can be 
interpreted only as a definite and defiant challenge to 
Great Britain; and in earlier and more heedless times 
they would have led straight to war. Fortunately, the 
Islanders did not lose their temper, but merely redoubled 
their precautions. So did Russia; so did France; so 
did the United States ; so did Japan. A single pronounce- 
ment of that kind might be discounted as due to a desire 
to expedite a New Navy Bill. But those dicta, when 
repeated, could not be thus explained. From Washington 
to Paris ; from London to Tokio the question arose, "Where 
" will the mailed fist fall next? " 

During several years the Pan- German movement 
aroused much ridicule; and Britons especially refused 
to take it seriously. We were wrong. These notions, 
which seem to us fantastic and unstatesmanlike, made 
a deep impression in Germany and German Austria. 
They touched the romantic strain, which is strong in the 
Teuton, and also appealed to his sense of national pride, 
which had been enormously inflated by the uninterrupted 



GERMANY'S WORLD-POLICY 67 

triumphs of the years 1864-1871. The Pan-German 
ideal supplied the young nation with two requisites 
for action — a theory attractive to superficial thinkers 
and a fighting creed for the masses. It became the 
dominant ideal of the German race; and those who 
held to the cautious nationalism of Bismarck were deemed 
fossilized survivals of an age which would soon be eclipsed 
by triumphs greater than Sedan. 

We must therefore dismiss from our minds the thought 
that we are at war merely with a Government which 
has blinded its subjects. That is inconsistent with the 
facts of the situation. It is also not a struggle with a 
dominant military caste, which may be overthrown after 
a few defeats. We are at war with a practically united 
nation. The energy with which wave after wave of 
old men and boys of the German reserve or Landsturm 
swept on to almost certain overthrow near Ypres ought 
to open our eyes to the fact that we are facing a nation 
in arms, a nation which is resolved at all costs to conquer. 
For the prize of triumph is a World-Empire; whereas 
defeat will imply that their population-problem will 
be solved by the most horrible of all methods, depopula- 
tion. 



5—2 



LECTURE IV 

MOROCCO: THE BAGDAD RAILWAY 

In the previous lecture it was apparent that many 
strands went to make up the imposing cable of Germany's 
World-Policy. We then glanced at two of them — South 
Africa and Brazil. But two others are equally important 
— Morocco and the Bagdad Railway. 

The European Powers have often endeavoured to 
secure a footing in Morocco. Great Britain and Spain 
were first in the field; and up to the year 1890 their 
interests in Morocco were supreme. But after that time 
France manifested designs of far-reaching scope. They 
comprised all the land from Cape Bon to the Straits of 
Gibraltar; from Tangier to the Gulf of Guinea. North- 
West Africa was to form a solid block of French territory, 
broken only by a few British enclaves at the Gambia and 
the Lower Niger. With the conclusion of the Franco- 
Russian alliance in 1894 and the end of the Algerian 
rising in 1900, these vast plans gained in consistency; 
and with the twentieth century Morocco became one of 
the danger-points of the political horizon. At first the 
chief friction was between Great Britain, France, and 
Spain. Their interests outweighed those of Germany; 
and at that time France looked upon us as her worst 



MOROCCO: THE BAGDAD RAILWAY 69 

competitor in commerce, while Spain clung jealously to 
the long cherished hope of conquest of the Moors. Her 
interests centred in Tangier and Tetuan ; those of France 
in the North-East and East and centre; for, obviously, 
she could not allow anarchy to prevail among the Moors 
of the East, lest Algeria should once more revolt. The 
interests of Great Britain were, in the main, commercial ; 
but we could not see unmoved the acquisition of the 
coast facing Gibraltar by a great maritime Power; and 
the critical points were Tangier, Ceuta, and possible 
coaling-stations on the Atlantic coast. For Germany 
the most desirable points were good harbours on the 
south part of the Atlantic coast of Morocco. The best 
were Mogador and Agadir, ^though the latter is a very 
indifferent port, which never could shelter large cruisers. 
The aims of the four Powers were not hopelessly 
opposed; but the tension between them became keen 
early in the twentieth century. During the South 
African War France pushed ahead fast in Morocco, the 
propelling force at Paris being a very masterful personality. 
Delcasse represented the ardent national spirit of young 
France, the France which rejoiced in the Russian alliance 
and believed itself strong enough to carry the tricolour 
into new lands. True, the Fashoda experiment had 
failed, owing to the lack of the expected support from 
Russia. Throughout the year 1898 and during the 
Boer War the French Press was extremely bitter against 
us; but Delcasse remained unmoved by the storm of 
words. He, the political heir of Gambetta, saw in 
England a potential ally, in Germany the only enemy 1 . 

1 R. Pinon, France et Allemagne, pp. 97-110; Reventlow, Deuischlands 
auswartige Polilih, pp. 126-8. 



70 LECTURE IV 

Foiled in the hope of pushing a belt of French influence 
across the Soudan and even to the Red Sea, France 
turned to Morocco. Her opportunity came during the 
South African War ; and in December 1900 she "squared" 
Italy by agreeing that the Government of Rome should 
have a free hand in Tripoli if that of Paris worked its will 
in Morocco. This compact explains why Italy lent but 
a feeble support to her ally, Germany, in the Moroccan 
dispute. 

Delcasse next approached the Court of Madrid. In 
the years 1901-2 he sought to frame a secret bargain 
whereby Spain should acquire North and North Central 
Morocco and France the remainder. But Great Britain, 
hearing of this clandestine "deal," managed to arouse 
Spanish sentiment against an affair none too flattering 
to the national pride. The Ministry resigned and its 
successors broke off the affair. Delcasse then turned to 
Great Britain, a Power which evidently must be satisfied 
before the tricolour could wave at Fez. Now, there 
were many topics in dispute between us and France. 
We had not settled the West African boundary disputes, 
or those relating to the Newfoundland fisheries, or to 
Madagascar and the New Hebrides. Above all, France 
had never forgiven us for occupying Egypt in 1882, though 
she herself had then refused to share in the dangers and 
burdens of the Egyptian enterprise. To settle all these 
outstanding disputes seemed impossible. Yet, owing to 
the tact of Edward VII, and the skill of Lord Lansdowne 
and Delcasse, it was accomplished in April, 1904, by a 
series of agreements which paved the way towards an 
Anglo-French Entente. The chief points which concern 
us here are these. France recognised our position in 



MOROCCO: THE BAGDAD RAILWAY 71 

Egypt, while we admitted that France had predominant 
claims and interests in Morocco, especially in assuring 
order. France declared that she would not alter the 
political status of that land; and we gave a similar 
promise about Egypt. But the first secret article attached 
to the Convention specified that both France and Great 
Britain might find themselves "constrained by force of 
"circumstances to modify this policy in respect to Egypt 
"or Morocco." By this questionable device both Govern- 
ments left themselves a loophole for escaping from the 
public promise. In the third secret article the Spanish 
sphere of influence was roughly defined as the Medi- 
terranean area of Morocco 1 . The Franco-Spanish agree- 
ment, foreshadowed by this secret article, came about in 
October, 1904, when Spain gained a reversionary claim to 
that area. 

The outstanding fact in the Anglo-French Entente is 
that the Powers earnestly desired to end their differences. 
Where there was the will, a way was found. To Delcasse 
belongs the credit of terminating the feuds between the 
two lands arising out of the Fashoda affair and the Boer 
War ; and to the Deputies, e.g. Deschanel, who reproached 
him with abandoning historic claims in Egypt, he retorted 
that the British occupation of the Nile valley was an 
accomplished fact, and that France would find Morocco 
of a hundred times greater value than Egypt, especially 
because the Moors would prove to be excellent troops for 
colonial service. We may note in passing that there had 
previously been proposals of an Anglo German-Japanese 

1 E. D. Morel, Morocco in Diplomacy, ch. x; Tardieu, Questions 
diplomatiques de 1904, p. 313; R. Pinon, France et Allemagne (1870- 
1913), (Appendix), for documents. 



72 LECTURE IV 

entente, but it fell through, chiefly because Germany 
refused to take a course of action which might in the 
future tie her hands with regard to naval programmes 
and WeltpolitiJc 1 . She further preferred to approach 
Russia probably with a view to joint aggressive action 
in the Far East. The results of her encouragement to 
the Court of Petrograd will soon appear. 

Meanwhile France, Great Britain, and Spain were 
gaining over Morocco the control of the purse. The 
Sultan of Morocco was extravagant and careless, therefore 
always in debt. The state of Moroccan finances was 
reflected in the prayer which is always affixed to any 
official reference to that Exchequer — "May God fill it." 
With oriental exuberance, the same prayer is added at 
any mention of the name of the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer: "May God keep him full 2 ." The half only of 
the prayer was answered; for the Chancellor was always 
full, but his Exchequer was always empty. 

France, Great Britain, and Spain undertook to play the 
part of a maleficent Providence. As might be expected, 
these dealings of France, Great Britain, and Spain with 
Morocco caused annoyance at Berlin. At first, it is true, 
that Government showed surprising calm respecting the 
Anglo-French agreement, and Count Biilow declared 
in the Reichstag on April 12, 1904, that, on the whole, 
Germany welcomed a good understanding between those 
two Powers as consolidating the peace of the world; 
that the chief question was as to Morocco, and German 
interests in that land were solely economic. This was 
reassuring enough; and the Franco-Spanish agreement 

1 Reventlow, pp. 229-235. 

2 Tardieu, Questions diplomatiques de 1904, p. 58. 



MOROCCO: THE BAGDAD RAILWAY 73 

also aroused no protest, probably because its secret 
articles were not then known 1 . But in the spring of the 
year 1905 there came a change which is highly significant; 
for it shows how completely German policy depended on 
outward circumstances. In a word it was Realpolitik. 

A change in the Balance of Power had come about 
owing to two chief events. Germany had completed her 
naval programme, planned in 1898 and increased during 
the Boer War. And Russia, early in March, had sustained 
that terrible defeat at Mukden at the hands of the 
Japanese. For the present, then, Russia, and therefore 
the Franco-Russian Alliance, could be neglected. Ger- 
many at once saw her chance. On March 12 it was 
officially announced that Kaiser William, in the course of 
a Mediterranean cruise, would visit Tangiers, and the 
announcement was made in an emphatic manner. When 
Herr Bebel, the Socialist leader, twitted the Chancellor 
with the hard and almost threatening tone of his references 
to Morocco, he replied: "I must remind him that the 
"language and attitude of diplomatists and politicians is 
"regulated according to circumstances. The moment 
"that I judge favourable for the setting forth of German 
"interests, I choose it according to my own opinion." 
Two days later (March 31) the Kaiser suddenly landed 
at Tangiers, and declared that he visited the Sultan of 
Morocco as an independent sovereign, in whose lands all 
Powers were to hold the same footing and enjoy the same 
commercial rights 2 . This was to ignore the French 
claim to exercise a certain measure of administrative 
control in Morocco, especially in the parts bordering 

1 Tardieu, La France et les Alliances, p. 205 ; Reventlow, pp. 228-233. 

2 Tardieu, La France et les Alliances, pp. 207-9. 



74 LECTURE IV 

Algeria — a claim which Great Britain and Spain had 
recognised and approved. 

Now, Germany had certainly grounds for annoyance 1 . 
But the question arises — Why did she veil that annoyance 
and take no action until March 1905? The answer is 
clear. Her action was based on the fact that Russia, 
and therefore France, were now weak. While the Franco- 
Russian Alliance retained its original strength, Germany 
said not a word about Morocco. She bided her time; 
and, so soon as the opportunity came, she shot her bolt. 
The German historian Rachfahl admits this. He says: 
"Because under the surface of the Morocco affair lurked 
" the deepest and most difficult problems of power (Macht- 
" probleme), it was to be foreseen that its course would 
"prove to be a trial of strength of the first order 2 ." 

That is quite true. The importance of the Morocco 
question does not lie in the details. It is easy to wander 
about among them and miss the significance of the whole 
affair. German writers and newspaper editors at once 
declared it to be a trial of strength between Germany and 
Austria on the one side, and Great Britain and France 
on the other. Italy and Russia stood outside the ring. 
The question therefore was whether the Anglo-French 
Entente would prove to be solid; or would go to pieces 
at the first shock. Germany intended to show that she 
was not going to be pushed out of world-politics, or, in 
the words of the Kaiser (July 3, 1900): "The ocean 
" reminds us that neither on it nor across it in the distance 
"can any great decision be again arrived at without 
"Germany and the German Emperor." 

1 E. D. Morel, Morocco in Diplomacy, chs. xi-xm. 

2 F. Rachfahl, Kaiser und Reich (Berlin, 1913), p. 233. 



MOROCCO: THE BAGDAD RAILWAY 75 

Germany was not about to be pushed out from Morocco. 
Her interests there were purely commercial, as her 
Chancellor admitted ; and those interests were guaranteed. 
Moreover, at that time her trade with Morocco (though 
fast increasing) could not compare in volume with that 
of Great Britain or France. If, therefore, she chose to 
consider Morocco as of vital importance to her, it must 
have been for wider reasons, which were not far to seek. 
Firstly, the statesmen of Berlin hoped to shatter the 
Anglo-French compact at the very point which had 
clinched it, viz. Morocco. But, secondly, the German 
navy badly needed coaling-stations. Between the North 
Sea and Togoland and the Cameroons was a very long 
space which she wished to halve by some intermediate 
station. In Morocco — say at Mogador or Agadir — such a 
station could be found. And if France, England, and 
Spain really intended to partition Morocco, Germany had 
some right to expect compensation in one of those towns. 
That was seen from the outset. Therefore, not only was 
the Morocco Question a Machtfrage for the purpose of 
testing the Anglo-French Entente, but also of procuring 
a much needed coaling-station. Here one must admit 
the fatality of Germany. Coming last into the field of 
World-Policy, she could not acquire a coaling-station 
without alarming everybody. France, Great Britain, 
Spain, and above all the United States were annoyed; 
for Mogador or Agadir, would be half way to South 
Brazil; and South Brazil is under the shield of the 
Monroe Doctrine. 

The intervention of the Kaiser in Morocco lost nothing 
by the language of his ambassadors. It was well known 
at Paris, and therefore at Berlin, that France was not 



76 LECTURE IV 

ready for war; that alone, without the help of Russia, 
she was sure to succumb. M. Rouvier, President of the 
Council of Ministers, admitted as much in the Chamber 
of Deputies during the humiliating debate of April 19, 1905, 
which may be termed the analogue of the debate of mid- 
July before the present crisis. A special envoy of the 
German Government, Prince Henckel von Donnersmarck, 
came to Paris and spoke as a Jupiter tonans. He said 
that it was now clear that the Anglo-French Entente had 
been framed for the isolation and humiliation of Germany. 
Was the recent Moroccan policy that of France or of her 
Foreign Minister ? The policy of that Minister was aimed 
at the Germans, who would not wait until it was com- 
pleted. It was also the policy of England to destroy the 
fleet of every rival, or better still, to prevent its con- 
struction. But could the British fleet help France? 
That fleet might bombard German towns and destroy 
German commerce. None the less, the milliards which 
Germany would wring from France would rebuild both 
towns and merchantmen. Let France think better of it. 
Give up the Minister who had made the trouble, and adopt 
towards Germany a loyal and open policy, such as would 
guarantee the peace of the world 1 . 

This remarkable pronouncement disclosed the real 
motives of the Court of Berlin. They were intended, not 
so much to promote the attainment of German aims in 
Morocco, as to give a brutal demonstration of the worth- 
lessness of the Anglo-French Entente when contrasted 
with the might of Germany. The purpose was to 
separate Great Britain and France, not to secure com- 
mercial concessions. 

1 Substance of a conversation printed by le Gaulois (June, 1905). 



MOROCCO: THE BAGDAD RAILWAY 77 

The upshot was that France decided to sacrifice 
Delcasse. There is no doubt that he had pushed ahead 
too far and too fast. His resignation, which took place on 
June 12, 1905, was desirable; but that it should take place 
at the imperious dictation of Germany was a Pyrrhic 
triumph for the victor. It enraged everyone. France 
ground her teeth and thought more than ever of revenge. 
Great Britain, no less than France, felt the blow dealt at 
Paris; and Russia knew full well that Muscovite defeats 
in Manchuria accounted for the whole affair. For the 
time the Realpolitih of Berlin succeeded, but only at the 
cost of exasperating three Great Powers; and such a 
success is really defeat. All three Powers began to take 
precautions for the future ; and Europe became more than 
ever an armed camp. France had been alarmed by 
Germany's threats; and in the latter part of 1905 voted 
the sum of £60,000,000 to make good the defects in her 
army organisation, including more than a million for 
strategic railways 1 . The retort of Germany was sharp 
and highly significant. In 1906 she commenced, among 
other things, the construction of a system of strategic 
railways from the Rhine, about Cologne, towards the 
Belgian frontier. Those railways, running through a 
rather sparsely inhabited country, aroused suspicion at 
the time. Only in this year has their terrible motive 
been fully revealed. 

That Germany's chief aim throughout was to separate 
France from Great Britain and from Russia appeared 
clearly enough during the Algesiras Conference (Jan. — 
March 1906). But she failed. Her efforts were marked 
by too much of Teutonic vigour, so much so that on one 

1 Tardieu, op. cit. p. 229. 



78 LECTURE IV 

occasion (March 17, 1906) they alienated the sympathy 
even of Mr Roosevelt. Though plied by the Kaiser 
with three personal telegrams, the President of the United 
States replied that he found the German propositions 
unacceptable. They were so to all the Powers, and 
finally, on March 26, Germany had to give way and 
accept the compromise proposed by the French pleni- 
potentiaries. The policy of Berlin had in turn gone 
counter to that of Italy, Russia, the United States, and 
even of Austria. This diplomatic defeat clearly resulted 
from excess of confidence or excess of zeal. Oscar Wilde 
once said that nothing succeeds like excess. That may 
be true in up-to-date literature; doubtless, it is true 
for the modern theatre ; but it is not true in the diplomatic 
sphere. There the advice of Talleyrand to a beginner 
is always applicable : " Et surtout pas trop de zele." 

The most important result of the Algesiras Conference 
remains to be noticed — the Anglo-Russian Entente. 
That understanding between the former deadly rivals 
would have appeared either miraculous or monstrous to 
men of the* time of Beaconsfield. But it is now fairly 
clear that Russia took seriously to heart the lessons of 
the Japanese War and saw the folly of that aggressive 
policy which had earned the distrust of all her neighbours. 
For the time she was amenable to reason, and Germany 
was not. That was the outstanding lesson of the Con- 
ference of Algesiras. British and Russian diplomatists 
there discovered ground for common action. Therefore 
that happened which always will happen when a Great 
Power tries to give the law to the others. They drew 
nearer together for mutual support. This has ever been 
the outcome of Weltpolitik — that of Philip II of Spain, of 



MOROCCO: THE BAGDAD RAILWAY 79 

Louis XIV, of Napoleon, of Wilhelm II. The last-named 
has succeeded, firstly, in making the British lion lie down 
by the side of the Russian bear, and, secondly, in rousing 
them to joint action. It is his chief diplomatic achieve- 
ment. 

Some years earlier, viz. in 1900-1, a British writer, 
evidently a diplomat, had maintained in the pages of 
the Fortnightly Review that we ought to come to terms 
with Russia. But at that time it seemed a mere dream. 
Then came the Dogger Bank incident, when we were on 
the brink of war with Russia. But Morocco and Algesiras 
ended all that. After the close of the Japanese War, the 
Tsar let it be known that he desired friendly relations 
with Great Britain ; and he received Sir Charles Hardinge 
in a markedly cordial manner at St Petersburg 1 . Algesiras 
having furthered the entente, Sir Edward Grey admitted 
on May 24, 1906, that, though there was no definite 
accord between Great Britain and Russia, yet they were 
more and more inclined to discuss amicably all the 
questions at issue between them. In March, 1907, a 
Russian Squadron received a hearty welcome at our 
naval ports; and in the month of August following the 
two Powers came to an agreement respecting Persia, 
Afghanistan, and Thibet 2 . It is impossible here to enter 
into details, save that Central Asian questions have 
since that time ceased to trouble us as they did in former 
periods. For a time tranquillity in Central Asia seemed 
to be dearly bought at the cost of our concurrence in 
Russia's Persian policy; but that is now seen to be a 
side issue compared with the graver questions at stake 
in Europe. 

1 The Times, October 23, 1905. 2 Tardieu, 282-6. 



80 LECTURE IV 

In 1909 there appeared for a time a prospect of better 
relations with Germany; and the improvement was 
almost certainly due to the personal intervention of 
H.M. Edward VII. During a State visit to Berlin he 
discussed important matters, thus probably helping on 
the Franco- German agreement on the Moroccan Question 
which was signed at Berlin on Feb. 9, 1909 1 . France 
thereby recognised the integrity of Morocco; while 
Germany admitted that France should maintain order 
in the interior. The agreement obviously was vague; 
and it soon fell through owing to the outbreak of dis- 
turbances in that land. 

Accordingly, in the early summer of 1911, France 
sent an expedition to Fez, whereupon Spain occupied 
points on the West coast, allotted to her by the secret 
Franco-Spanish treaty of 1904. Germany, seeing her 
commercial interests threatened, made protests; and 
when nothing came of them, sent the corvette Panther to 
Agadir (July 1911) in order "to help and protect German 
"subjects and clients in those regions." Much could be 
said in favour of some such step, for as matters then stood, 
German interests were certain to suffer unless she made 
a stand against French and Spanish expansion in Morocco. 
But the Pan-Germans aggravated the crisis by demanding 
the annexation of all S.W. Morocco ; and no less a person 
than the Secretary of State, Kiderlen-Wachter, declared 
privately that the German flag would never be hauled 
down at Agadir, and that he would not hear of any 
exchange of it for French Congo districts 2 . 

1 Rachfahl, p. 310; Reventlow, p. 309; Pinon, 185. 

2 See article in the Fortnightly Review, xci (new series, 462) founded, 
in part, on revelations made on oath by Herr Class, President of the 



MOROCCO: THE BAGDAD RAILWAY 81 

British Ministers protested against the action of 
Germany; and it was made clear that her occupation of 
Agadir and its coast was an unfriendly act, respecting 
which Great Britain must be consulted. The silence of 
Germany respecting this declaration led to a shrill remon- 
strance from Mr Lloyd George; and the whole affair 
trended dangerously near to war. The secrets of that 
time have not been disclosed; and we cannot expect to 
fathom the motives of the Kaiser with any approach to 
certainty; but it is generally believed that he desired 
to avert war. The anonymous author of that curious 
book, "The Secrets of the German War Office," asserts 
that the German war party intended by the despatch of 
the Panther to provoke a quarrel with Great Britain or 
France; also that peace was maintained only by the 
personal interposition of the Kaiser, who sent him, a 
secret agent of the Government, with the utmost haste 
and secrecy to Agadir. His mission was to warn the 
captain of the Panther that in no circumstances was he 
to begin hostilities with the French and British vessels 
in that port. The statement is made without proof and 
is on several grounds suspicious. Nevertheless, if not 
true to fact, it is true to character. The Kaiser appears 
to have desired peace. 

It is, however, doubtful whether his pacific leanings 
were due to a persistent conviction, or whether he desired 
to defer a rupture until a more favourable juncture. Was 



Pan-German League. Reventlow (p. 354) asserts that Kiderlen- 
Wachter always looked to an exchange between S.W. Morocco and 
districts on the French Congo, such as finally was arranged. But this 
seems a lame excuse for the final compromise, which the Pan-Germans 
detested. 

R. L. 



82 LECTURE IV 

he waiting for a time when the Kiel Canal would be 
widened so as to admit the German Dreadnoughts then in 
course of construction? And was he dismayed at the 
prospect of the huge financial crash which bankers and 
merchants confidently prophesied as the immediate 
result of war? On both grounds it was highly desirable 
to avert hostilities. Then, too, in the Bosnian Crisis of 
1908-9 (see Lecture VI) he had inflicted a rebuff on the 
Powers of the Triple Entente; and after strengthening 
his control over the Turkish Empire, he might hope 
before long to find in the re-organised Turkish army an 
effective ally against Russia in Caucasia, and England in 
Egypt. 

For these reasons — naval, diplomatic, and financial — 
it is highly probable that the Kaiser's resolve not to 
provoke a rupture in 1911 was based on prudential con- 
siderations. As events have actually shown, the Triple 
Entente was stronger in 1914 that in 1911. But that 
could not have been foreseen. According to all appear- 
ances in 1911, the Kaiser might well deem that the Triple 
Alliance would be stronger, and the Triple Entente 
weaker, in the near future; and this result would have 
come about but for that unexpected event in the autumn 
of 1911 — Italy's attack upon Turkey, which will be 
considered in due course 1 . 

It is now time to turn to the Bagdad Railway Question, 
which closely concerns the future of Asia Minor, Meso- 
potamia, and Egypt. The scheme crystallized in 1898 at 
the time of the Kaiser's visit to the Holy Land. Out- 

1 For the final settlement of the Moroccan Question see E. D. Morel, 
op. cit. pp. 304-323, also the cessions of the French Congo territory to 
Germany. 



MOROCCO: THE BAGDAD RAILWAY 83 

wardly he appeared as a crusader, championing the 
interests of Christian pilgrims to Jerusalem, for whom 
he gained concessions from the Sultan 1 . But he also 
procured from the Sultan a verbal promise for the con- 
struction of the Bagdad Railway. This happened in 
the year succeeding the Armenian and Macedonian 
massacres. At the time of those outbreaks of calculating 
fanaticism strong remonstrances were made to the 
Sublime Porte by the Western Powers. They were 
fruitless. For many years past Germany had supported 
Turkey, in pursuance of the policy of Prussia traditional 
since the days of Frederick the Great; and in 1897 
Kaiser William emphasized the closeness of the political 
tie connecting the German* and Ottoman Empires 2 . 
Consequently poets and idealists in Western Europe 
raged in vain against the atrocities perpetrated by " Abdul 
Hamid the Damned." The power behind his throne 
was the Kaiser, who found his reward for the great betrayal 
of 1897 in the bargain for the Bagdad Railway. In 
1902 the Porte issued a firman authorising that enterprise. 
The Kaiser, during his visit to these shores in November, 
1902, probably sought to interest our Government in 
his scheme. True, Mr Balfour denied that we were 
asked to participate in it, and scolded the Spectator for 
crediting that story. But early in 1903 General von 
der Goltz delivered to the Konigsberg Geographical 
Society a lecture in which he stated that the German 
Bagdad Syndicate had secured a concession for extending 

1 Elkind, The German Emperor's Speeches (pp. 62-4, 318-322): 
" Not splendour, not power, not glory, not honour, no earthly blessing 
is it that we seek here : we pine, we pray, we strive alone after the sole, 
the highest blessing, the salvation of our souls." 

2 Sir H. Rumbold, Final Recollections of a Diplomatist, p. 296. 

6—2 



84 LECTURE IV 

its line to Koweit on the Persian Gulf " after diplomatic 
" negotiations with Great Britain 1 ." He also foretold 
that British mails for India would soon go via. Vienna, 
Constantinople, Bagdad, and Koweit. It was evident 
that British trade in the Persian Gulf, especially at 
Basra, would largely be diverted to this railway, especially 
if, as was contemplated, it was connected with European 
lines by a tunnel under the Bosphorus. In this case, 
there would be through communication from Ostend or 
Antwerp to the Persian Gulf, with serious results to our 
shipping interests. 

But the promoters of the German Bagdad scheme 
showed clearly enough that political and military issues 
of great moment were at stake. This appeared in a work, 
Lie Bagdadbahn, published in 1902 by Dr P. Rohrbach, 
whose travels in Mesopotamia, originating in theological 
motives, had of late led him to take a decidedly militant 
tone. He stated frankly that it was not worth while 
spending a pfennig for a weak Turkey; but for a strong 
Turkey it might be worth while to spend many million 
marks. He pointed out how the Bagdad Railway would 
enable the Sublime Porte to bring up its Anatolian troops 
quickly to the Bosphorus, whereas in the Russo-Turkish 
War of 1876-7 seven months were wasted by the troops 
from Mesopotamia before arrival at the front. The new 
lines would double the military strength of the Ottoman 
Empire. Further, the prosperity of Mesopotamia and 
Asia Minor would revive, stimulated as it would be by 
the immigration of numbers of Germans. Thus, both 
in a financial and military sense Turkey would soon 

1 See the Spectator for November 8, 1902, April 4, 1903; also June 5, 
1909, and Nineteenth Century and After, June, 1909. 



MOROCCO: THE BAGDAD RAILWAY 85 

be able to resist her redoubtable enemy, Russia. Rohr- 
bach also affirmed that agreements had been almost 
secured both with France and with Great Britain (this, 
too, in 1902). 

The revival of irrigation in Mesopotamia was already 
planned by Sir William Wilcocks; but the arrival of 
the Bagdad Railway might have helped the development 
of that now desolate region. Nevertheless, in view of 
the unfriendly conduct of Germany in other quarters, 
the Bagdad scheme had to be scrutinised closely. Her 
ambassador at Constantinople, Baron Marschall von 
Bieberstein, was openly hostile to Great Britain; and, 
if we had helped on the Bagdad scheme, we should at 
once have been represented as the enemies of Russia. 
On the other hand the British opposition to the Bagdad 
scheme was finally declared by a German writer in the 
Nineteenth Century and After [June, 1909] to be due 
to Russian instigation. Clearly, the only way with so 
intricate and compromising a scheme was to let it alone, 
and allow the Germans to make the line if they could 
get the money for it. They failed to carry through 
the original scheme so far as concerned the Persian 
Gulf. To this extension the British Government could 
not assent; for it would have enabled Turkey and 
Germany to send troops quickly to the confines of Persia, 
and a further extension of the line would threaten India. 
The design of Germany and Austria to control the Balkan 
Peninsula and Asia Minor appeared clearly in the years 
1908-10. In 1908 Austria annexed Bosnia ; and though 
for a time in that year the Young Turk Movement over- 
threw German influence at Constantinople, yet the 
intrigues of Baron von Marschall brought about a complete 



86 LECTURE IV 

revival of Teutonic ascendancy in April 1909. Ever since 
that time the Young Turks have been the creatures of 
Berlin. All the more reason, then, had we for opposing 
the German scheme of " pacific penetration " to the 
Persian Gulf, where British merchants had long before 
built up an extremely valuable trade 1 . Moreover, the 
terminus, Koweit, was the city of an independent Sheikh 
whom we had more than once supported against the 
coercion of Abdul-Hamid. In 1911 Sir Edward Grey 
demanded that, if a railway were made to the Gulf, it 
must be a purely commercial undertaking. Herein he 
followed the lines laid down by Lord Lansdowne, who 
stated that we could never allow another Power to obtain 
there a strong naval position " which might be used on 
" the flank of our communications with India." 

Such an assertion was all the more needed because 
of a recent compact between Russia and Germany. 
In November, 1910, the Tsar visited the Kaiser at Potsdam 
and they conferred together on matters of State. Their 
meeting caused no little surprise in view of the rebuff 
which the Kaiser had dealt to the Tsar in the winter of 
1908-9 over the Bosnian Question. It now seemed that 
the Tsar had accepted defeat and was willing to follow 
the lead of Germany. The meeting of the two Emperors 
therefore caused great concern at London and Paris; 
for it might betoken the break-up of the Triple Entente, 
lately severely strained by the death of H.M. Edward VII. 
The German account of the deliberations of the two 
Emperors is as follows: Russia agreed not to oppose 
the scheme, and even to link up that railway with her 
Persian lines; also to recognize Germany as an equal 
1 D. Fraser, The Short Cut to India (1909), chs, 19-25. 



MOROCCO: THE BAGDAD RAILWAY 87 

in matters commercial in that country. The Court of 
Berlin, on its side, recognized that Russia had special 
political and strategic interests in Northern Persia, as 
well as rights to construct railways, roads, and telegraphs. 
Thus, Germany said in effect, " Help me to build the 
" Bagdad Railway through to the Persian Gulf, and I 
" will hand over to you North Persia and as much of 
" that land as you want." But this was not all. The 
Russian and German Governments also gave mutual 
assurances that each would enter into no engagement 
inimical to the other 1 . 

The Potsdam Convention was a triumph for the 

diplomacy of Germany. She had set back Russia's 

interests at the time of the Bosnian crisis ; and she pushed 

on the Bagdad Railway until it promised to become 

a menace to Russian Caucasia. Then she turned round 

and said, " Now that I have beaten you, will you not 

' make a bargain ? Let us virtually partition Persia 

' between us, shutting out the British ; and, while we 

1 are about it, let us have a friendly understanding all 

1 round. I will not attack you in any quarter, if you 

' will not attack me." The method is rather crude, 

as German diplomacy has been since Bismarck's day. 

It succeeded in 1910. But it seems probable that the 

Potsdam compact marks the last success of this policy 

of blows and bluff. 

For the time there were searchings of heart at London 
and Paris. Was the Triple Entente of any avail if Russia 
could thus clasp the hand of our declared rival? And 
were there any secret clauses? Such were the questions 

1 Rachfahl, pp. 331-2; Nineteenth Century and After, June, 1914, 
pp. 1323-6. 



88 LECTURE IV 

that agitated the political world 1 . Obviously, the year 
1911 was one of great anxiety for French and British 
statesmen; and the facts just passed in review explain 
why the war party at Berlin so vehemently clamoured 
for hostilities with France and Great Britain at the time 
of the Agadir affair. 

Their confidence found expression in several ways. 
Germany had recently gained from the Sultan a concession 
respecting the port of Alexandretta which made it for 
all practical purposes a German port. She also secured 
permission to build an important branch line to Damascus 
and past the east of the Dead Sea and the Sinaitic Penin- 
sula to Mecca. It comes almost within striking distance 
of the Suez Canal. Represented as a semi-philanthropic 
enterprise, designed to lessen the hardships of pilgrims 
proceeding to Mecca, it was always intended to menace 
Egypt. This was stated by Dr Rohrbach in a later 
edition of his book (1911): 

England can be attacked and mortally wounded by land from 
Europe only in one place — -Egypt. The loss of Egypt would mean 
for England not only the end of her dominion over the Suez Canal, 
and of her connections with India and the Far East, but would 
probably entail the loss of her possessions in Central and East 
Africa. The conquest of Egypt by a Mohammedan Power, like 
Turkey, would also imperil England's hold over her 60,000,000 
Mohammedan subjects in India, besides prejudicing her relations 
with Afghanistan and Persia. Turkey, however, can never dream 
of recovering Egypt until she is mistress of a developed railway 
system in Asia Minor and Syria, and until, through the progress of 
the Anatolian Railway to Bagdad, she is in a position to withstand 
an attack by England upon Mesopotamia Egypt is a prize which 

1 See an article in La Revue des Questions diplomatiques (Jan.-June, 
1911) which reproaches Russia with her Persian policy, which " a 
emascule la Triple Entente." 



MOROCCO: THE BAGDAD RAILWAY 89 

for Turkey would be well worth the risk of taking sides with 
Germany in a war with England. The policy of protecting 
Turkey, which is now pursued by Germany, has no object but 
the desire to effect an insurance against the danger of a war 
with England. 

The Bagdad-Mecca scheme aimed at the revival of 
the Moslem Power 1 ; and that Power, when strengthened 
by German money, and drilled by German officers, was 
to play a great part in an eventual conflict with Russia 
or Great Britain. The curious tactics of the Goeben 
and the Breslau, and the coercion recently employed 
by Germany at Constantinople, explain the drift of events 
in the Near East. The Kaiser and his Ministers supported 
successively the Sultan and^ the Young Turks against 
the impulse for reform because they saw in the Ottoman 
Empire an effective ally against Russia and a means 
of dealing a deadly blow at a vital part of the British 
Empire. 

It may be asked — How could the Kaiser make the 
mistake of hoping to dominate Egypt without previously 
having gained the mastery at sea ? Does not Bonaparte's 
adventure of 1798 stand as a warning against such an 
attempt? Not wholly, I think. For the Corsican 
committed two blunders, firstly, of not securing the 
definite support of Turkey before he sought to over- 
throw the Mamelukes; secondly, of disregarding British 
maritime power at a time when sea-power counted for 

1 It proved very profitable to the promoters and burdensome to 
Ottoman finance: see D. Fraser, op. cit. chs. n-v, xvm; L. Fraser, 
articles in National Review, April, May, 1911; Mons. A Geraud, in 
articles in Nineteenth Century and After, May, June, 1914, shows the 
weakness of the Anglo-French opposition to the scheme. On the Horns- 
Bagdad railway scheme, favoured by England and France, which utterly 
failed, see The Imperial and Asiatic Quarterly (July, 1912). 



90 LECTURE IV 

far more than it does in the present case. Bonaparte's 
exploit was therefore doomed to failure, if we and the 
Turks attacked him. Now, however, in favourable 
circumstances, the Kaiser and the Turks might attack 
Egypt with a fair chance of success. For he and they 
reckoned on having almost continuous communications 
by land between Berlin and the Sinaitic Peninsula. If 
Balkan affairs had gone as he desired, Austria would 
have controlled the line to Constantinople, and have 
poured troops speedily into Syria, thence menacing the 
Suez Canal. There only could the Sea-Power have 
opposed any effective resistance; and it is doubtful 
whether warships cooped up in a canal can long oppose 
with success an attack of a large army provided with 
pontoons. We shall do well not to underrate the danger 
at the canal, though it is far less formidable than was 
designed at Berlin, Vienna, and Constantinople. For, 
as we shall see in Lecture VI, neither Italy nor the little 
peoples of the Balkans maintained the passive role which 
the Kaiser desired. They successively attacked Turkey, 
thereby enfeebling her and preventing that through 
railway communication with Syria which was needed for 
the full realization of the dreams of the modern Alexander 
the Great. 



LECTURE V 

ALSACE-LORRAINE 

La conquete et V annexion par la force de V Alsace, el de la 
Lorraine sont le principal obstacle a la paix et la vraie cause 
des armaments gigantesques. 

(La Ligue internationale de la Paix. Geneva, 1884.) 

In nearly all wars there are motives deeper and 
more fundamental than those which appear on the 
surface. The latter may be the occasion of the rupture, 
but they need not be the fundamental cause. It is so 
in the present instance. The murder of the Archduke 
Francis Ferdinand was merely the spark that ignited 
vast stores of combustible material which had long been 
accumulating. They may be classed in three general 
groups. The first was due to the clash of British and 
German national interests, especially in matters colonial 
and naval. This we have already surveyed. But that 
friction might have continued indefinitely, had not 
flames burst forth in the south-east of Europe. The 
flames spread swiftly to France (and incidentally to 
Belgium) because France was on the same electrical 
circuit as Russia. When we inquire why the French 
Republic is connected with the Tsardom, we find the 
cause in the deep-lying hatred and fear of Germany 



92 LECTURE V 

which has prevailed at Paris since the year 1870. Those 
feelings centre in the Alsace-Lorraine Question, which, 
as by an electric thrill, set the West in a blaze so soon 
as fire broke forth in the East. 

In September, 1870, during the Franco- German War, 
when the first feelers with regard to peace were put 
forth by the young French Republic to the victors, 
Bismarck declared that Germany must have Strassburg 
and Metz. To German diplomatists he wrote, " So long 
as France possesses Strassburg and Metz, her strategical 
position is stronger offensively than ours is defensively. 
....In Germany's possession, Strassburg and Metz 
assume a defensive aspect. In more than twenty 
wars with France we have never been the aggressors. 
We have nothing to demand from her except our 
own security .... From Germany no disturbance of 
the peace of Europe need be feared 1 ." These words 
constituted a pledge that the possession of Alsace and 
part of Lorraine would be a guarantee for the peace of 
the world. From the historical standpoint Bismarck was 
right. With the exception of Metz and its district, 
Alsace-Lorraine belonged to Germany by right of ancient 
possession. It was partly by force, partly by fraud, 
that Louis XIV acquired Strassburg and neighbouring 
towns. Further, the German plea was tenable on military 
grounds. Under the two Napoleons France had recklessly 
disturbed the peace of Europe; and we are suffering 
now from the final results of the Napoleonic policy. 
The recollections of the times of the two Emperors still 
haunt the brain of Germany and indispose her to any 
weakening of her Western frontier. 

1 Lowe, Prince Bismarck, i. 568 ; Sir R. Morier, Memoirs, n. 220-9. 



ALSACE-LORRAINE 93 

But what of the sentiments of the Alsatians and 
Lorrainers ? Did they incline towards France or Germany ? 
Here there was little doubt. Ever since the great Revolu- 
tion, Alsace-Lorraine had been enthusiastically French. 
That great event sent a thrill through those once German 
provinces and united them with la patrie; witness the 
declaration of the deputies of Lorraine at that memorable 
sitting of the National Assembly on August 4, 1789. 
After Dauphine, Brittany, and other provinces had 
renounced their local privileges, the men of Lorraine 
stood up and declared that their province, though the 
youngest of all, desired to join intimately the life of 
: ' this glorious family." Alsace-Lorraine sealed those 
sentiments with their bloody in the Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic Wars, when Kellermann, Kleber, Ney, Rapp, 
and many others added lustre to the French arms. 
Thenceforth those provinces were French to the core. 

Early in 1871 Bismarck had an uneasy feeling that 
the annexation of the French-speaking districts of Lorraine 
about Metz might be undesirable. His secretary, Busch, 
reports him as saying, " If they (the French) gave us 
a milliard more, we might perhaps let them have Metz. 
We would then take 800,000,000 francs and build 
ourselves a fortress a few miles further back .... I do 
not like so many Frenchmen being in our house against 
their will. It is just the same with Belfort. It is all 
French there too. The military men, however, will not 
be willing to let Metz slip, and perhaps they are right 1 ." 
It is well known that Bismarck and Moltke differed 
sharply on this subject. Moltke kept saying that the 

1 Busch, Bismarck in the Franco-German War, 11. 341; Journals of 
Count von Blumenthal, pp. 316-8 (Eng. edit.). 



94 LECTURE V 

acquisition of Metz meant a difference of 109,000 men 
in a campaign ; and this estimate convinced the Emperor 
William 1 . Probably the Germans had from the outset 
resolved to have Alsace-Lorraine; for they imposed 
German institutions immediately after military occupa- 
tion, a step which they did not take in districts further 
West. At the first mention of the terms of peace 
the 35 deputies of the doomed lands made a strong 
protest to the French Chambers, then at Bordeaux: 
" Alsace and Lorraine refuse to be alienated. With one 
" voice, the citizens at their firesides, the soldiers under 
" arms, the former by voting, the latter by fighting, 
" proclaim to Germany and to the world at large, the 
" immutable will of Alsace and Lorraine to remain 
" French. France can neither consent to nor sign the 
" cession of Lorraine and Alsace without imperilling 
" the continuity of her national existence, and, with 
" her own hands dealing a death-blow to her unity 2 ." 

That was the opinion of nearly all Alsatians and 
Lorrainers. But Germany held them in her grip except the 
maiden fortress of Belfort. Further, Bismarck was ordered 
by his sovereign not to relax his terms. M. Thiers, however, 
made a supreme appeal to prevent the annexation of 
Belfort. Failing even at that point to break the will 
of the iron Chancellor, he broke forth into the following 
protest: "Well then. Let it be as you will, Count! 
"These negotiations are nothing but a sham.... Make 
" war, then. Ravage our provinces, burn our houses, 
"slaughter the inoffensive inhabitants: complete your 

1 Blowitz, My Memoirs, p. 161. 

2 J. Simon, The Government of M. Thiers (Eng. trans.), I. 129, 130; 
H. Welschinger, La Protestation de V Alsace-Lorraine (Paris, 1914). 



ALSACE-LORRAINE 95 

" work. We will fight you until our last breath. We 
" may be defeated, but at least we shall not be dis- 
" honoured." Even Bismarck was moved. He retired 
to consult, first Moltke and then his sovereign ; and the 
verdict was that France should retain Belfort, provided 
that the Germans should enter Paris in triumph. The 
proud city underwent that humiliation with quiet disdain 
because she saved Belfort. 

At the last moment it seemed that Bismarck would 
break off the negotiations. On February 25 he spoke 
with extreme harshness to the French plenipotentiaries 
and accused them of spinning out the conferences. The 
cause of his anger was obvious. The British Government 
was about to make representations concerning the 
enormous indemnity claimed *by Germany from France. 
That sum had been fixed at six milliards (£240,000,000). 
But on February 23 the Emperor William consented 
to reduce it to five milliards (£200,000,000)!. Whether 
this reduction was due to the generosity of the old 
Emperor or to a knowledge that Great Britain was 
about to take diplomatic action, is open to question. 
Certainly, here was one cause of the extreme anger of 
Bismarck and the German Headquarters against us. 

But there were other causes. Some of our manu- 
facturers had secretly supplied munitions of war to the 
French, a fact which the German Staff ascertained and 
forthwith proclaimed to the four winds. Secondly, a 
portion of the British Press indulged in unseemly diatribes 
against the Germans for their harshness in the conduct 
of the war and in the demand for Alsace-Lorraine 2 . 

1 J. Simon, The Government of M. Thiers (Eng. transl.), i. 137. 

2 Sir R. Morier, Memoirs, n. 165, 246. 



96 LECTUKE V 

The German newspapers savagely retorted, and thus 
there began that ceaseless war of words which must 
be pronounced an indirect but important cause of this 
war. When journalists of all lands learn the urgent 
need of self-restraint in times of general excitement, 
the cause of peace will take a long stride forward. 

Bismarck also inveighed against the British Govern- 
ment for asking permission to send a gunboat up the 
Kiver Seine in order to remove English refugees. He 
peremptorily refused, saying that we desired merely to 
find out whether the Germans had laid mines in the river 
below Kouen, so that French warships might follow 
the gunboat. ^Referring to our real motive (surely, by no 
means discreditable) he burst out, " What swine ! They 
are full of vexation and envy because we have fought 
great battles here and won them. They cannot bear 
to think that shabby little Prussia should prosper so ... . 
They have always done their utmost to injure us. 
The Crown Princess herself is an incarnation of this 
way of thinking. She is full of her own great con- 
descension in marrying into our country 1 ." 
The terms imposed by Germany upon France seemed 
designed to crush her to the earth. Great therefore 
was the joy at London and the annoyance at Berlin, 
when, under the fostering care of Thiers, France paid 
off the enormous war indemnity by the spring of 1873. 
Thus the Germans had violated the maxim of Frederick 
the Great, " Never maltreat an enemy by halves." They 
had deeply wounded France by tearing from her two 
provinces that formed an integral part of her life. Yet 
they had not wholly crushed her; and since 1875 they 

1 Bismarck: Some Secret Pages, i. 500. 



ALSACE-LORRAINE 97 

have had no chance of doing so except by an unparalleled 
effort. That has been a dominant factor of the European 
situation. Just as the Eastern Question brought Russia 
and Austria into sharp rivalry, so Alsace-Lorraine kept 
up an irreconcilable feud between France and Germany; 
and by degrees the two Germanic Empires ranged them- 
selves together, while France and Russia became close 
allies. 

This arrangement lay in the natural order of things. 
So far back as 1856 Bismarck had discerned that truth, 
which became clear after the crisis of 1875 1 . But the 
Franco-Russian alliance came about slowly owing to 
his cautious and skilful policy. To this we must briefly 
advert; for it is not too much to say that his dealings 
with the Great Powers were prompted by a resolve to 
escape, if possible, from the consequences of the annexa- 
tion of Alsace-Lorraine. Foreseeing that France would 
seek to reconquer those provinces, he sought to keep 
her isolated. 

His first effort was the Three Emperors' League 
(DreiJcaiserbund) of 1872. When that compact virtually 
lapsed in the crisis of 1875, he looked about for an 
alternative scheme. The crisis in the Eastern Question 
in 1876-8 gave him his chance. He supported Austrian 
claims against those of Russia, and thus in 1879 found his 
reward in the Austro-German alliance. But he did not 
desire to offend Russia. Both William I and he desired 
merely to teach Russia a sharp lesson; and, when she 
had learnt it, in isolation, they would welcome her back. 
This policy of alternate cudgelling and cajoling led to 

1 Busch, Our Chancellor, I. 320. 
R L. 7 



98 LECTURE V 

what have been termed the Reinsurance Treaties with 
Russia — a topic too complex for treatment here 1 . 

Far more important and interesting is the skilful 
lead which Bismarck gave to France into the colonial 
adventures of the eighties. He sketched their first 
outlines at the time of the Berlin Congress of 1878. His 
ingenuity at that time would have made Machiavelli 
hail him as a master in this craft. While opposing the 
oncoming tide of Slavonic " barbarism," he found means 
to turn the energies of Great Britain, France, and Italy 
towards Africa. Oppert, correspondent of the Times at 
Berlin, states that Bismarck gave the following advice 
to Beaconsfield : — Do not quarrel with Russia. Let her 
take Constantinople, while you take Egypt — France will 
not prove inexorable. Besides, one might give her 
Syria or Tunis 2 . At that time, then, he cared not a jot 
for Turkey. He was even desirous of starting a partition 
of the Ottoman Empire, provided that the German 
Empire thereby gained immunity from a similar proceeding 
— witness his graphic declaration, that the whole Eastern 
Question was not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian 
grenadier. 

His foresight was justified. France in 1880 began 
to cast jealous eyes upon Tunis, which Italy had marked 
out for herself; and when the statesmen of Rome plied 
M. de Freycinet at Paris with anxious questions, they 
could gain from him no more assuring reply than that 
" for the present, France had no intention of occupying 
" Tunis, but that the future was in the hands of God." 

1 See J. W. Headlam, Bismarck, pp. 442, 443. 

2 Ibid. n. 92; Blowitz, My Memoirs, p. 165; Crispi, Memoirs, 
vol. n. pp. 98, 



ALSACE-LORRAINE 99 

A little later, when Rome became more restive, Freycinet 
gave up his predestinarian argument and said plainly, 
"Why will you persist in thinking of Tunis ?.... Why 
"not turn your attention to Tripoli?" Bismarck's 
procedure is worth noting: Great Britain is directed 
towards Egypt ; France towards Tunis ; and she, in order 
to " square " Italy, waves her on to Tripoli. The Chan- 
cellor contrived the scheme; but the statesmen of Paris, 
London, and finally of Rome concurred in it 1 . 

By this gigantic " deal " in North Africa Bismarck 
diverted political activity away from Europe to the 
Dark Continent. What was more, he set by the ears 
not only French and Britons but French and Italians. 
During twenty-two years (1882-1904) we were on strained 
terms with France respecting Egypt. Further, the 
Sultan Abdul Hamid never forgave us for our intervention 
in Egypt; and the Pan-Islam movement which that 
crafty potentate so skilfully nursed was largely the 
outcome of our presence in that land. True, we went 
to Egypt in 1882 as the mandatories of Europe to secure 
order; but we went with the ostensible blessings and 
secret curses of the Balaam of Berlin. As for the feud 
between France and Italy respecting Tunis, it survived 
to the year 1911, when Italy acquired Tripoli. Until 
then, she could not feel cordially towards the French, 
who had played her that shabby trick over Tunis in 1881. 

During many years the energies of France obeyed 
the centrifugal impulse which Bismarck had skilfully 
imparted. Some of her ministers, notably M. Ferry, 
suffered from colony-fever. France seemed for the time 
to have forgotten Alsace-Lorraine amidst these distant 
1 Crispi, Mems. n. pp. 97-104. 

7—2 



100 LECTURE V 

quests. But at the end of the year 1885 a reaction 
set in. Tens of thousands of French youths had perished 
of malaria amidst the swamps of Tonquin or the forests 
of Madagascar; and M. Clemenceau and other patriots 
asked indignantly what had France to show for this 
waste of life and treasure — Great Britain offended, 
China hostile, and Germany cynically complacent. He 
pointed his attacks by assertions, culled from the German 
Press, that the French were the inferiors of the Germans, 
and that the Republic was much in the debt of the 
Teutonic Empire for helping on her colonial enterprises. 
The elections of 1885 sent up a large number of royalist 
and Bonapartist deputies. It was clear that the Republic 
would fall if it persevered in plunging into tropical swamps ; 
and it came very near to perishing at the time of the 
Boulanger crisis. Le brav' general, who caracolled about 
Paris on his black charger, was in reality a poor creature 1 . 
He became a danger to the Republic chiefly because 
he championed a national policy. For this he was 
abused by the German Press, a fact which gained him 
the heart of France. He rode on the crest of public 
opinion because he bade Frenchmen think of Alsace- 
Lorraine and prepare for revenge. The first definite 
sign of a rapprochement between France and Russia 
belongs to this year, the year when Russia first renewed 
her Reinsurance Treaty with Germany. At the request 
of the Court of Petrograd the French Republic under- 
took to send thither 500,000 Lebel rifles, on the express 
stipulation that they should never be used against 
France 2 . 

1 Sir T. Barclay, Anglo-French Reminiscences (1876-1906), p. 96. 

2 Count Reventlow, Deutschlands auswartige Politik (1888-1913), p. 5. 



ALSACE-LORRAINE 101 

The thought of revenge was kept alive in France 
by events in the conquered provinces; and to these we 
must now turn. The North Germans, for all their vigour 
and manliness, have not the arts that conciliate the 
vanquished. That was seen clearly by a German Liberal, 
named Rasch, who in 1876 sought to discover the real 
state of affairs in the Reichsland (Alsace-Lorraine). 
He found it absolutely different from what the German 
newspapers represented. Having had their orders, they 
described the revival of old German ways, and the popular 
rejoicings at events such as the starting of a steamboat 
service, or the opening of the new University buildings 
at Strassburg. This latter event was recounted in moving 
terms. But Rasch found that less than one-fourth of 
the students were natives of the province, and those 
chiefly theological students who had to study there in 
order to obtain cures in that Reichsland. The population 
had dwindled, no fewer than 100,000 having emigrated 
to France. Metz had sunk from 50,000 to 33,000 in- 
habitants. This was not surprising ; for freedom of the 
Press was a thing of the past, and the French language 
was proscribed. In fact, the Germans were hated in the 
Reichsland 1 . 

Bismarck had bidden the Alsatians and Lorrainers 
consider themselves an independent Republic. In reality 
the Reichsland resembled a satrapy of Xerxes rather 
than Athens. Our diplomatist, Sir Robert Morier, 
during a visit to Strassburg in 1872, had an interview 
with the ex-mayor, a chemist named Klein, who had 
not been hostile to the German occupation. Klein went 

1 E Rasch, Die Preussen in Elsass-Lothringen (1876), chs. n.-v 
E. Hinzelin, V Alsace sous le Joug (1914). ch. 11. 



102 LECTURE V 

with a deputation to Berlin in May, 1871, to beg Bismarck 
to defer the imposition of military conscription; but 
the Chancellor opposed an adamantine opposition, 
because " Prussia had an immense experience of the 
" results produced by wearing the Prussian uniform. 
" Get the King's coat on to a man's back and let him 
" wear it for three years, and you have made not only 

" a good soldier but a good citizen of him ' Yes ' (was 

" Klein's reply), ' but you must get the coat on first, 
" and that is what you will not succeed in doing.' : 
Bismarck, however, was inexorable; and the results 
were that vast numbers of Alsacians, who might have 
become reconciled if Germany had treated them with 
forbearance, became permanently embittered. Some 
12,000 of them fled to France and joined the French 
army rather than don the Prussian uniform. 

The men of Berlin were deaf to all appeals. They 
adopted a drastic system and then forced it through 
at all costs. This spirit has been the curse of Berlin 
ever since the days of Frederick William I; but never 
has it wrought more far-reaching ill than when applied 
by the Iron Chancellor to Alsace-Lorraine. The improve- 
ments in the legal system and in the railways of the 
Reichsland counted for nothing when accompanied by 
this premature rule of the drill-sergeant 1 . 

The Alsatians were virtually an unfree community, 
held down by the sword. They retorted by tabooing 
the Prussian officials, and extended this ostracism even 
to the new station-masters, so that one of them, failing 
to find an Alsatian girl who would marry him, had to 
institute a search for a wife in Berlin. Fifty wealthy 

1 Sir R. Morier, Mems. n. 264-6, 273-4. 



ALSACE-LORRAINE 103 

manufacturers left Miihlhausen for France. There and 
throughout Alsace the people were German in type and 
generally spoke German, but their hearts were in France. 
Rasch deemed it essential that Germany should know 
the truth, which was this: her ways were odious to 
her new subjects, and she must mend those ways if 
a reconciliation was to be effected. Alas ! The Prussian 
official is not open to conviction; and though a few 
changes were made at a later time, e.g., a certain measure 
of constitutional government, yet they produced little or 
no effect, because there was no change in the spirit of 
the administration 1 . The Statthalter, Prince Hohenlohe, 
in February, 1887, made an almost open bribe to the 
people that they should have full constitutional rights 
if they ceased to protest against the German connection 
and entirely accepted it. Then and then only would the 
Empire relax its policy 2 . 

If we look deeper, that is, into the thoughts of Bis- 
marck, what do we find? In April of that year he 
confessed to Busch that he wished he could adopt the 
methods of Charlemagne and transplant all the Alsatians 
and Lorrainers to Posen, and all the Poles of Posen 
into Alsace 3 . In 1912 a German author, Frymann, in 
a book termed Wenn ich der Kaiser war\ stated the same 
thought equally crudely : " We acquired Alsace-Lorraine 
' because the land is necessary to us in a military sense. 
' The inhabitants were thrown in. . . .The constitution of 
" Alsace-Lorraine should be abolished and its administra- 
: ' tion be placed under a Minister with dictatorial powers." 

1 M. Leroy, IS Alsace-Lorraine (Paris, 1914), chs. i-m. 

2 M ems. of Prince Hohenlohe, n. 3G1. 

8 Bismarck : Some Secret Pages, in. 167. 



104 LECTURE V 

There is the reason why Prussia has never won the 
Alsatians. She was not the alma mater, but rather 
the harsh step-mother. 

The friction came near to producing war in 1887, 
when the German police on the frontier brutally mal- 
treated a French agent, named Schoabele. The Tsar, 
Alexander III, sent to Berlin a remonstrance, and William I 
arranged matters reasonably. But the incident proved 
that the endeavours of Bismarck to divert the thought 
and energy of France to Africa had signally failed. 
Accordingly Germany had to act up to his motto — 
Toujours en vedette. 

This appeared in the first Proclamation to the Army 
issued by William II, which sent a shiver of apprehension 
through Europe. Its effect was not lessened by a later 
declaration respecting Alsace-Lorraine. There having 
been suggestions in peace-circles as to the neutralising 
of those provinces, the late Emperor Frederick was 
mentioned as favouring such a scheme. The young 
Kaiser emphatically denied it; and at Frankfurt-on- 
the-Oder, when unveiling a statue to Prince Frederick 
Charles, he uttered these words : " We would rather 
" sacrifice our eighteen army corps and our 42,000,000 
" inhabitants on the field of battle than surrender a 
" single stone of what my father and Prince Frederick 
!e Charles gained 1 ." That was the official version of 
the Kaiser's words; but if we may credit Bismarck, 
they were far stronger and more melodramatic. For 
Bismarck criticized him for saying "If at last the whole 
" nation lies hushed in the silence of death 2 ." It soon 

x Elkind, The German Emperor's Speeches, p. 17. 
2 Biimarck: Some Secret Pages, in. 202. 



ALSACE-LORRAINE 105 

appeared that the young Kaiser intended to put in force 
a more rigorous regime in the conquered provinces. 
French writers agree that the state of affairs under him 
was worse than under William I, and that the increase 
of rigour has produced little more than an increase of 
hatred towards Germany. The merchant classes of 
Alsace-Lorraine may outwardly appear resigned to the 
new state of things; but at heart they detest it. The 
1,550,000 natives long to be free from the Empire. Only 
the 300,000 German immigrants are loyal to it 1 . 

The recrudescence of the Alsace-Lorraine Question 
under William II would, perhaps, not have led to war 
if he had continued the Bismarckian policy of com- 
plaisance towards Russia. But in 1890 he resolved on 
drawing closer the bonds with Vienna and loosening 
those with Petrograd. His reasons for this important 
step were probably as follows. He knew, from a secret 
report of a German political agent, that the Russians 
were deficient both in regard to arms and the railway 
facilities needful for mobilization of their huge array. 
The chances, therefore, were that Russia would in no 
case be able to attack Germany before the year 1895 2 , 
and by that time the Kiel Canal would be open, and 
thereby double the efficiency of the German fleet. For 
these reasons William II recked little of Russia. He 
chose to adhere closely to Austria, gave up all thoughts 
of a Russian connection, and dismissed Bismarck. This 
is one explanation of the breach between them. The 

1 Hinzelin, E., U Alsace sous le Joug (1914), ch. 12; J. Claretio 
Quarante Ans apris (1911); A. Hallays, En fldnant (1911); Betham 
Edwards. Under the German Ban (1914). 

2 M. Harden. Monarchs and. Men. p. 143. 



106 LECTURE V 

other explanations are that the Kaiser insisted on the 
prosecution of colonial and naval designs, to which 
Bismarck demurred, or that he then disliked the Chan- 
cellor's anti-Socialist tendencies. Perhaps all these causes 
were operative. In any case, Germany and Russia drifted 
apart in 1890 ; and, on the accession of the present Tsar 
in 1894, there was an end of the personal motives which had 
for so long kept Russia aloof from the French Republic. 
The Franco-Russian alliance soon came about, and it was 
patent to all the world in June, 1895, when the French 
and Russian fleets steamed together into Kiel harbour 
to grace the opening of the Kiel Canal. It was their 
way of emphasizing the significance of that pacific under- 
taking. Thus, the completion of Kaiser William's first 
naval programme coincides with the hardening of the 
national resistance to his designs both on the east and 
west of the German Empire. It is no exaggeration to 
say that the cautious policy of Bismarck would somehow 
have prevented a Franco-Russian alliance. The Kaiser's 
restless and ambitious plans, set forth in flamboyant 
speeches, helped on that alliance. The isolation of 
Germany, which her publicists ascribe to French, Russian, 
or British jealousy, was in all probability due mainly 
to the reckless policy of William himself. Napoleon I 
always declared the alliances against him to be the 
outcome of British gold. It is ever the same story. 
The would-be conquerors of the world will not understand, 
until too late, that the world must insure itself against 
them by alliances. 

There was another alternative, that the Kaiser should 
win the affections of the Alsatians and Lorrainers. He 
has tried to do so by methods successful in North Germany. 



ALSACE-LORRAINE 107 

He has dazzled them by parades. He has re-built in 
Lorraine a castle which recalls the splendours of old 
Germany. But he has not won the hearts of that people. 
Strive as he might, sometimes by menace, sometimes by 
cajolery, he could not escape from the consequence of the 
blunder of 1871. The young generation of Alsatians proved 
to be more Gallophile than that which lived through the 
war of 1870. Consequently, German policy was held as 
in a vice. The more the Kaiser fumed and threatened, 
the closer became the union between France and Russia. 
The harder he pressed upon the conquered provinces, 
the more they turned towards Paris. There were but 
two ways of escape from the deadlock, conciliation or 
war. There was much to be said for the former alterna- 
tive, as will dow appear. 

It is a mistake to suppose that all Frenchmen and 
Alsatians longed for a war of revenge. Many of them 
realised the impossibility of such a scheme; and they 
also saw that, even if it succeeded, the holding of those 
provinces against a hostile Germany would impose 
crushing burdens upon France and perpetual unrest 
upon Europe 1 . Moreover, the teachings both of ethnology 
and history warned them against any such enterprise. 
The term Alsatia, once applied to a no-man's land in 
London, reminds us that Alsatia was in olden times a 
debateable land between Gaul and Teuton. In point 
of fact, the Alsatians are almost entirely German by race, 
and the ties of commerce connected her with the Teutons 
rather than the Gauls; for rivers connect peoples while 
mountains divide them. Consequently many influences 

1 See " La Situation" par un Alsacien-Lorrain (Geneva, 1887); 
Sir T. Barclay, pp. 312-4. 



108 LECTURE V 

told against a complete absorption of Alsace into France 1 . 
Therefore they pleaded for the neutralisation of the 
annexed provinces. Arguments in favour of that solution 
were well set forth at the International Peace Congress held 
at Geneva in 1884. Several Frenchmen protested against 
that solution on the ground that the provinces wanted 
union with France. Others, however, notably M. Demo- 
lins, advocated the middle course. He pointed out 
that during 1000 years those districts had formed a 
debatable land between the French and German peoples, 
neither of which could hold them permanently. There- 
fore, was it not better to pronounce the struggle a draw? 
A recent book by Herr Maas of Leipzig, Die Vereinigten 
Staaten Europas, had urged the neutralisation of the 
provinces, all the fortresses being dismantled, " for the 
" strength of a nation consists in the ascendancy of 
" light, science, and law." Ardently endorsing these 
proposals, Demolins appealed to the Germans to give 
up their militarism, alike cramping to themselves and 
menacing to their neighbours. Frenchmen, on their 
side, must abandon all thought of a war of revenge, 
and be satisfied to see Alsace-Lorraine independent and 
neutral. This solution, however, by no means satisfied 
an Alsatian delegate, Waag of Colmar, who spoke 
passionately for union with France as the cherished 
desire of all Alsatians. Their civilization was Roman, 
not Germanic 2 . The final vote of the Conference showed 
a perplexing balance between the cosmopolitan and the 
national solutions. Twelve of the delegates voted for 
neutralising Alsace-Lorraine, six opposed it, six abstained 

1 See, too, M. Leroy, ch. I. 

2 So E. Hinzelin, p. 153, 



ALSACE-LORRAINE 109 

from voting, and one resigned. Nothing could better 
indicate the difficulty of the question. The only topic 
on which there was an approach to unanimity was in 
regard to the preliminary step, that Alsace-Lorraine 
must be allowed to express freely by a mass-vote their 
desires for their future. 

Any such proposal was vetoed by the German Govern- 
ment; and the outlook, as we have seen, became more 
gloomy under William II. Then the spirit of Treitschke 
began to prevail in Germany. In 1871 the professor 
had raged at the lenient terms accorded to France; and 
the burden of his professorial message was that Germany, 
now strong in herself, must expand by force of arms: 
"War is the mightiest and -most efficient moulder of 
" nations. Only in war does a nation become a nation, 
" and the expansion of existing States proceeds in most 
" cases by way of conquest." As for the notion of 
seeking the consent of the annexed people, he ridicules 
it: " States do not arise out of the people's sovereignty, 
' but they are created against the will of the people 1 ." 
Doubtless, he deduced this principle from the war of 
1866, which created the North German Confederation 
despite the opposition of the Prussian Parliament. But, 
with the perfervidum ingenium Prussorum, he expanded 
that single instance into a universal truth. Monstrous! 
you will say. True; but the youth of Germany believe 
it." Hence the soul of Germany became hardened against 
the appeals of pity that came from the Reichsland. 
And when the Pan-German idea came to reinforce pro- 
fessorial fallacies, all hope of a compromise respecting 
Alsace-Lorraine vanished. 

1 Treitschke, Die Politik, Bk. i. §4. 



110 LECTURE V 

Yet, if the Pan-Germans had been logical, they would 
have allowed some discussion on the subject of Metz. 
That city was thoroughly French, as were all the villages 
around ; so too was Thionville. For this reason, Bismarck, 
as we have seen, secretly disapproved the annexation 
of Metz and its environs. Further, on historical grounds 
Germany had no right to Metz; for though that city 
had been connected with the Holy Roman Empire, yet 
the link was very slight 1 . Besides, language was an 
insuperable barrier. There is, I believe, no example in 
history of a French-speaking people giving up their 
mother-tongue and taking to German, though instances 
to the contrary might be cited. Consequently, the 
Germanising of Metz was hopeless. On the occasion of 
State visits numbers of people could be drafted in to 
cheer the Emperor 2 ; but the cheers of these hired 
claqueurs were openly ridiculed. 

Accordingly, some Germans came to see the desirability 
of exchanging Metz for some French colony, an exchange 
which might have eased the tension. The colonial 
party in Germany would have scored a success, and 
France would no longer have fumed at seeing French- 
speaking people at her very doors dragooned by Germans. 
Further, she would have been free from that military 
menace, the great bastion of Metz thrust forth into 
the levels of Lorraine. In every respect the crux of the 
Franco-German problem is at Metz. The Kaiser, how- 
ever, and the leaders of German opinion scouted all 
thought of an exchange which would restore that city 

1 Dom Calmet, Hist. eccUsiastique et civile de la Lorraine, h. p. 1296 ; 
H. Maringer, Force an Droit, pp. 65-83. 

2 Mems. of Prince Hohenlohe, n. p. 350 (Engl. edit.). 



ALSACE-LORRAINE 1 1 1 

to France. This appears even in a little book, England 
and Germany, published in 1912. It consists of a number 
of articles urging friendlier relations between the two 
countries. Sir Thomas Barclay, whose labours helped on 
the Anglo-French Entente, pointed out that that measure 
was not hostile to Germany; but that our friendship 
to France caused us to take a lively interest in the Alsace- 
Lorraine Question, which held Germany and France 
apart; and he suggested that the statesmen of Berlin 
should approach those of Paris with a view to finding 
some modus vivendi. The response from the German 
contributors was disappointing. Baron von Pechmann, 
a Munich banker, reprobated any discussion of the 
Treaty of Frankfurt of 1871, which assigned Alsace- 
Lorraine to the Fatherland. Ignoring the fact that 
Metz stood in a very different relation from Strassburg 
to the German Empire, he asserted that the possession 
of the whole of the annexed districts was an absolute 
necessity to Germany : " Anyone who questions that right 
is guilty of a wrong to Germany, a wrong that hurts 
us in a very sensitive spot, one which not only calls 
in question our rights but the most sacred memories 
in our history and everywhere in the world the inalien- 
able and inviolable quality of our national honour." 
These are the words, not of a Prussian bureaucrat, but 
of a South German banker; and they are uttered in 
rejection of a friendly suggestion, that Germany should 
approach France with a view to some compromise 
respecting Alsace-Lorraine. If that is the spirit of all 
Germans, war with France, was, I admit, inevitable. 
I do not believe, however, that all Germans would have 
excluded from discussion the French part of Lothringen. 



112 LECTURE V 

Many of them desired a compromise. But so long as 

Treitschke swayed the convictions, and the Kaiser 

excited the emotions, of the German nation, a friendly 

settlement, even as regards Metz, was out of the question. 

For the spirit in which a nation approaches a political 

problem is more important even than the problem itself. 

Who would have said, early in 1904, that the many causes 

of dispute between Great Britain and France would be 

amicably settled in that year? During two centuries 

and more the two peoples had been quarrelling about 

the fish ofl: Newfoundland. For a couple of decades 

; they had been snarling about Egypt, Madagascar, the 

\ Niger, and Siam. And then, thanks to the tact of King 

\ Edward VII and Lord Lansdowne, they speedily discovered 

that cod-fish and fellaheen, Malagasy, Haussas, and 

i Siamese, were not worth a war. But that discovery 

J came about because on both sides of the Channel there 

existed a latent longing for peace, which, with fostering 

care, could become vocal and speedily drown or resolve 

the earlier discords. 

But how did Germany regard the Anglo-French 
entente? As a lesson in the methods by which disputes 
may be solved peaceably? She might have viewed it 
in that light; and there are good grounds for believing 
that we should have gone far to meet her. Lord Rosebery 
in his speech of October 25, 1905, stated emphatically 
that our understanding with France ought not to be 
regarded as a threat to Germany, but, on the contrary, 
that we desired friendlier relations with her. Still 
more important is Lord Lansdowne's letter of May 8, 
1904, to Sir Thomas Barclay. He expressed his desire 
'* to see all matters which might give rise to controversy 



ALSACE-LORRAINE 113 

' between ourselves and other countries happily settled 1 ." 
If that was the spirit animating our Foreign Minister, 
we may be sure that he endeavoured to include Germany 
within the scope of the recent cordial understanding 
with France. Further, it is contrary to all that is known 
of the convictions of his successor, Sir Edward Grey, 
to suppose that he too would not have welcomed such 
an arrangement. 

But was Germany disposed to meet us half-way? 
The Pan-German writer, Count Reventlow, supplies the 
answer. Discussing the proposals that passed between 
London and Berlin on that question, he declares that 
they were not feasible; for a British alliance would in 
the future have tied Germany's hands. The ally would 
inevitably ask Germany to consent to a proportional 
diminution of the British and German naval programmes 
as a sign of trust and goodwill. Germany, however, 
could not lessen her naval preparations. She must keep 
a free hand to build warships as she saw fit, otherwise 
she would be in a worse position relatively to Great 
Britain. Equally must she be free to pursue her World- 
Policy 2 . These admissions are illuminating. They show 
the reason why the proposal of an Anglo-German- Japanese 
entente in 1901 came to nought, also the causes of the 
failure of King Edward and his statesmen to include 
Germany in the entente cordiale with France. The 
latter failure is easily intelligible, despite the efforts of 
Frenchmen (e.g. M. Jules Lemaitre). It is summed up 
in the words, Alsace-Lorraine 3 . 

1 Sir T. Barclay, p. 312. * Reventlow, pp. 178-9. 

3 M. Leroy, chs. iv, v; V. M. Laurent, etc. Le Paix armte et le 
Probleme d' Alsace (1914). 

R. L. 8 



114 LECTURE V 

Even so, the statesmen of Berlin should not have 
interpreted that entente as a threat to them, but rather as 
a sign of affability to France. But they could not, or would 
not, see. They interpreted every act of Great Britain 
in the most unfavourable sense 1 . An English princess 
could not marry a Continental prince without cries 
being raised all over the Fatherland that we were hemming 
it in by alliances ; though, surely, we were not to blame 
if neither, the supply was so bounteous nor the demand 
so keen in regard to German princesses. These acrid 
complaints were signs of a mental disease which it is 
difficult to diagnose apart from the teachings of Treitschke 
and Bernhardi. Its most prominent symptom was an 
unreasoning Chauvinism, which, after the military 
collapse of Russia in Manchuria, took the form of intoler- 
able arrogance both towards France in Moroccan affairs 
and towards Russia in those of the Balkan Peninsula. 

1 e.g., Reventlow, passim. 



LECTURE VI 

THE EASTERN QUESTION 

When the Balkan States form a compact body, opposing firm 
resistance to every attempt upon their union, all covetousness will 
cease, and the East will no longer be a menace to the peace of Europe. 

Signor Tittont, Speech in the Chamber at Rome, Dec. 3, 1908. 

The Serbs of Bosnia-Herzegovina have twice set 
Europe in a blaze — in 1875 when their revolt against 
Turkish misrule reopened the Eastern Question, and 
again in June, 1914, when two of their fanatics murdered 
the Austrian Archduke, Francis Ferdinand. These two 
events remind us of the diverse issues that confronted 
the Christian peoples of the Balkans in the past genera- 
tion and in our own day. In 1875 the Turk was the one 
and only enemy. In 1914 the enemy is Austria. Thus, 
there has come about an almost bewildering change over 
the problem known as the Eastern Question. But, 
before we seek to gauge the importance of that change and 
of its present issues, let us try to understand the essentials 
of that Question. 

It is a profoundly national problem, the most complex 
which has distracted the world since the break up of the 
Roman Empire. The feuds of hostile races and creeds 
in the Balkan Peninsula have been keener than in any 

8—2 



116 LECTURE VI 

other part of Europe ; and this is due, firstly, to geographi- 
cal causes. Peninsulas are like pockets hanging from the 
mainland. They hold up the flotsam and jetsam of 
humanity. Wales, Brittany, the Iberian Peninsula, Italy, 
all are examples of the working of this ethnic law. But 
the Balkan Peninsula, gaping widely towards the North, 
has collected far more peoples than any other peninsula 
except India. It has gathered in the races wandering 
from East to West, who were deflected southwards by the 
great barrier of the Carpathians. It also held up the 
reflux from the North- West and wedged it against the far 
greater drift from the North-East. 

But the Balkan Peninsula is not only a great wallet, 
it is also (if I may violently change the metaphor) a bridge, 
the easiest way from Asia into Europe. As such it brought 
the Turks into Europe. Nearly a century before their 
capture of Constantinople (1453) they harried the Balkan 
lands. In 1389 they utterly crushed the Serbs in the 
Battle of Kossovo, which that brave little people yearly 
laments. Their grief is natural; for that disaster ended 
their days of splendour. It is Kossovo, not the capture 
of Constantinople, which marks the beginning of the 
Eastern Question. Thereafter the Turks overcame the 
Bulgars, a warlike race of Tartar origin who became 
Slavised and Christianised after their settlement in the 
Balkan Peninsula. The crescent also prevailed over the 
Greeks and Roumans. Thus there began that long 
agony, the subjection of brave and civilized Christian 
peoples to a Tartar horde which could neither under- 
stand, assimilate, nor even govern them. During ages 
the Osmanli Turks, the bravest but most ignorant and % 
fanatical of the Moslem peoples, studied practically 



THE EASTERN QUESTION 117 

nothing but the Koran, a bewildering jumble of precepts 
calculated to muddle the clearest of brains. Napoleon 
greatly admired the Koran because it made men good 
fighters. Yes; but if its votaries were wolves in 
war, they were sheep in time of peace, especially before 
the head shearer, the Sultan. Valiant in fight, but 
helpless in the art of government, they slowly yielded 
ground before their Christian subjects, until in our own 
day the strife in the Balkans became balanced. It was 
reserved for the little peoples of the Balkans in the 
epopee of 1912 (surely worthy of a second Tchaikovsky) 
to defy with success the western Moslems, who in the 
middle ages had beaten back the forces of the whole of 
Christendom. 

In those long struggles for liberation, ranging over 
nearly 250 years, two external States have played a helpful 
part, Russia and Austria. But here we must distinguish 
between the motives that prompted intervention by those 
Powers. The Russian people has always taken keen 
interest in the struggles of Serb and Bulgar against the 
Sublime Porte. Kinship in race and community of religion 
(that of the Greek Church) impelled them to intervene. 
The generous feelings that led mankind to undertake 
the Crusades have nerved the Muscovites in their wars 
against the Turks. True, ambition has often prompted 
the policy of their Government, from the times of Peter 
the Great and Catherine II onwards; but the rank and 
file have been actuated by a noble impulse, the desire to 
free the oppressed and to plant the cross once more on 
the dome of St Sophia at Constantinople. This is the 
feeling which nerved the soldiers of Suvorof and Diebitsch 
to their deeds of heroism. It is the same feeling, largely, 



118 LECTURE VI 

which inspires them now to overthrow the last but 
deadliest enemy of the Balkan Slavs, Austria. 

During more than a century the House of Hapsburg 
has had no similar motive for intervention in Balkan 
affairs. But, as the Ottoman power decayed, the States- 
men of Vienna discerned in the south-east the line of 
least resistance for their imperial projects. Italian 
patriots, notably Count Balbo, urged the Hapsburgs to 
turn towards the Balkans the energies which were vainly 
employed beyond the Alps to hold down Italians 1 . His 
prophecy in 1843 was fulfilled in 1866, when Austria was 
expelled both from Italy and from the Germanic confeder- 
ation. After the formation of the German Empire under 
the headship of Prussia, the polyglot Hapsburg dominions 
could expand only towards the Balkans. Hence the 
principle of growth which pushes the Germans towards 
the North Sea and into new lands, also urges Austria 
towards the iEgean. We must recognise that in both 
cases an impulse natural to a vigorous people is driving 
on these movements. In the interests of the little 
peoples who are threatened on the lower Rhine and 
Meuse, as well as on the lower Danube, we must oppose 
such forcible expansion; but it has in it something of 
the elemental, which, in the wiser future that is surely 
ahead, will demand satisfaction by methods less brutal 
than war. 

In this brief study of the Eastern Question we must 
limit ourselves mainly to the ever increasing rivalry 
between Austria and the Balkan Slavs and their champion, 
Russia. In the years 1875-7 that rivalry was restrained 
by the counsels of prudence which then prevailed in 

1 C. Balbo, Le Speranze d' Italia (Turin, 1843). 



THE EASTERN QUESTION 119 

presence of the rising power of democracy. The three 
Empires, still loosely connected by the Three Emperors' 
League, sought to localize the Herzegovinian Rising and 
to induce Turkey to grant the needed reforms. We now 
see that pacific coercion of the Sublime Porte was the 
sole method for ending the troubles in the North-West of 
its Empire; and it is generally agreed that the support 
offered by the British Government to the Turks was a 
political blunder of the first magnitude. At once they 
stiffened their necks ; and the new Sultan Abdul Hamid II, 
prepared to defy Russia if she took up the cause of the 
now despairing Christians of the Balkans. 

Mark what ensued. Britain's policy having broken 
up the Concert of the Powers which had sought to end 
the crisis peaceably, the former rivals, Russia and Austria, 
came to a secret agreement. Regarding war between 
Russia and Turkey as inevitable, they agreed to the 
following compromise. Austria would remain neutral, 
provided that Russia respected the integrity of Roumania, 
and did not annex land south of the Danube. It was 
also understood that she should confine her military 
operations to the eastern half of the Peninsula. Austria, 
however, exacted a high price for her neutrality, viz. the 
occupation of Bosnia at the end of the war. But this 
by no means satisfied the statesmen of Vienna. The 
severe defeats sustained by Russia before Plevna whetted 
their appetite for Balkan lands; and in the spring of 
1878, before the Berlin Congress which was to settle the 
Eastern Question, they demanded that Austria should 
occupy the whole of Albania and Macedonia, including 
Salonica. Bosnia was also to become a principality 
dependent on the Hapsburgs ; and Austria was to acquire 



120 LECTURE VI 

the right to make special treaties with Serbia and Monte- 
negro, on terms which would have made them virtually 
dependent on her 1 . 

She did not gain these concessions. But she procured 
the insertion in the Treaty of Berlin of Articles 25 and 29, 
which empowered her provisionally to occupy the Sanjak 
of Novi Bazar, and also to extend her influence beoynd 
Mitrovitza, its southernmost limit. This was equivalent 
to handing her the key to Macedonia and bidding her 
advance to Salonica when she saw fit; and on several 
occasions she seemed about to begin the march to Salonica, 
to which the chauvinists of Vienna constantly impelled 
her 2 . 

The Balkan peoples lived in perpetual dread of such 
an event. Mr Minchin found during his sojourn in 
Bosnia and Serbia that the Montenegrins dreaded Austria 
far more than their ancient foes, the Turks. So did the 
Greeks. The Turk was in his dotage, but his place 
would at once be taken by the active and intriguing 
Austrian, and then farewell to all hopes of a Greek 
Salonica 3 . Most of all, the Serbs dreaded Hapsburg 
aggression. True, Austria coquetted with King Milan, 
but only on condition that he worked in her interests. 
In 1885 she also saved the Serbs from the advance of 
the victorious Bulgars ; but she could do no less ; for she 
had incited them to attack the Bulgars ; and when her 
proteges were badly beaten she of course intervened ; but 
thereafter she was described as the shadow hanging over 

1 Debidour, Hist, diplomatique de VEurope, n. 515. 

2 Tittoni, Italy's Foreign and Colonial Policy (Eng. edit.), pp. 139- 
143. 

3 J. Minchin, Growth of Freedom, in the Balkan Pensinula, pp. 19, 
32. 221 ; Cassavetti. Hellas and the Balkan Wars, p. 226. 



THE EASTERN QUESTION 121 

the whole of Serbia. Indeed, it would seem that nothing 
but the dread of increasing the Slav population of the 
Dual-Monarchy prevented its statesmen from annexing 
Serbia outright. There were credible reports that both 
King Milan and afterwards King Alexander were about 
to place Serbia under vassalage to Austria. 

The Albanians were equally apprehensive. Both 
Austria and Italy coveted their land, especially its coast 
line, which commands the entrance to the Adriatic. 
Those nominal Allies could scarcely forbear laying violent 
hands on that important coast, a question which in the 
winter of 1912-3 nearly brought about a European War. 

We must now trace the growing rivalry between Austria 
and Russia in Balkan affairs. Early in the present 
century Austria began to gain ground far more quickly 
than Russia in Balkan Questions. This may be explained 
by her advantages of position, her skill in the management 
of half-civilized races, and the firm backing of Germany. 
The support of Berlin is intelligible in the light of events 
described in Lecture IV. So as soon the Bagdad Railway 
scheme took definite form, in the year 1902, Germany 
had every reason for desiring Austria to control the 
Balkan lands, and therefore the through railway lines 
from Central Europe to Constantinople. These schemes, 
linked as they were with the Bagdad and Hedjaz Railways 
were so vast that the Sultan ought to have perceived 
their menacing character. But Germany convinced him 
of her goodwill — England had stolen Egypt and Cyprus; 
France had annexed Tunis ; Italy coveted Tripoli ; 
Russia threatened Armenia. The Austrians might be 
dangerous in Macedonia; but Germany would see that 
they did the Turk no harm; and by her railways she 



122 LECTURE VI 

sought to do Turkey nothing but good. The Germans, 
in fact, were the only sincere friends that Turkey had in 
the world 1 . Moreover, the Kaiser encouraged the Sultan 
to persevere in the Pan-Islam movement. In fact, Pan- 
Germanism and Pan-Islamism acting together would 
stalemate Pan-Slavism. The crafty Sultan was completely 
cajoled; and during many years Berlin virtually swayed 
the counsels of the Sublime Porte, giving it carte blanche 
in regard to the Christians of Macedonia and Armenia. 
The more the British Government and Press protested 
against his policy of terrorism and massacre, the more he 
leant on the Kaiser; and a large share of the responsi- 
bility for those horrors must fall to the imperial moralist 
and preacher of Potsdam. For the time his pro-Turkish 
policy succeeded. The influence of Berlin superseded 
that of Great Britain and France; and it promised to 
support Turkey even against the dreaded Muscovite. 

Thus, the Teutonic programme was as follows : Ger- 
many would partly support, partly control Turkey 
(meanwhile exploiting Asia Minor) while Austria was to 
become supreme in Serbia, Bulgaria, and finally in 
Macedonia. That accomplished, the Germanic Empires 
might hope for the Empire of the Orient. 

How came Russia to permit these schemes? We 
must here remember that Russia in 1900 successfully 
opposed the northern route of the Bagdad Railway; 
and, having diverted the line far from her Caucasian 
borders, she now viewed the scheme with less reluctance, 
especially as it promised to link up her Persian lines 
with the Bagdad system. Russia, moreover, at that time 
was chiefly intent on her Trans-Siberian railway schemes 

1 Reventlow, p. 313. 



THE EASTERN QUESTION 123 

and the construction of great naval and commercial 
bases on the Pacific at Port Arthur and Dalny. The 
Far East diverted her from the Near East. The statesmen 
of Petrograd and of Tokio are said to be convinced that 
Germany lured Russia on to the dangerous schemes in 
Korea which embroiled her with Japan, an explanation 
which seems reasonable in view of the reconciliation 
between the two Powers, which came about speedily after 
the end of the war. 

Certain it is that, some ten to fifteen years ago, Russia 
took far less interest in Balkan affairs than formerly. In 
1903, when on the brink of the Japanese War, she came 
to terms with Austria in what was known as the Murzsteg 
programme of reforms. Ostensibly it aimed at the im- 
provement of the lot of the oppressed peoples of Macedonia 
under the joint supervision of Austria and Russia. That 
the two rivals should join hands in promoting philan- 
thropic schemes caused cynics to sneer; and unfortu- 
nately the cynics were right. The scheme was supposed 
virtually to supplant the obligations laid upon all the 
Great Powers by the Treaty of Berlin. England, enfeebled 
by the Boer War, was glad to hand over her responsibilities 
as regards the Christians of Turkey. France and Italy 
took much the same view ; while Germany was hand and 
glove with the Sultan, the sworn foe of all reforms. When 
Russia was defeated in the Far East, Austria virtually 
let the Murzsteg programme lapse 1 . Rut in the meantime 
she had secured the first place in Balkan affairs. 

Signs of her activity have been portrayed in the 
sprightly pages of Miss Edith Durham. She describes 
the splendour of the Austrian consulates then being built 

1 Reventlow, p. 316. 



124 LECTURE VI 

in Albania and Macedonia. She says, "The consul lives 
"in a palace, and has a whole staff: of lively youths, 
" whose principal business in life appears to be taking 
" holidays for shooting expeditions, and whose knowledge 
" of the land is minute and exhaustive. They will even 
" take you out for a walk and tell you the improvements 
" which their Government means to introduce in a few 
" years' time." She once asked one of them whether 
a new consulate was not large enough for a Governor's 
palace. He at once replied : " Then it will be very useful 
" to us in a few years' time 1 ." 

The first great coup came in 1908. Austria then 
annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina outright. The Powers pro- 
tested vigorously, all the more so because the Young 
Turks had just gained power at Constantinople amidst 
the plaudits of an astonished world. But while visions 
of a political millennium seemed to be taking shape on 
the Bosphorus, there fell this heavy blow from Austria. 
Was it her way of discrediting the new system, detested 
by Germany, acclaimed by Great Britain? Or was it 
merely a coincidence that the annexation came at the 
time of the Diamond Jubilee of Francis Joseph, providing 
him with a present of imperial splendour? Or, again, 
was it that Russia was still weak and could not resent 
Austria's expansion in the Balkans? 

It is certain that the Austrian statesman who carried 
through this stroke, had adopted a very different policy 
from that usually associated with Vienna. During many 
years Viennese policy had been conservative and cautious, 
so that Austria had been called the House of Lords of 
Europe. Up to the autumn of 1906 she was so passive 

1 E. Durham, Burden of the Balkans, ch. 3. 



THE EASTERN QUESTION 125 

in foreign affairs that Kaiser William took occasion to 
describe her Foreign Minister, Count Goluchowski, as "a 
" brilliant second" during the Algeciras Conference of the 
spring of that year. Damned with faint praise, that 
Minister retired from office. His successor, Baron von 
Aehrenthal, soon proved to be a man after Kaiser William's 
own heart. He was enterprising, and thoroughly German. 
Above all he believed that the best means of stopping 
the eternal feuds in the Parliaments of the Dual Mon- 
archy was to embark on a spirited foreign policy 1 : 

Be it thy course to busy giddy minds 

With foreign quarrels; that action, hence borne out, 

May waste the memory of the former days. 

Those words, which Shakespeare puts in the mouth of 
Henry IV, as parting advice to his son, may stand as the 
motto of Austria's policy since 1906. Aehrenthal was 
only too ready to obey the impulses emanating from 
Berlin. He checked the pro-Slav tendencies in the 
Dual Monarchy and prepared to subject the Slavs on 
its southern borders. Russia, weakened by her disasters 
in Manchuria, was not likely to oppose him. As for 
Great Britain he openly flouted her; and he declined to 
take us seriously even after the conclusion of our entente 
with Russia in 1907. In fact in the autumn of that year 
he pushed on a railway scheme into Macedonia by way of 
Novi Bazar, and in order to procure the consent of the 
Porte he offered that Austria should renounce her partici- 
pation in the Miirzsteg scheme of Macedonian reforms. 
His bargain with Turkey may be thus described: "You 
" Turks may do what you like in Macedonia if you will let 
" us build our railway." At home Aehrenthal defended his 

1 W. Steed, The Hapsburg Monarchy, pp. 224-230. 



126 LECTURE VI 

scheme on the ground that it would be an important link 
between Europe, Egypt, and India 1 . The mention of 
Egypt and India was, of course, meant as a threat to us. 

These were the events preceding the annexation ; and 
they explain the indignation which that event occasioned 
at Petrograd, Paris, and London. Austria, backed up 
by Germany, was clearly working to precipitate the ruin 
of the Turks by abandoning the reform programme 
which alone could save Macedonia from anarchy; but 
she was also pushing on a railway that would enable her 
to profit to the full by that anarchy. So soon as Turkey 
went to pieces, the white coats of Austria could be at the 
gates of Salonica. That was the way in which Vienna 
then regarded the Eastern Question; and it must be 
remembered that Germany, for all her bolstering up of 
the old Sultan's tyranny, was ready with railway schemes 
in Asia Minor so as to profit by the breakdown in 
Turkey which clear-sighted observers confidently pre- 
dicted. She was prepared for either alternative, the 
continuance of Turkish tyranny, or the fall of the Sultan. 

Why, then did she not push on her schemes when the 
Sultan's authority collapsed at the time of the Young 
Turks' triumph at Constantinople? Doubtless, because 
that event overthrew German influence at the Sublime 
Porte. It has even been asserted by German writers 
that the Young Turks dealt their stroke because just 
previously King Edward VII and the Tsar had met at 
Reval on the Gulf of Finland. Post hoc ergo propter hoc. 
Evidently (so argue these logicians) those potentates met 
for something. The Young Turk Revolution was some- 

1 W. Steed, The Hapsburg Monarchy, p. 235 ; Sir C. Eliot, Turkey 
in Europe, ad fin. (new edit. 1908) ; Reventlow, p. 316. 



THE EASTERN QUESTION 127 

thing. Therefore the royal meeting met for the Young 
Turk Revolution. In the eyes of these writers King 
Edward was the Mephistopheles of the age, ever plotting 
the isolation of Germany. — His summer visits to Carlsbad 
or Ischl, where he often met Kaiser Franz Joseph, were 
intended to withdraw him from the German alliance, 
or tempt him to persuade Kaiser Wilhelm not to build 
ships so fast. And now at Reval King Edward and the 
Tsar launched the Young Turks against Abdul Hamid 1 . 
— It seems to us incredibly superficial. But very many 
Germans, judging other sovereigns by the phenomenal 
activity of their own, could not believe that anything 
great could happen unless some monarch or statesman 
contrived it. 

Alas ! The prospects of the reformers at Constantinople 
were speedily blighted by their follies and factions; and 
in April, 1909, there came to power a party favourable 
to Germany, — a result due largely to the skill of the 
German ambassador, Baron Marschall von Bieberstein. 
Since then she has resumed her former sway at Con- 
stantinople 2 . 

Meanwhile the two Germanic Empires had also won 
a diplomatic triumph. They made good their contention 
that Austria should annex Bosnia. The Triple Entente 
opposed them in vain. Russia was still weak; France 
knew that she would get no help from Petrograd, and 
took little interest in Balkan affairs. Great Britain took 
more interest; but, alone, she was helpless against the 

1 Reventlow, p. 322 : the King and Tsar probably did not discuss 
politics (see W. Steed, p. 237). 

* Sir W. Ramsay, The Revolution in Constantinople and Turkey 
(1909), pp. 15-17. 



128 LECTURE VI 

Triple Alliance. For at that time Italy held by her 
Allies. True, she did so somewhat doubtfully; and her 
Government was sharply criticized in the Chambers at 
Rome for its pro- Austrian policy. But, by coming to an 
understanding with Russia on Balkan affairs, the Cabinet 
of Rome scored one success. At the Congress of the 
Great Powers which deliberated on the Bosnian Question, 
Austria had to consent to withdraw from the Sanjak of 
Novi Bazar. She did so very reluctantly, and mainly, it 
is said, owing to the insistence of Italy and Russia 1 . 

But mark the result of this withdrawal. It left only 
one line of advance southwards to a Power which was 
resolved to extend not only its railways but its political 
power in the Balkans. This line was through Serbia, 
which provided both the shortest and the easiest route 
to Salonica. Indeed, a railway already ran right through 
to the coveted port. Therefore the Austrian military 
men and engineers consoled themselves with the thought 
that thenceforth the route through Serbia must be the 
object of Austria's efforts. 

Serbia was exasperated by these events 2 . The annexa- 
tion of Bosnia, and the handing back of the Sanjak to 
the Porte shut her out from all hopes of reaching the 
sea, which she had so long cherished. Through the 600 
dark years which have rolled over her since the downfall 
of her glorious kingdom, she had dreamed of once more 
reaching the Adriatic. Now that dream was dispelled. 
On all sides she felt herself threatened; for that most 

1 Tittoni, p. 142. For the Austro-Turkish bargain of February, 
1909, which ended "the annexation crisis" (see W. Steed, p. 255). 
Biilow, Imperial Germany, pp. 50-61. 

2 Reventlow, p. 328. 



THE EASTERN QUESTION 129 

crafty of European rulers, Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria, 
had recently taken a threatening step. Just before 
Austria's annexation of Bosnia, he had visited Vienna ; 
and on his return proclaimed himself Tsar of the Bul- 
garians, a claim which implied sway over the million or 
more of Bulgars in Central and West Macedonia. This 
again seemed to blight Serbia's hopes of expanding 
southwards. Nay ! She was threatened at her very 
heart by a war of tariffs with Austria. Her chief product 
was pigs; and now the Dual Monarchy refused to take 
them. The Turks refuse all pigs. Therefore the sole 
exit for Serb pigs was Bulgaria ; but as the Bulgars had 
enough of their own, the future for the Serb animals 
became gloomy in the extreme. For a time King Peter 
and some of his counsellors are said to have thought of 
entering into some form of dependence on Austria at 
which that Empire had been aiming. 

But, fortunately for the cause of the little States, 
they decided to fight, not each other, but rather the 
common enemy, either Turkey or Austria. One of their 
delegates to London in 1912, when questioned as to the 
date of their preparations for war, said that they were 
begun immediately after Austria's annexation of Bosnia ; 
for all those peoples then felt their doom approaching 1 . 

The assertion may be commended to the German 
writers who have seen in the Balkan League merely the 
outcome of Russian intrigues. All who are acquainted 
with Balkan affairs know that it originated in a sense 
of despair of any reforms from the Young Turks or of 
effective help from the Great Powers. Germany and 

1 Letter of Mr Frederick St John in Times August 14, 1914. 
R. L. 9 



130 LECTURE VI 

Austria blocked the way to intervention by the Great 
Powers; and by the years 1911-12 the incredible folly 
of the Young Turks led to hardships worse even than in 
the days of Abdul Hamid. Only occasionally did he 
order massacres. But the Young Turks persistently 
pressed hard upon all the Christians of the Empire. 
Trained at Paris or Berlin, they had imbibed the doctrine 
that public affairs would go well if organized by a scientific 
administration. To them nationality and religion were 
absurd survivals, to be swept aside as soon as possible. 
Turkey would prosper when her government resembled 
that of Paris or Berlin. A sort of Pan-Turk propaganda 
was set on foot to assimilate all the diverse peoples of the 
empire. A Young Turk said to Miss Durham: "All is 
" now simplified. The Greek, the Bulgar, the Serb, the 
" Albanian Questions no longer exist. We have passed a 
" law, and now all are Osmanli." To which Miss Durham 
replied: "You can pass a law, if you like, that all cats 
" are dogs; but they will remain cats." 

In 1912 the opportunity for the little peoples had come. 
In the previous autumn Turkey was attacked by Italy, 
an event which disordered all the calculations of Berlin 
and Vienna. It had long been known vaguely that 
Italy desired Tripoli. So far back as 1878 Bismarck 
had pointed her to that land, if France took Tunis. 
But very few persons expected the blow to fall in 
1911. Her part in the Triple Alliance was to act as a 
passive third, behind Austria as a "brilliant second." On 
one occasion Kaiser William said as much to an Italian 
diplomat who complained of the lenten fare provided for 
Italy by the Triple Alliance. He said to him: "Wait 
" patiently. Let the occasion but present itself, and you 



THE EASTERN QUESTION 131 

" shall have whatever you wish 1 ." But Italy waited in 
vain. Her impatience became extreme in 1911; for by 
then France had cut a great slice out of Morocco, and 
Germany out of the French Congo. The Cabinet of Rome 
therefore resolved to strike at Tripoli; and those who 
watch the inner ironies of history will note with satis- 
faction that the Kaiser was hoist by Bismarck's petard, 
and that, too, at a time extremely inconvenient for the 
oriental designs of Germany. The railways were progress- 
ing favourably. The Turkish army and navy were said to 
be gathering strength. Even Turkish finances were said 
not to be hopeless. But now Italy spoilt the game. 

As if this were not enough, the Turks chose this time 
of crisis for dragooning the Albanians and massacring 
Bulgars at Kochani in Macedonia. The Christian States 
therefore came to terms, framed their league, struck home ; 
and within a month the Turkish Colossus lay prone. 

But then came a terrible event. The victors fell out 
among themselves as to the share of Macedonia. The 
cause of these disputes is still obscure; but I have been 
informed by a diplomat of a Balkan State that it resulted 
largely from the vagueness of the original compact, which 
at first did not include Greece. Serbia and Bulgaria 
had arranged a general scheme for dividing Macedonia; 
but this proceeded on the assumption that Serbia would 
acquire Albania. She did acquire it by the prodigious 
exertions of her troops in the rush through snow and 
slush to Vallona. But it soon appeared that Austria and 
Italy would forcibly oppose her at that coast. Those 
two States very rarely pull together ; but on this occasion 
they did, because each hoped to get Albania. Thus it came 
1 Crispi, Mems. m. 326 (Eng. edit.). 

9—2 



132 LECTURE VI 

about that in the Congress of the Powers held in London 
in 1912-13, Serbia had finally to give up North Albania. 
It was a bitter blow to her people ; but now they demanded 
a larger share of Macedonia. To this the Bulgars demur- 
red; and it is almost certain that their opposition in its 
final stages was instigated by Austria. It is an open 
secret that she encouraged her protege, King Ferdinand, 
to expect Austrian help if he rejected the demands of 
Serbia. Several of the hotheads of Sofia hearkened to 
this insidious advice. The Danefl Ministry at Sofia was 
less to blame than has been generally believed. It was 
pushed on to the brink of the precipice by the chauvinists. 
Indeed, the final order to the Bulgarian troops to attack 
the Serbs never had the signature of the responsible 
Ministers. Insidious influences were certainly at work to 
set the Christians of the Balkans by the ears ; and those 
influences emanated from Austria. She had resolved to 
smash the Balkan League, whose victory over the Turks 
had been a most unwelcome surprise. Both at Vienna 
and Berlin it was believed that the Turks, drilled by 
Germans, provided with Krupp's artillery, and rendered 
doubly mobile by the new German railways in Asia Minor, 
must prevail over allies who until lately had hated each 
other more bitterly than the Turks. What wonder that 
the Germanic Empires loathed the thought of a Turkey in 
Europe controlled by four Christian States whose pro- 
gressive culture marked out the future as theirs. The 
German plans proceeded on the assumption that Turkey 
would survive, at least long enough for the Teuton to 
step in as residuary legatee. And now the Christian 
States were about to share the best part of the inheritance. 
Their triumph would imply the throwing in of four solid 



THE EASTERN QUESTION 133 

blocks into the path which the Germanic Empires were 
resolved to control, the path leading from Berlin and 
Vienna to Constantinople and thence to the Persian 
Gulf. 

In these considerations we may find the explanation 
of the miserable events of the summer of 1913, which 
exhausted the Balkan States and led to the conclusion 
of the unsatisfactory Peace of Bukharest, mainly at the 
dictation of the Germanic Powers. Here again they 
prevailed. They threw back the Slav cause in a way 
which caused keen satisfaction at Berlin and Vienna, but 
still keener resentment at Sofia, Belgrade, and Athens — 
above all at Petrograd. The Slavs had not sought this 
conflict, though this is constantly asserted at Berlin. It 
was forced on them by the aggressive designs of the two 
Germanic Empires, and, later, by the insane misgovern- 
ment of the Young Turks. Twice the Slav cause was set 
back by the action of Austria and Germany, viz. in the 
winters of 1908-9 and of 1912-13, on both of which 
occasions Europe narrowly escaped a general war. But 
the experience of those crises led to a firm resolve not to 
accept further humiliations from the Houses of Hapsburg 
and Hohenzollern. 



LECTURE VII 

THE CRISIS OF 1914 

By whatever means we must he strong, so that by a powerful effort 
we may destroy our enemies in the east and in the west. 

(German Secret Report, March 19, 1913.) 

The events in the Balkans during the year 1913 
ushered in a time of severe tension. It was evident to all 
observers that the two Central Powers were bent on 
breaking up the Balkan League and securing their 
supremacy in that peninsula. The participation of 
beaten Turkey in that second war could scarcely have 
occurred without encouragement given from Berlin and 
Vienna. The intention evidently was to re-establish the 
Ottoman power as far as possible and deal a blow to the 
Slav cause both by lessening its gains of the year 1912 
and by sowing discords among its champions. The plan 
met with startling success, and Austria might well hope 
finally to secure her supremacy in Turkey in Europe. 

The secrets of those months are half revealed by some 
significant signs. Evidently the Sublime Porte must 
have considered itself very closely bound to the Central 
Powers; otherwise it would not now have intervened in 
this war. The Turkish troops are fighting with extreme 
reluctance; and it is well known that the Moslems of 



THE CRISIS OF 1914 135 

India and Egypt regard Turkey's action as likely to lead 
to utter ruin. How close, then, must have been the grip 
which the German Powers fastened on Turkey in 1913 ! 
As to the Balkan States, though they nurse bitter hatred 
against each other, yet it is repressed by their over- 
mastering dread of Austria. Early in the present war 
it was expected that Bulgaria would attack Serbia in 
order to regain Central Macedonia. Why did she not 
do so? Because to do so would be to play the game for 
Austria; and her experience of the insidious policy of 
Vienna in 1913 has now kept her quiet. 

Turn to Roumania. That State used to be on 
friendly terms with the Triple Alliance owing to re- 
sentment at the shabby conduct of Russia in 1878 
in annexing Western Bessarabia. But her anger has 
abated. She no longer fears Russia; but she does 
fear Austria. On November 20, 1914, a leading 
Roumanian statesman, M. Jonescu, telegraphed to a 
Russian paper the following: — "All Roumania's interests 
'and her future are inseparably bound up with the 
'victory of the Triple Entente, to which Roumania must 
'contribute by participating in the war. Roumania 
'should strive to promote a Serbo- Bulgarian agreement 
'and do everything possible to come to terms with 
'Bulgaria, thus enabling all the Balkan States to side 
'with the nations of the Entente. A German victory 
'would mean the burial of all the hopes of the Balkan 
' States and of the independence of the neutral countries 1 ." 
Roumania has her own special reasons for wishing the 
overthrow of Austria, from whom she hopes to recover 
the Roumans living north of the Carpathians. But she 

1 Times, Nov. 23, 1914. 



136 LECTURE VII 

also knows that Austrian supremacy in the Balkans 
would sound the death-Jmell of every free State in the 
Peninsula. Thus, the Aehrenthal policy has had the 
effect of uniting practically all the Balkan peoples against 
the menace from the north. 

Hungary has behaved worse to the Slavs than Austria 
has done. In the Western half of the Monarchy a feeling 
not long ago prevailed in favour of encouraging the Slavs 
as a make- weight against the Magyars. In its extreme 
form this policy was known as Trialismus, i.e. a triple 
division of the Empire, the Slav provinces becoming a 
third division with Agram as capital. To the Magyars 
this notion spelt ruin, and they opposed it furiously. 
Thus, severe friction resulted, especially on the Serb 
border. There the Magyars sought to crush their Serb 
subjects, while these retaliated by a nationalist propa- 
ganda which sometimes led to fights and outrages. In 
the main, however, the Magyars carried things with a 
high hand, as was seen in that disgraceful episode, the 
Fried] ung trial. For details I must refer you to the 
works, of Messrs Seton- Watson and Wickham-Steed. 
Nowhere in Europe, except in Ireland, was there friction 
so acute as in the Slav provinces of Hungary; and it 
was there that friction first produced flame. 

On June 28, 1914, two Bosnian Serbs murdered the 
heir to the throne of the Dual Monarchy, Archduke 
Franz Ferdinand. This dastardly crime aroused intense 
indignation against the Serbs. Their cowardly assassi- 
nation of King Alexander and Queen Draga in 1903 was 
remembered; and all through Europe there rang denun- 
ciations of that "nation of assassins." There were 
suspicious features about the crime. The Archduke had 



THE CRISIS OF 1914 137 

favoured Trialismus ; and the Archduchess was of Slav 
race. Therefore the murdered pair were more Slavonic 
in their sympathies than nine-tenths of those who now 
denounced the Serbs. But there can be no doubt as to 
the intense indignation which the crime at Serajevo 
aroused throughout the Austrian dominions; and it 
excited, what has been so rare in the recent history of 
that Empire, a passionate and general longing for war. 
A hackneyed saying of Napoleon assigns to moral power 
three-fourths of the might of an army. That moral 
power was now on the side of the " white-coats " about to 
wield the sword of justice against cowardly murderers. 
The Slav cause being disgraced, that of the Teuton bade 
fair to prevail. German and Magyar in the Dual Monarchy 
clasped hands enthusiastically; and even their Slav 
subjects seemed likely to fight for good old Kaiser Franz 
against a nation that had put itself under the ban of 
Europe. The opportunity was all the more favourable 
because Austria generally viewed with suspicion and 
alarm the forward moves of Germany. As von Bernhardi 
said in the Preface to his book, How Germany makes 
War, neither Austria nor Italy took any interest in 
Germany's World-Policy. They were therefore certain to 
desert her if she began hostilities on her own account. 
But in July, 1914, Austria, the backward partner, was 
eager for war. What a chance! It might never again 
recur. Finally, there was this consideration, that the 
Tsar would probably be reluctant to draw the sword on 
behalf of "a nation of assassins." In the next lecture 
we shall see the use to which the Kaiser put this murder- 
motive. 

Meanwhile notice that the war-party at Vienna began 



138 LECTUKE VII 

forthwith to exploit the crime for their own ends, and to 
plan forcible intervention in Serbia. The French am- 
bassador in Vienna on July 2 reported as follows : " The 
"inquiry into the origin of the outrage, which is to be 
"demanded on conditions intolerable to the dignity of the 
"Belgrade Government, would, in case of refusal, provide 
"the excuse for proceeding to military execution." The 
scheme was seen through at Petrograd. There the 
Austrian ambassador stated that Austria might be forced 
to search in Serbia for the accomplices of the crime. 
Thereupon Sazonoff, Minister for Foreign Affairs, uttered 
these warning words: "No country has suffered more 
"than Russia from outrages planned upon foreign 
"territory. Have we ever claimed to adopt against any 
"country whatever the measures with which your news- 
papers threaten Serbia ? Do not enter upon that path 1 ." 
Up to July 23 Austria delayed action. But the Mili- 
tdrische Rundschau clamoured for war. — "The moment is 
still favourable for us. If we do not decide upon war, 
the war we shall have to wage in two or three years at 
the latest will be begun in circumstances much less 
propitious. Now the initiative belongs to us. Eussia 
is not ready ; the moral factors are for us, might as well 
as right. Since some day we shall have to accept the 
struggle, let us provoke it at once." The Neue Freie 
Presse demanded the extermination of the accursed 
Serbian race 2 . 

Let us now take a brief survey of the general situation 
in Europe in the first seven months of 1914. In Eussia 
there was a very serious strike, which promised to paralyse 

1 French Yellow Book (1914), pp. 20, 21. 

2 Ibid. p. 22 



THE CRISIS OF 1914 139 

not only the tram service but also the transport service 
of the Empire. Consequently that vast organism seemed 
likely to move with far more than the traditional amount 
of circumspection. Difficulties of mobilization have 
always been great in Russia owing to the sparseness of 
the population and the primitive nature of the means 
of communication. Her railways are not all of the same 
gauge; and the locomotives on different lines are con- 
structed, some to burn wood, others coal or oil. But 
strategic railways to her western frontier were either 
planned or were in course of construction, an additional 
motive why the Germans should act soon. Further, 
in her three last wars, the Crimean, the Turkish, and the 
Japanese, her organization hadproved to be very defective. 
Consequently, it was a proverb in historical circles that 
Russia, however strong for defence (as against Charles XII 
and Napoleon) was weak for offence; and in June, 1914, 
her offensive power seemed at the lowest point. Russian 
finances were also judged to be weak. In 1912 Dr Rohr- 
bach stated that they would not bear the strain of a single 
bad harvest. As for her army organization, it had been 
improved somewhat since the Japanese War; but up to 
1912 no real improvement had taken place. In an earlier 
work he pronounced Russia's power to be overrated, 
and he now repeated his verdict. Such, too, was the 
report of the French diplomatic and consular agents in 
Germany: "In political and military circles it is not 
" believed that her assistance will be sufficiently rapid 
"and energetic to be effective 1 ." 

CLet us turn to France. In the spring and summer 
of 1914 the French Republic was not in good odour. 

1 French Yellow Book (1914), p. 18. 



140 LECTURE VII 

The miserable Caillaux affair, with the resulting recrimi- 
nations between Ministers of State, awakened a general 
sense of distrust and alarm. Parliamentary Government 
had long been on its trial, and now it seemed condemned. 
Groups of men, struggling for power, displaced others so 
soon as they were hopelessly discredited. Above them 
there stood a manly figure, M. Poincare, who typified 
France ; but he seemed powerless before the strife of the 
factions. Worst of all, some Ministers stood accused 
of selling State secrets to Germany. Then again, the 
army was far from strong. True, the Chambers had in 
the summer of 1913 passed a law reinforcing three years' 
military service, a measure which promised to restore 
the military efficiency latterly open to question. But 
early in 1914 the supporters of the new Ministry threatened 
to get that decree repealed. Everything therefore 
became uncertain. Later on, on July 13, there took 
place in the Chambers a debate, in which the army was 
alleged to be ill equipped for war, boots and other 
necessaries being deficient both in quality and quantity. 
The disclosures sent thrills of alarm through France, of 
exultation through Germany. 

At that time, too, no small part of the French effectives 
was still locked up in Morocco ; and some weeks must 
ensue before those war-hardened troops could form front 
in Lorraine. Accordingly, Morocco was a drain on the 
French army almost as serious as Mexico was to Napoleon 
III in the crisis of 1866. German generals are known to 
have rejoiced at the ending of the Agadir affair, which 
gave France carte blanche in Morocco, because "it put 
an elephant on the back of France." There was another 
reason why they should act soon against France. When 



THE CRISIS OF 1914 141 

she had thoroughly conquered Morocco, she could marshal 
an army corps of Moors, some of the bravest fighters in 
the world. For the present, Morocco held some 80,000 
of her best troops. As for the French navy, once the 
second in the world, it had now sunk to fifth place. 

The most serious feature in the life of France remains 
to be noted, the declining birth-rate. If that decline 
continued, France would obviously become a Power of 
the second rank. A German official puts it thus : " The 
" French may arm as much as they like. They cannot 
"from one day to another increase their population 1 ." 
Count Reventlow urges that fact as a reason why 
King Edward chose to ally himself with France. She 
was a decadent nation, and therefore it was better 
policy to 'act along with her rather than with ever 
increasing Germany 2 . The argument is true if we 
assume that Great Britain desires to maintain the Balance 
of Power. But the argument is fatal to the Count's 
favourite thesis, the ceaseless greed of the islanders. If 
they were ever eager to clutch at a World-Empire, why 
did they not unite with powerful Germany to partition 
rich but decadent France and her extensive colonial 
empire? That we clasped the hand of the weaker State 
is a convincing refutation of the charges of selfish cunning 
so often flung at us. 

What of the British Empire? In the year 1914 how 
did it stand in the eyes of the militant party of Berlin? 
Certainly there was much to excite their hopes. The 
Pan-Germans had long filled their books and journals 
with disquisitions on the inherent weakness of the British 



1 French Yellow Book (1914), p. 9. 

2 Reventlow, p. 233. 



142 LECTURE VII 

dominions. The arguments were curiously like those 
used by the French Republicans in 1793, adopted by 
Bonaparte, and then pressed home in his Continental 
System. An essay might be written on the theme Delenda 
est Carthago, as applied to England. The idea has capti- 
vated many a thinker, from the time of Quesnay and the 
French Economistes down to the German Agrarians of 
to-day. The fundamental notion is the same. Land is 
the basis of a State, and agriculture is the true source of 
wealth. Manufactures and commerce are later and 
artificial developments. The British, while relying on 
them, have neglected the source of real wealth, agri- 
culture. Therefore England resembles a ship, light in 
ballast and with a fine show of top-hamper, destined to 
founder in the first tempest. The France of Napoleon I 
and the Germany of William II are well trimmed craft 
and will ride out the storm. Such is the theory. It is 
highly attractive, especially to the German Agrarians, 
as it enables them to tax foreign corn and thereby steady 
the ship of State and fill their own pockets. 

One must admit that in the light of the teachings of 
history — Tyre, Carthage, Venice, Portugal, Holland — 
the persistent survival of Great Britain is the most 
exasperating of facts to theory-ridden professors; and 
this it is which, in part at least, accounts for our extreme 
unpopularity in German academic circles. That all the 
learning and ingenuity of the Fatherland should hitherto 
have stumbled over our rock of offence is an unpardonable 
crime. Treitschke, Rohrbach, Reventlow, Frobenius and 
others have proved to demonstration the fragility of the 
British Empire. It was won by guile. We set all the 
Continental States fighting and then stole the best lands 



THE CRISIS OF 1914 143 

across the seas. The moral was obvious. Let all the 
aggrieved States combine and compel the footpad to 
disgorge. If the Pan-Germans had been wise, they 
would have limited themselves to that programme, at 
once moral and lucrative. For the British nation (they 
said) was weak and degenerate, utterly given over to 
sport, neglecting the first duty of citizenship by hiring 
"mercenaries" to fight, detested by the Irish, and loathed 
both by the Boers and the peoples of India. The landing 
of a European force in South Africa (so said Rohrbach 
in 1912) would lead to a rising of the Dutch population, 
and that wealthy land would soon be lost to the Union 
Jack. In that year Germany made formidable military 
preparations in South- West Africa. As will be seen in 
the Appendix, ammunition and stores sufficient to equip 
a force of 10,000 men for six years were in that colony 
in the autumn of 1912; and about that number of men 
were ready to take the field. German officials, when 
questioned, said that these preparations were against the 
Ovambos in the north ; but that native tribe was absolutely 
quiet; and the chief preparations were in the south, not 
far from the border of Cape Colony. Finally it became 
known through an intercepted letter to the German 
cruiser Eber, at Cape Town, that orders were issued at 
Berlin, on June 14, 1914, whereby that ship and others 
would be supplied with coal by means therein described, 
if war ensued 1 . 

Reverting to Rohrbach, we note his estimate of the 
defensive power of Australia. He declared that she 
could not resist if her four chief towns, all of them near 
the coast, were occupied by an invader. As for Canada, 

1 Times, Oct. 6, 1914. 



144 LECTURE VII 

she was sparsely peopled and had no military force worthy 

of mention. India was discontented; the handful of 

white administrators did not understand the people, 

who were always on the brink of revolt. The appearance 

of a single Russian army-corps on the Indus would lead 

to the collapse of British rule. Egypt, the keystone of 

the imperial arch, could easily be dislodged by the Moslems 

in a Holy War. Above all the heart of the Empire was 

weak; for the British people were too enervated by 

luxury and selfishness to cope with the difficulties presented 

by their overgrown Empire 1 . The hopes which Germany 

placed in a general rising of Moslems against Great 

Britain, Russia and France, are strikingly shown in a 

German secret report, dated Berlin, March 19, 1913, 

which advocated extensive preparations for war. It 

proceeded thus: "Disturbances must be stirred up in 

'Northern Africa and in Russia. This is a means of 

'absorbing the forces of the adversary. It is, therefore, 

'vitally necessary that through well-chosen agents we 

' should get into contact with influential people in Egypt, 

'Tunis, Algiers and Morocco, in order to prepare the 

'necessary measures in case of a European war. These 

'secret allies would, of course, be recognized openly in 

' time of war. . . . They should have a guiding head, who 

'might be found among influential religious or political 

'chiefs. The Egyptian school is specially suited for 

' this. More and more it gathers together the intellectuals 

'of the Moslem world 2 ." 

Even those who did not depreciate Great Britain to 

1 Rohrbach, Deutschland unter den Welt-Volkern (1908), pp. 67-164; 
Der deutsche OedanJce in der Welt (1912), pp. 168-176. 

2 French Yellow Book (1914), pp. 9, 10. 



THE CRISIS OF 1914 145 

this extent, proclaimed the need of beating her down. 
General von Bernhardi in his second book, Unsere Zukunft 
(Berlin, 1912), declared that a naval war with her might 
be successful; she found great difficulty in manning her 
fleet by the voluntary system; and (said he), "she seems 
" to be approaching the limits of her naval capacity. In 
"the second place the Baltic and North Sea Canal will 
"soon be finished, and its completion will yield consider- 
able military advantages to Germany. Lastly, the 
"German navy grows from year to year, so that the 
"conclusion lies near, that the comparative strength of 
"the two navies will gradually be altered to England's 
"disadvantage. In the Mediterranean the Austrian and 
"Italian navies are about to k be strengthened." He then 
says it is clearly to the interest of Great Britain to provoke 
a war with Germany as soon as possible. This advice 
to us (we may notice) was a counterpart to that which 
in 1911 he had given to Germany in his work, now 
translated, — Germany and the next War. At the end of 
that book he spoke thus : " Even English attempts at a 
"rapprochement [to Germany] must not blind us to the 
" real situation. We may at most use them to delay the 
" necessary and inevitable war until we may fairly imagine 
" we have some prospect of success." 

Those prospects of success mounted high in the 
summer of 1914. Firstly, because Germany at Midsummer 
opened the enlarged Kiel Canal. In consequence of the 
general adoption of the Dreadnought type of battleship 
she had been forced in 1905 to set about the widening and 
deepening of that canal, so as to admit the passage of 
her new warships, the first of which was launched in 
1908 and completed (I believe) by 1911. Other ships of 
r. l. 10 



146 LECTURE VII 

the Dreadnought type soon followed. But none of them 
could pass quickly from the Baltic to the North Sea or 
vice versa until that canal was widened and deepened, as 
it was at an estimated cost of £12,000,000. The com- 
pletion was fixed for 1915, a time when Germany expected 
to have 18 Dreadnoughts or Super- Dreadnoughts ready, or 
nearly ready, for sea. By great exertions and additional 
expense she completed the canal at Midsummer, 1914. 
She had every reason for haste. In 1910 she transferred 
her large battleships from Kiel to Wilhelmshaf en : and, 
until the canal was completed, they would be unable 
quickly to reach the Baltic and confront the Russian 
fleet. After 1914 Germany could expect to overpower in 
succession both the Russian and French navies if they 
came out of port. She held the interior position between 
them, an immense advantage at all times; and that 
advantage was now enhanced by the means of swift 
entry either into the Baltic or North Sea. 

These considerations are all important for a due under- 
standing of the course of German policy. It is a policy 
based on military and naval considerations. In 1866 
she forced on a war with the Hapsburg Power because 
she had the needle-gun, while other circumstances also 
promised success to her arms. The same holds good of 
the war of 1870. Indeed, writers who neglect the military 
and naval situation leave out of count the determining 
factor of the policy of Berlin. Germany has enjoyed an 
astonishing series of triumphs because she does not go to 
war for an idea or a principle, but because she awaits a 
time favourable for dealing a sudden blow. That is the 
essence of Realpolitik. Even when she does not deal the 
blow, her diplomacy is coloured by the military and 



THE CRISIS OF 1914 147 

naval situation. Note the following facts. Her tone 
became far more aggressive in the year 1895, the year in 
which the Kiel Canal was first opened. She then adopted 
a high tone towards us in the Congo and South African 
Questions, the latter of which nearly led to war. The 
spurt thereby given to British naval construction served 
to impose respect upon her during the Boer War; but 
she then began to build very fast. The Ententes with 
France and Russia and increased naval construction were 
our methods of retort. She, too, pushed on her navy as 
fast as possible; but the adoption of the Dreadnought 
placed her for a time at a great disadvantage, because, 
after the completion of her first Dreadnoughts in 1911-12, 
she could not send them through her ship-canal ; and in 
view of the persistence of the Anglo-Russo-French entente, 
which she found to be solid at the time of the Bosnian 
crisis of 1908-9, she had to prepare to face a naval war 
with all three Powers. She then made greater efforts 
than ever, and so did her Allies, Austria and Italy. By 
the Naval Act of 1912 she provided that about four-fifths 
of her marine should always be kept on a war footing; 
and so threatening was the situation which thus came 
about that the British Admiralty for a time decided to 
leave the Mediterranean, a resolve which emphasized 
our reliance on France in that quarter. It was clear, 
then, that Germany was beginning to run us close. Still, 
she could not well face a war until the great strategic 
advantages of the Kiel Canal were again at her disposal. 
Therefore, on naval grounds it was desirable for her to 
postpone a war until after the completion of that great 
work. This fact was well understood in naval circles. 
In 1913 Commandant Davin of the French navy wrote 

10—2 



148 LECTURE VII 

an article reviewing the naval resources of Germany and 
pointing out that the Canal changed a weak naval base 
into a very strong one. He therefore concluded that 
she would await the completion of that work before 
declaring war 1 . 

But why did she hurry on the Canal so as to be ready 
by Midsummer, 1914? Here the state of the French 
and Belgian armies must be considered. The efficiency 
of the French army was certain soon to increase owing 
to the operation of the law of 1913, reinforcing three years' 
military service. The Belgian army also was becoming 
stronger every year. In 1910 that Government carried 
a law imposing compulsory service for one son at least 
in every family. But in 1912, owing to alarming advice 
respecting German plans, the Chambers at Brussels 
extended the principle of compulsory service with few 
exceptions to males physically fit, above the age of 
nineteen. This would bring to the colours as many as 
56,000 men in 1914-15, instead of 35,000, the contingent 
for 1912-13. Inclusive of the militia reserve, the grand 
total would amount to 200,000 men at the end of 1913. 
Finally it would rise to 340,000. It is certain that Ger- 
many took into consideration this increase. 

The new Army and Taxation Bills introduced into 
the Reichstag on April 7, 1913, led to an interesting 
discussion, the Imperial Chancellor stating that it was the 
duty of the Government to train 60,000 men more every 
year, in order to meet the proposed increases of the 
French and Russian armies. He also pointed out the 
difficulty of acceding to Mr Churchill's proposal of a 

1 La Revue des Questions diplomatiques (1913), pp. 417, 418. 



THE CRISIS OF 1914 149 

Naval Holiday. The Minister for War then stated that 
the object of the Bills was to render possible an offensive 
strategy if war came; for "the best parry is the lunge: 
"the best covering force is the offensive." The new 
taxation comprised a drastically graduated Property 
Tax, as well as Death Duties and Increment Duties, 
against which the Conservatives protested. The Imperial 
Budget subsequently empowered a special vote for 
expenditure of £21,000,000; but that sum has been 
largely exceeded. It is known that the purchase of 
petrol in 1914 was double, and of corn nearly double, 
of that in average years. The opinion became prevalent 
that this drastic taxation could not last ; and a feeling of 
restlessness increased. German newspapers stated that 
£40,000,000 would be spent on war material by July 1. 

A rupture of the peace of Europe appeared so imminent 
on the Albanian-Montenegrin disputes as to justify the 
Powers in taking financial precautions. Those of Germany 
were especially thorough, probably because her credit 
suffered severely at the time of the Agadir crisis in 1911. 
The wholesale collapse which was then barely averted 
led her to take measures to avert a crash in the event of 
war. The full details of her action with the Banks are 
not known. But the German Secret Report of March 19, 
1913, laid down these guiding principles — There must 
be a great increase in armaments and consequently in 
taxation, so that " an outbreak [of war] shall be considered 
"as a deliverance, because after it would come decades 
"of peace and prosperity, such as those which followed 
"1870. The war must be prepared for from a financial 
" point of view. There is much to be done in this direction. 
"The distrust of our financiers must not be aroused, 



150 LECTURE VII 

"but, nevertheless, there are many things which it will 
"be impossible to hide 1 ." 

Accordingly, on July 3, 1913, amidst a time of great 
prosperity, a law was passed authorising the addition of 
gold and silver equal in value to £12,000,000 2 . This sum 
was to be added to the imperial reserve of £6,000,000 
deposited in 1871 in the fortress of Spandau. In addition, 
there was in the Banks of Issue bullion of the value of 
£86,960,000. Thus, the total value of gold and silver 
reserve was £104,960,000. But the Government was 
also ready with measures calculated to meet a sudden 
demand for money. On August 1, 1914, it suspended cash 
payments at the Banks and issued a large amount of paper 
notes and silver coins. The imperial reserve was also made 
available, and the Government immediately established 
banks for the issue of loans even for very small amounts 
on the security of goods and securities of all kinds, thereby 
becoming a paternal pawnbroker. There was therefore 
no need of a moratorium, and Germany prided herself on 
the ease with which she adapted herself to a state of war. 

All had been thought out beforehand ; and there was 
little confusion, certainly far less than was the case here. 
The British Government had no plans ready for meeting 
the financial strain; and at the close of July we were 
face to face with a very serious situation. The Joint 
Stock Banks have been blamed for increasing the general 
distrust by alarmist measures; but it is only fair to 
remember that the situation was so alarming because 
the Government had no plans ready for meeting it. If 

1 French Yellow Book (1914), p. 9. 

2 An authority has informed me that by July 31, 1914, only 
£4,250,000 had been acquired in gold. 



THE CRISIS OF 1914 151 

Bank Holiday had not ensued, and been extended by 
three more days, an unparalleled panic might have been 
the result. Fortunately, the advice of financial experts 
led to the adoption of remedial measures such as the 
moratorium. The mere fact that so desperate a measure 
had to be adopted showed that the Government had 
prepared no plan for reassuring the Joint Stock Banks 
in case of a crisis. It is also noteworthy that the reserve 
of gold in the Bank of England had not been increased, 
as would certainly have been the case if a crisis had been 
expected. No scheme for paper notes was ready, and 
some little time elapsed before the issue of Treasury 
Notes which an amateur forger could not easily counterfeit. 
At Berlin everything had been thought out and provided. 
At London the City was caught in a state of trustful 
innocence. 

Far worse, however, was the general political situation 
of the United Kingdom. The Germans seem to have been 
singularly impressed with the inability of our Government 
to deal with "the wild women." Much space was given 
in their papers to the outrages of the militants; and 
many were the comments on the softness and hesitancy 
of British procedure. The Germans, who never have 
any difficulty with their women, seem to have concluded 
that a Government which allowed itself to be hen-pecked, 
must be in its dotage. That was the general view in 
Germany ; and it must be reckoned among the influences 
which produced a feeling of pride in the Fatherland and 
contempt for the decadent islanders. 

The Irish Question produced an even deeper impression. 
That the British Government should be unable to prevent 
two sets of Irish Volunteers procuring arms and drilling 



152 LECTURE VII 

was incomprehensible to the German mind. If it were 
possible I should like to have heard a lecture by Treitschke 
on that subject. Imagine the scorn he would pour forth 
on a State that could not control its citizens in the most 
elementary of political duties, and allowed them to per- 
vert national defence into a national danger. A heavy 
responsibility lies somewhere about that whole business. 
That responsibility will be allotted someday and will 
prove to be an indirect cause of this war. One cannot 
but sympathize with the German private who was taken 
prisoner by an Irishman. At this he was most indignant. 
"What business have you fighting here (he said). You 
"ought to be fighting in your own civil war." I have 
received interesting proof that General Bernhardi himself 
had expected a civil war in Ireland. My informant 
allows me to quote the part of her letter bearing on this 
topic : — 

Letchwobth. 
Sept. 17, 1914. 

It may possibly interest you to know that last April — May 
I spent at a Pension at Frascati, where I was next to General 
von Bernhardi and his wife at table. He asked me repeatedly 
about the Irish Question, showing great sympathy with the 
Nationalists ; he also asked about the causes of the failure of the 
Government to deal successfully with the Suffragettes. All German 
men I met in Italy this winter seemed to take a special interest in 
these two points .... 

This further point deserves notice. The Austrian Note 
to Serbia was sent on July 23, the day on which it became 
known that the Buckingham Palace Conference on the 
Irish Question was certain to fail. 

It is now, I think, clear to anyone whose eyes are not 
blinded by preconceived notions, that the two Germanic 



THE CRISIS OF 1914 153 

Empires chose the time with extreme skill for launching 
their bolt. Their method of clinching its effects will 
concern us in the next lecture. Here I wish to point 
out that the leaders of Germany, both in the spheres of 
thought and action, have always advocated an energetic 
initiative whenever a fit opportunity occurred. Treitschke 
represents the union of historical learning with the 
victorious militarism of 1870. He uses history as a text 
for glorifying Prussian procedure and stimulating its 
progress towards wider triumphs. He rejoices over the 
treatment of Saxony by Frederick the Great in 1756. 
"Should Frederick (he asks) have had respect for the 
"official regulations of Saxony?" Treaties? What are 
treaties ? The State is superior to all treaties. Treitschke 
says: "The State cannot recognize an arbiter above 
"itself, and consequently legal obligations must in the 
"last resort be subject to its own judgment 1 ." Which 
means that Prussia cannot be bound by international 
law if it thwarts her interests ; also, that the rules of the 
Hague Conference are null and void so soon as the Prussian 
State feels the pinch of circumstances. That has been, 
not merely the dictum of a deaf professor ; it is the maxim 
which has guided Prussia at most of the great crises since 
her first successful crime, the seizure of Silesia. Under 
good men like Frederick William III and IV and William 
I, she swerved nervously towards the Ten Commandments ; 
but she afterwards recurred to the more gainful creed of 
Frederick the Great. 

Let us look more closely at his procedure and that 
of Bismarck ; for they are the chief exponents of Prussian 
State policy. Frederick made no attempt to justify his 

1 Treitschke, Die Politik, Bk i. § 3. 



154 LECTURE VII 

seizure of Silesia from the young Empress- Queen, Maria 
Theresa, whom his father had lately sworn to uphold. 
The young king struck quickly in 1740, and he left it to 
his later apologists, including Carlyle, to discover justi- 
fications. Frederick in his Histoire de mon Temps uses 
no whitewash. He merely says that Maria Theresa was 
weak; her army had of late been badly beaten by the 
Turks; Russia for the time favoured him; and, as 
France and England were always at feud, he would be sure 
of the help of one of them. Therefore he struck at Silesia 1 . 
His action at the beginning of the Seven Years' War 
is equally noteworthy. Here he had more reason for 
striking. His enemies were preparing to move against 
him, and he anticipated them. But he did so by over- 
whelming an unoffending neutral that lay in his way, 
Saxony. True, by that elaborate piece of mystification, 
his Memoire raisonne, he tried to show, later on, that 
Saxony was conspiring against him: but the excuse 
rings hollow, as hollow as those which William II sought 
to foist on the world respecting Belgium. Frederick in 
his Histoire supplies the real reason for the blow dealt 
at Saxony: "Saxony not having finished her [military] 
"arrangements, these conjunctures seemed favourable to 
"gain advantages over the enemies, by forestalling them 
"from the beginning of the campaign 2 ." The British 
Government, which did not want war in Europe, sought 
to dissuade him from this precipitate action against 
a neutral, but Frederick persisted. " Let us conquer " (he 
said) : "the politicians will then find plenty of justification 
"for us." That phrase summed up his motives ; and they 
have largely governed Prussian policy ever since. It has 

1 Fr6d&ric, Hist, de mon Temps, n. 54-6. 2 Ibid. m. 37. 



THE CRISIS OF 1914 155 

become a maxim at Berlin to make rapid use of the 
advantage which a central position gives to well-armed 
forces, In a strictly political sense the central position 
of Germany causes her anxiety. But every student of 
war knows that it confers great advantages if it be used 
with rapidity and decision. Therefore her policy at a 
crisis tends to be governed by military rather than diplo- 
matic considerations. Prussian statesmen always remem- 
ber those significant words in the will of Frederick the 
Great: "May this State always be governed with justice, 
wisdom and force 1 ." 

Much the same view was presented by the Prussian 
military writer, Clausewitz. For him the life of States 
was a constant struggle. When war broke out, it was 
only a change of method ; the struggle for self-preservation 
then went on openly and by force. His notion of strategy 
is this: "The best strategy is always to be very strong, 
"firstly in general, and secondly, at the critical point." 
Thus, Prussia is always struggling. When she goes to 
war she merely intensifies and specializes her efforts with 
a view to the exhaustion of her enemy by the exercise of 
the utmost possible rigour. He thoroughly approved of 
Frederick's merciless use of Saxony in 1756-1762. All 
this was written in 1836-7, a time of profound peace 2 . 

The next great exponent of Prussian policy, Bismarck, 
modelled his policy on that of Frederick. It was strictly 
objective. He hated idealists. Of one of them he 
wrote thus in 1881 : " Professor Gladstone perpetrates 
"one piece of stupidity after another. He has alienated 

1 Frederic, Hist, de mon Temps, vi. 219. 

8 Clausewitz, Vom Kriege und Kriegfuhrung, Bks I. Chg. 1, 2; vm. 
Chs. 6, 7. 



156 LECTURE VII 

"the Turks: he commits follies in Afghanistan and at 
"the Cape [the Majuba affair] ; and he does not know how 
"to manage Ireland. There is nothing to be done with 
"him 1 ." The part of Bismarck's career in which he 
himself took most pride was the Schleswig-Holstein 
Question, in which he got the better of many opponents, 
brushed aside in succession all solutions but his own, and 
had the satisfaction of seeing his handiwork completed 
by an opportune attack upon Austria. His conduct of 
Franco-Prussian negotiations in July 1870 was almost 
equally skilful, for it led up to a rupture at a time ex- 
ceedingly favourable to Prussia. Napoleon III was 
known to be contemplating a league with Austria and 
Italy with a view to an attack upon North Germany in 
1871. Bismarck anticipated that attack; and, on the 
plane of expediency, on which statesmen must act in such 
a crisis, he was justified. Germany waged the war in a 
straightforward way, and she deserved her triumph. 

The wars of 1866-1870 are good examples of Prussian 
policy. They were undertaken after a careful cal- 
culation of chances and by a swift offensive. Whenever 
Prussia wavered and acted weakly, as under Frederick 
William II and III (at least in 1805-12), she came near 
to ruin. The fate of Frederick William IV was even more 
pitiable; for his plans were as diffuse as his decisions 
were halting. Concentration of purpose on one prac- 
ticable aim, and swiftness of action at the favourable 
time, these have been the guiding principles of Prussia 
at her most successful times. It is necessary to recall 
these facts; for many persons who do not know them, 
have formed curiously wrong judgments on Prussian 

1 Bismarck ; Some Secret Pages, n. 456 



THE CRISIS OF 19H 157 

policy, and have framed for it apologies at which the men 
of Berlin in their franker moods would be the first to 
gibe. Treitschke and Bernhardi are excused as freaks, 
alien to the German genius. True, they are to the 
German genius in its best form, as typified by Goethe, 
Kant, Schiller. But Imperial Germany is not now the 
land of Goethe, Kant, Schiller. She is the creation of 
William I and II, of Roon, Moltke, Bismarck and Krupp ; 
and she takes after her creators. A central State must, 
of course, be cautious. Its policy cannot be swayed by 
sentimental considerations. But since 1870 the German 
frontier has been strong. It is extremely strong on the 
side of France and equally so on that of Austria. There- 
fore in the new order of things there is less excuse for a 
Machiavellian policy than there was in the days of 
Frederick the Great. Fortified, too, by the Triple 
Alliance with which Bismarck had buttressed her, she 
might readily have relaxed her military rigour. But 
the restless activity of William II has impelled her on 
dangerous quests, which, as we have seen, involved acute 
friction with Russia, Great Britain and Japan, while 
alarming the United States and Portugal. At the same 
time, too, he did nothing to relax the tension between 
Germany and France. On the contrary, his rigorous 
policy in Alsace-Lorraine made the friction worse. 

That was seen at the time of the Zabern outrage, when, 
after trifling provocation, a neurotic young lieutenant drew 
his sword on a lame shoemaker. The Chancellor and 
Minister of War refused to censure him; and the protest 
of the Reichstag, which at first passed a vote of censure, 
was entirely ignored. The Military Court at Strassburg 
quashed all legal proceedings ; and it was seen that civil 



158 LECTURE VII 

law and a formal protest of the Reichstag counted as 
nothing. The army ruled the State. That was clear in 
the early days of 1914. 

The excuse for all these proceedings was that Germany 
must be armed to the teeth in order to confront Russia 
and France; and that her policy may be explained as 
prompted by fear. Let us examine this theory, not from 
the utterances of private individuals (for they count as 
nothing in Germany), but from the conduct of the Govern- 
ment, which alone is important in this connection. 

There are two infallible tests by which you can tell a 
fearful policy. It seeks to propitiate the most dan- 
gerous of its enemies ; and it seeks to gain every possible 
ally. Now, has Germany of late sought to propitiate 
Russia? No sign can be found of any such intention, 
since the Potsdam interview of November 1910. Then it 
seemed for a time that Tsar and Kaiser had come to a 
temporary accord. But, so soon as the Eastern Question 
again became acute, Germany acted in direct opposition 
to Russia's declared interests. She successfully opposed 
Serbia and Montenegro in the Albanian dispute, and 
finally she helped Austria in those insidious efforts which 
wrecked the Balkan League, patched up an unsatisfactory 
peace, and set the Turk on his feet once more. In all 
this there was a direct defiance of Russia ; and, what is 
more, the two Germanic Empires succeeded. The years 
1908, 1911 and 1913 are marked by three German successes, 
Bosnia, the Morocco-Congo exchange, and the Treaty of 
Bukharest 1 . Central Europe then gave the law to the 

1 Pan-Germans pronounced the acquisition of the large and fertile 
district from the French Congo a defeat ; but this only shows the extent 
of their Moroccan designs. 



THE CRISIS OF 1914 159 

Triple Entente, which bowed before the dictates of 
Berlin. In all this there is no sign of fear, rather of bound- 
less confidence. This was seen by M. Jules Cambon, 
French ambassador at Berlin, who reported to his Govern- 
ment on May 6, 1913: "These people do not fear war: 
"they fully accept its possibility, and they have taken 
"their steps in consequence 1 ." 

Equally significant was the treatment of Italy by the 
Germanic Empires. It was notorious both in 1908 and in 
1912-13 that Italy disliked their Balkan policy. Yet, 
save in the matter of the Sanjak of Novi-Bazar (1908), 
Italy had scant consideration at their hands. In truth, 
their policy seems to lay more stress on the friendship of 
the Sublime Porte than of the Cabinet of Rome. Certain 
it is that neither Berlin nor Vienna swerved from their 
designs in order to retain the alliance of Italy. That 
alliance was of a defensive nature, and was therefore 
forfeited if war resulted from their aggressive designs; 
yet they persisted in those designs, with the result that 
they must have foreseen, the loss of Italy's help. All 
this, I repeat, savours not of fear, but of blind confidence 
in their ability to carry out at all costs a preconceived 
policy, the hour for the execution of which had now 
sounded forth. 

Finally, take the supreme test for Prussian policy, 
the disposition of her troops at the beginning of the war. 
Did that imply dread of Russia ? On the contrary, 
Bernhardi, Frobenius and other officers have for some 
time past been declaring that Germany is perfectly well 
able to wage war on both fronts at once. They had 
built strategic railways, often four lines abreast, which 
1 French Yellow Book (1914), p. 12. 



160 LECTURE VII 

would enable large masses of men to be thrown quickly 
on the eastern or the western frontier ; and on the eastern 
lines especially they have adopted a mechanical device 
whereby their rolling-stock could quickly be adjusted to 
the different gauge of some of the Russian lines. Of 
course, they would not repeat Napoleon's blunder of 
advancing far into Russia ; but, if Austria offered vigorous 
help, as she was certain to do after the murder of her 
Archduke, the German Powers might hope to converge on 
Warsaw and capture it before the unwieldy Eastern 
Colossus had fully bestirred himself. The special cir- 
cumstances of 1914, viz. the strike in Russia, afforded 
special ground for hope that the Germans and Austrians 
might not only capture Warsaw, but push on finally to 
what is a good military position — the line of the Rivers 
Niemen and Bug. There they might pause for the winter, 
having weakened Russia by the occupation of Poland 
and perhaps part of her Baltic provinces. But, far from 
throwing their chief weight on the side of Russia, as they 
would have done if they feared her, they sent their great 
masses westwards to Belgium and France. 

The supreme proof that they did not fear Russia is to 
be found in this fact. Austria, which has more reason 
than Germany to be apprehensive of Russia, sent a 
considerable force, along with heavy siege guns into 
Belgium and Northern France. True, the Central Powers 
found out, when too late, that they had made a blunder 
— that Belgium was not to be walked over in a week, 
and Paris entered within three weeks. The resistance 
in the west was more obstinate, the advance of the 
Russians quicker, than the German Staff had expected. 
But their miscalculation is a tribute to their excess of 



THE CRISIS OF 1914 161 

confidence; and it suffices to explode the theory of fear 
which has been so confidently set forth. The German 
Staff summarized its programme thus : " We shall smash 
"France in three weeks, then wheel about and deliver a 
"knock-down blow to Russia before she has had time to 
"complete her mobilization. Belgium will offer only the 
"resistance of sullenness. England will not come in at 
"all." That was the prospect held forth to encourage 
the leaders of German industry; and it only slightly 
exaggerates what we can now see to have been the plan 
of campaign. That plan was based, not on fear, not even 
on principles of ordinary prudence, but rather on the 
feeling of supreme confidence expressed in the favourite 
national song: 
Deutschland, Deutschland, iiber alles, liber alles in der Welt. 



R. L. 11 



LECTURE VIII 

THE RUPTURE 

" Tore 8e kol veorrjs TroWrj fiev ovcra iv rfj THkoTrovvqa-cd, noWrj 5' 

iv rats 'Adrjvais, ovk aKOvcrlcos inrb aireipias rJTTTero tov iroXifxov." 

(And then the young men being numerous in the Peloponnese, and 

also at Athens, were, through inexperience, not unwilling to start 

the war.) 

Thucydides, Bk n. ch. 8. 

As we have seen, Austria despatched to Serbia a 
series of exacting demands on the very day on which it 
became known that the Buckingham Palace Conference 
on Irish Affairs was certain to fail. So soon as that news 
reached Berlin, the chances became in the highest degree 
favourable to the Central Powers. The finances of France 
showed a deficit of £32,000,000, and the Chambers had 
reluctantly assented to the loan of £52,000,000, deemed 
necessary for carrying through the Three Years' Service. 
The Russian railways were likely to be paralysed by a 
wide-spread strike; and the United Kingdom was on the 
verge of a civil war. Thus, by July 23 a state of things 
had come to pass far more favourable even than that 
which Bernhardi had thus described: 

When a State is confronted by the material impossibility of 
supporting any longer the warlike preparations which the power 
of its enemies has forced upon it; when it is clear that the rival 



THE RUPTURE 163 

States must gradually acquire, from natural reasons, a lead that 
cannot be won back; when there are indications of an offensive 
alliance of stronger enemies who only await the favourable moment 
to strike — then the moral duty of the State towards its citizens 
is to begin the struggle while the prospects of success and the 
political circumstances are tolerably favourable 1 . 

Further, Germany could not wait much longer. The 
Junker party was resolved to get rid of the drastic suc- 
cession duties recently outlined by the German Govern- 
ment. They were inevitable if the armed peace lasted; 
and the German governing class judged war to be pre- 
ferable to such a peace. The Junkers were furious at 
the heavy financial burdens, with no territorial acquisitions 
to show for them. The French Minister at Munich in 
July, 1913, declared that public opinion would welcome 
war — " as the solution of political and economic difficulties 
"which will only become worse 2 ." 

Moreover, Austria was eager to attack the Serbs. 
Her Note of July 23 contained two demands which no 
independent State could accord; viz. to admit Austrian 
officials to take part in the trial of the Serbs accused 
of complicity in the murder at Serajevo; while other 
officials were to collaborate in the suppression of the 
anti- Austrian propaganda. The former of these demands 
Serbia rejected; the latter she promised to comply with 
so far as it agreed with the principles of international 
law, criminal procedure and neighbourly relations. To 
all the other demands she assented. To the two just 
named she could not assent without becoming a vassal 
State. In view of the exceptionally short interval of 

1 Bernhardi, The Next War, p. 52. 

2 French Yellow Book (1914), p. 13 

11—2 



164 LECTURE VIII 

48 hours allowed for a reply to far-reaching and complex 
demands, Austria must have sought to provoke a war. 
Such was the opinion of our ambassador at Vienna, 
Sir Maurice de Bunsen, who stated that: "this country 
"has gone wild with joy at the prospect of war with 
"Serbia, and its postponement or prevention would 
"undoubtedly be a great disappointment 1 ." Whether 
Austria would have welcomed a general war is a wider 
question ; but Russia had repeatedly warned the Court of 
Vienna that any attack on Serbia must involve war with 
Russia 2 . Therefore, that Government precipitated the 
crisis with a full knowledge of the terrible consequences 
that must ensue ; and the question now arises — Would it 
have acted thus if it had not received promises of powerful 
support? 

What was the influence of Germany in the develop- 
ments of Hapsburg policy? Her Government has dis- 
claimed all knowledge of the Austrian demands on Serbia. 
But the following facts seem to imply adequate if not 
exact knowledge on the part of some at least of her re- 
sponsible Ministers. (1) A German oflicial Note approving 
Austria's demands was handed in at London by the 
German Ambassador on July 24, a fact scarcely possible 
unless the Cabinet of Berlin had previously known their 
tenour. (2) The Italian Government, always on cool terms 
with /Austria, had cognizance of them on July 23. If so, 
why j had not the Government of Berlin, always closely 
associated with that of Vienna? (3) On July 23, the 
Bavarian Prime Minister stated that he knew the terms 



1 British White Paper, Nos. 5, 39, 41. 

2 Ibid., No. 139; Russian Orange Book, Nos. 4, 5, 10 ; 13-16, 23. 



THE RUPTURE 165 

of that Note 1 . (4) Von Tschirsky, German Ambassador 
at Vienna, stated on July 26 that Germany "knew 
"very well what she was about in backing up Austria- 
" Hungary in this matter." (5) Sir Maurice de Bunsen 
had good reason for believing that Tschirsky knew 
the terms of the Austrian Note and telegraphed them 
to Kaiser William 2 . These facts, taken together, con- 
stitute a proof as complete as historical evidence generally 
admits. There is also the curious fact, just revealed in 
the French Official Correspondence (Yellow Book), that 
von Jagow, German Secretary for Foreign Affairs, did 
not think it worth while to read the Serbian reply to 
Austria's demands, though on that reply depended peace 
or war in the South-East 8 . Equally significant is it 
that, on the Kaiser's hurried return from his Baltic cruise 
to Berlin, Germany and Austria acted in unison. On the 
28th Germany rejected the British proposal for a Confer- 
ence, and on that day Austria declared war on Serbia. 

As to the Powers forming the Triple Entente, they 
were undoubtedly surprised by Austria's sudden action. 
On July 23 the French President and the chief Ministers 
of the Republic were at Cronstadt and entertained the 
Tsar and his suite on board their warship La France. 
President Poincare and the Tsar both made friendly 
speeches containing not a phrase that differed from the 
ordinary. The Tsar referred to the Franco-Russian 
alliance as a guarantee for peace which both nations 
desired to perpetuate. At Paris a European war was far 
from the thoughts of the public. The Caillaux Trial still 
reigned supreme, witness the fact that the issue of the 

1 French Yellow Book (1914), p. 28. 

2 British White Paper, Nos. 0, 32, 38, 95. 3 French Yellow Book, p. 69. 



166 LECTURE VIII 

Figaro of July 24 allotted two columns to the Cronstadt 
fete, thirty-six columns to the Caillaux Trial, and two 
only to the Austrian Note to Serbia. The editorial 
comment ended with the declaration that the Great 
Powers would abstain from conflict; and it seemed that 
Russia was intimidated by Austria's energy. 

Across the English Channel public attention was 
concentrated almost entirely on the preparations for 
civil war in Ireland. But on July 20 Sir Edward Grey 
asked the German ambassador, Prince Lichnowsky, what 
step Austria was about to take regarding Serbia, and 
advised Germany to urge moderation on the Court of 
Vienna. The prince gave a dubious reply. On July 22 
von Jagow, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at 
Berlin, admitted to our ambassador, Sir Edward Goschen, 
that Austria was about to take action, and he claimed 
that it concerned no other Power whatever; and this, 
too, in spite of the repeated warnings of Russia to the 
Hapsburg Court that its attack on Serbia must involve 
war with Russia. In the face of these repeated warnings 
Germany held to her original contention, that the quarrel 
concerned Austria and Serbia alone. By this course of 
action the Berlin Government practically gave Austria 
carte blanche. 

From this rigid attitude little hope of success could be 
augured for Sir Edward Grey's proposals (July 24-26) of 
a Conference, in which Great Britain and France, after 
deliberating with Germany and Italy, should endeavour 
to moderate the zeal of their respective Allies — Russia 
and Austria. Seeing that the war-fever at Vienna was 
arousing angry feelings at Petrograd, such a solution of 
the difficulty was perhaps the only one practicable. 



THE RUPTURE 167 

France and Italy accepted it ; while Russia expressed her 
approval. Germany declined, for reasons which must be 
pronounced frivolous, in view of the extreme gravity of 
the situation. The coincidence of her refusal with the 
aggravation of the crisis by a declaration of war against 
Serbia has already been noticed 1 . 

An alternative to Sir Edward Grey's proposal of a 
Conference was suggested concurrently at Petrograd on 
July 24, that is, three days before Austria declared war. 
It was as follows. Sazonoff, Russian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, and the French ambassador at Petrograd, sug- 
gested that Great Britain ought at once to join France 
and Russia, the three Powers taking up "a firm and 
"united attitude," as the only means of averting war 2 . 
The question has by this time often been discussed whether 
that was the only means of averting war. That expla- 
nation is plausible. But such a course of action was open 
to grave objections. Firstly, our ambassador, Sir George 
Buchanan, to whom this difficult question was put, had 
no authorization to assent to it. The Triple Entente did 
not bind us to joint action — so much is clear; for other- 
wise the question would not have been put. But, apart 
from that, Great Britain could not consistently adopt a 
threatening tone towards the Central Powers when on 

1 British White Paper, Nos. 10, 11, 36, 42, 43, 49, 71. 

2 Ibid. No. 6; Russian Orange Book, No. 17. No. 23 shows that 
Russia sought to persuade Italy to mediate at Vienna in favour of 
peace. All documents yet published show Russia's desire for peace. 
No. 77 sets forth her case against Germany. 

With the facts stated above, compare the assertion of the German 
Chancellor, on December 2, 1914, that our Government could have 
averted war "if it had without ambiguity declared at Petrograd that 
" Great Britain would not allow a continental war to develop from the 
" Austro-Serb conflict " ! 



168 LECTURE VIII 

that very day Sir Edward Grey had suggested a Conference 
with a view to a friendly solution of the difficulty. You 
may either conciliate or threaten ; you cannot do both at 
once; and Sir Edward Grey, when the question was 
referred to him from Petrograd, commended our am- 
bassador's caution and continued to advocate the Con- 
ference. He knew, far better than his critics can know, 
that both Austria and Germany were in so irritable a 
mood as to be likely to take extreme measures if anything 
resembling a menace were used. He therefore adhered to 
the conciliatory proposal, which Germany was to reject 
on the 28th. By so doing she put herself in the wrong ; 
while unprejudiced observers noted that British policy was 
not only pacific, but also calculated to allay the rising 
storm of passion. 

Most important of all considerations was the influence 
which a menacing attitude would exert upon the Cabinet 
of Rome. There was to be found the key of the diplomatic 
situation. Relatively to the Central Powers, Italy held a 
position not unlike that of Great Britain with regard to 
the Triple Entente. True, she was more closely attached, 
but her obligations were of a defensive nature. If, 
however, we joined Russia and France and issued a 
threatening declaration to the Central Powers, the im- 
mediate result must have been to tighten the bonds of 
the Triple Alliance. Therefore conciliation was not merely 
the only consistent and morally justifiable course; it was 
also the prudent course. In truth those who now say 
that a sterner attitude should have been taken towards 
the Germanic Powers advocate what was, in the cir- 
cumstances, a weaker course of action. They confuse 
diplomacy with war, where the offensive is generally the 



THE RUPTURE 169 

stronger alternative, whereas in diplomacy it is generally 
the weaker alternative. It was so in this case. Italy, 
noting that her Allies persistently adopted an aggressive 
tone, was perfectly justified in parting company with 
them. On August 3 the Italian Government stated that, 
the action of the Central Powers having been aggressive, 
the Triple Alliance lapsed, and Italy would remain 
neutral 1 . That decision, I repeat, could not have been 
formed if we had joined France and Russia in a declaration 
to the Central Powers which could have been represented 
as a menace. The nation therefore owes a deep debt of 
gratitude to Sir George Buchanan and Sir Edward Grey 
for their self-restraint in declining a course of action 
which on the surface seemed attractive. If they had 
followed it, war would not have been averted, and we 
should now be fighting Italy. A study of this question 
must yield cause for thankfulness that our foreign policy 
has not been directed by brilliant and self-confident 
amateurs, who claim to possess an exceptional fund of 
common sense. 

Meanwhile, as we have seen, Kaiser William had 
returned in haste from his Baltic cruise, greatly to the 
regret of the German Foreign ; Office, which affected 
solicitude for the excitement likely to be produced by 
that step 2 . The fact of its regret may be noted, the 
excuse may be disregarded. Late on July 28 (the day of 
Austria's declaration of war) Kaiser William telegraphed 
to the Tsar. After referring to the murders of King 

1 British White Paper, Nos. 49, 64, 92, 152. 

2 The arguments urged in Germany as to the Kaiser knowing nothing 
of diplomatic developments during his cruise are clearly inapplicable to 
the age of wireless telegraphy 



170 LECTURE VIII 

Alexander and his Queen in 1903, and to that of the 
Archduke Francis Ferdinand, he continued: " Un- 
doubtedly you will agree with me, that we two, you and 
"I as well as all sovereigns, have a common interest in 
"insisting that all those morally responsible for this 
"terrible murder shall suffer deserved punishment." 
He therefore expressed the hope that the Tsar would not 
be overborne by the excitement on behalf of Serbia which 
was increasing in Russia. The Tsar replied on the 
following day: "...In this serious moment I ask you 
'urgently to help me. A disgraceful war has been de- 
clared on a weak nation. The indignation at this, 
'which I fully share, is immense in Russia. I foresee 
' that soon I can no longer withstand the pressure that is 
'being brought to bear upon me, and that I shall be 
'forced to adopt measures which will lead to war. In 
'order to prevent such a calamity as a European War, I 
'ask you in the name of our old friendship, to do all 
'that is possible for you to prevent your ally from going 
'too far." The Kaiser returned to the charge with two 
telegrams. In the former he repeated his former argument 
and added: "it is quite possible for Russia to remain in 
"her role of a spectator towards the Austro-Serbian War, 
"without dragging Europe into the most terrible war 
"that it has ever seen 1 ." The ground on which the 
Kaiser based this charge was that on July 29 Russia had 
mobilized part of her army (viz. in the military districts 
of Odessa, Kieff, Moscow, and Kazan) as a sharp warning 
to Austria. The Kaiser deprecated this mobilization 

1 German White Book, Annexes 20-23 a. For Serbia's appeal to 
Russia for help see Russian Orange Book, No. 6. No. 56 shows that 
the Tsar on July 28 telegraphed a reply in the affirmative. 



THE RUPTURE 171 

(albeit only partial) obviously because it would interfere 
with the pre-arranged plan of an Austrian incursion into 
Serbia, with which no outsider had any concern. To this 
scheme he adhered with the rigidity which forms a pro- 
minent feature of his character. As his study of Napoleon 
has finally endowed him with a full measure of Napoleonic 
pertinacity, we may pause to notice its manifestation in 
a physical sense. On the occasion of a religious service 
before the troops on parade, it was noticed that, while 
everyone else occasionally shifted the weight of the body 
from one leg to the other, the Kaiser remained absolutely 
inflexible during the whole of the hour. It was his manner 
of doing honour to the Hohenzollern Deity. Now, the 
will-power which so prolonged a strain implies has been 
exerted increasingly on foreign policy, all the more so 
because the present Chancellor is inexperienced in diplo- 
matic affairs 1 . 

In its psychological aspect, then, the crisis may be 
stated thus: the fate of Europe depended on the ability 
of the Kaiser to realize the extreme peril of the course 
which he was following, that is, if he was, as he claimed, 
the friend of peace. If so, he completely misjudged the 
situation, mainly (it would seem) because he staked all 
on being able to convince the Tsar that all sovereigns 
had a common interest in assuring the chastisement of a 
nation of assassins. But here again he displayed another 
defect, excess of energy. He urged this plea with so much 
insistence that the Tsar must have discerned in it an 
appeal to his fears. Certainly, he rejected it most 
decisively, and he took his stand on what may be termed 
the national ground. As the father of his people he 

1 Lamprecht, pp. 82, 110. 



172 LECTURE VIII 

could not see a small Slav State dragooned by Austria. 
Knowing the history of her efforts, from 1878 onwards, 
to secure hold of Serbia, he saw in the present appeals 
merely a repetition in acuter form, of the Germanic 
policy which had inflicted defeats on the Slav cause in 
1908 and 1912-13. Twice he had bowed before the 
Kaiser's "shining armour." He was resolved not to 
endure humiliation a third time and see Austria overrun 
the Balkans. That she was aiming at the longed-for 
goal, Salonica, was reported both at Rome and Con- 
stantinople. At the latter place the Austrian ambassador 
bemoaned "the deplorable situation of Salonica under 
" Greek administration," and then spoke of the "assistance 
"on which an Austrian army could count from Mussulman 
"population discontented with Serbian rule 1 ." While 
the Tsar was being amused by professional disquisitions 
on the duties of crowned heads, the Austrian eagle was 
about to wing its flight to Salonica. 

If there was any danger of the Tsar succumbing to 
the appeals from Potsdam, it vanished on receipt of the 
news as to secret and swift preparations for war in 
Germany, which were proceeding on both fronts. This 
was the more threatening, as the French President and 
Ministers did not reach France, after their voyage from 
Cronstadt, until July 27-28, up to which time no Minister 
was able to give definite orders. The absence of the 
Government and the general confusion in the adminis- 
tration, presented an opportunity such as had never occur- 
red since the year 1875. Then, as we saw in Lecture I, 
Russia and Great Britain declared that France must 
not be taken at a disadvantage; and, now again, as the 

1 British White Paper, Nos. 19, 82. 



THE RUPTURE 173 

situation developed, Russia saw the danger to her ally. 
On July 31 she ordered a general mobilization. This 
led to instant ultimatums from Berlin to Petrograd and 
Paris, requesting demobilization under pain of the com- 
mencement of hostilities. 

The circumstances amidst which these imperious 
demands were sent deserve notice. On July 31 Russia 
signified both to the Austrian and British Governments 
her desire to frame an amicable arrangement with the 
Court of Vienna, in accordance with the plan suggested 
by Sir Edward Grey. That Court forthwith assented; 
and consequently there appeared a prospect of a peaceable 
settlement. The attitude of Russia had throughout 
been conciliatory, and Austria now seemed about to 
respond in the same spirit. Then it was that Germany 
intervened, allowing Russia only twelve hours in which 
to agree to a complete demobilization. In the words 
of Jules Cambon, French ambassador at Berlin, — "The 
"ultimatum of Germany, intervening just at the exact 
"time at which agreement appeared on the point of 
"being established between Vienna and Petrograd, is 
" significant of her bellicose policy." Further, the incident, 
distinctly aggressive on her part, could be represented 
by her as implying general disarmament (though her own 
preparations were far advanced) — a plea which would 
for the time cajole her Social Democrats 1 . Germany, 
however, claims that Russia was arming fast before 
July 31, and without the Tsar's knowledge. On this 
question it is impossible at present to acquire exact 
information. 

1 French Yellow Book, pp. 5, 13 15-17, 41, 66-9, 109, 110; Russian 
Orange Book, pp. 48-57. 



174 LECTUEE VIII 

Kussia refused to accede to the German demand: 
France temporized, in the hope of gaining a day or 
two of respite. But the rupture came about on 
August 3; with Russia on August l 1 . 

The storm-centre now moved suddenly to Belgium. 
Already, on July 29, the German Chancellor had made to 
Sir Edward Goschen his "infamous proposals," to the 
effect that, in the event of war, and provided that Great 
Britain maintained neutrality, Germany would take no 
mainland territory from France but limit her demands 
to French colonies. He further promised to respect the 
neutrality of Holland. As regards Belgium he said : " It 
"depended upon the action of France what operations 
" Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but, 
"when the war was over, Belgian integrity would be 
"respected if she had not sided against Germany 2 ." The 
last clause is to be noted, because by the custom of 
nations, Belgium is bound to uphold her neutrality if it 
is impugned. 

This stipulation is, indeed, an essential condition of 
neutrality ; for otherwise a neutral State becomes a means 
whereby one State may attack another at a comparatively 
unguarded part of its frontier. The neglect to maintain 
neutrality had been the ruin of Poland. Moreover, at the 
end of August, 1870, when threatened by the powerful 
armies of Germany and France, Belgium had maintained 
her neutrality; and Marshal McMahon's forces, because 
they respected that neutrality, became wedged into a 
false position at Sedan. Further, in 1842 and 1875 (as 

1 British White Paper, Nos. 99, 105, 134. See M. P. Price, Diplo- 
matic History of the War (1914), pp. 90 — 114 for military moves, etc. 

2 British White Paper, No. 85. 



THE RUPTURE 175 

we have seen), statesmen, who discussed the question of 
Belgium's neutrality, agreed that she would fulfil the 
duties which it imposed. Early in 1852, Queen Victoria 
wrote to the King of the Belgians, assuring him against 
the alleged designs of Napoleon III, and stating — " Any 
" attempt on Belgium would be casus belli for us 1 ." In 
1875 Bismarck admitted that Great Britain, as one of 
the signatory Powers of the treaty of 1839 (constituting 
Belgium a neutral State under international guarantees) 
must defend Belgium if she were attacked. That was 
consonant with the declaration of Mr Gladstone in 1870, 
though he phrased it with less clearness than could be 
desired. 

It is also well known that* the German Staff discussed 
questions arising from the possible forcing of the Scheldt 
estuary (in Dutch waters) by a British expedition, which 
might seek to succour the Belgian army if driven into its 
great camp of refuge at Antwerp. Those discussions pre- 
supposed that Great Britain would make the attempt. 
Further, the Dutch Government had mounted heavy guns 
at Flushing to command that estuary, as if it feared some 
such action by the British. Its action was deemed un- 
friendly both to Great Britain and to Belgium, especially 
as it neglected to fortify the Dutch-German frontier. 

Consequently the military and naval situation, no less 
than the diplomatic engagements, proclaimed the fact 
that Great Britain was bound in honour to protect 
Belgium if she were attacked, and that both at Berlin and 
The Hague it was expected that she would in that case 
defend her by force of arms. The Belgian Government 
also, on July 24, expressed the confident belief that Great 

1 Letters of Queen Victoria, n. p. 438. 



176 LECTURE VIII 

Britain and the other signatory Powers would act in that 
manner. For its part, it intended to uphold the neutrality 
of Belgium, "whatever the consequences." Preparatory 
measures of defence were also adopted to give effect to 
this appeal for the support of the Powers. Belgium had 
every right to expect that her appeal would be respected 
because, of the four States which have been permanently 
neutralized by international law, viz. Switzerland (1815), 
Belgium (1831, 1839), Luxemburg (1867), the [Belgian] 
Congo (1885), not one has been attacked. On the 
contrary, in the case of Belgium, on every occasion on 
which she appealed to the treaty constituting her a neutral 
State, that treaty was respected, even in less important 
matters 1 . History will therefore record the verdict that, 
during 99 years, there has occurred no violation of the 
territory of an internationally neutralized State, and that 
Germany has been the first nation since Waterloo to 
commit such a violation. To find a parallel, we must go 
back to the ages of barbarism. 

As regards the conduct of Great Britain at the crisis, 
Germans, from the Kaiser downwards, have affected so 
much surprise that a few words seem called for as to our 
action in times past when the independence of the Low 
Countries was threatened by a Great Power. 

I must almost apologize for the hackneyed nature of 
the facts I am about to name. Since the reign of Edward I 

1 E. Descamps, La Neutrality de la Bdgique (1902), pp. 335, 552. 
Professor Westlake (Bevie/w of International Law, 1901), states that 
neither the neutral State nor any of the signatories can annul the 
obligations which the original compact imposes. See, too, Descamps, 
V&tat neutre & Titre permanent (Paris and Brussels, 1912), ch. v, § 6. 
On April 29, 1914, von Jagow assured the Reichstag Committee that 
Belgian neutrality would be respected. 



THE RUPTURE 177 

no English ruler, endowed with energy and patriotism, has 
allowed a Great Power to conquer or annex the Flemish 
and Dutch provinces. Our first important naval battle, 
that off: Sluys (1337), was fought to keep the French out 
of Flanders. The names of Sir Philip Sidney, Cromwell, 
Marlborough, and Wellington, further recall to us the 
numerous campaigns whereby Britons assured either the 
independence of those provinces, or at least, their govern- 
ance by Austria on terms not unfavourable to them and 
productive of security to England. On the other hand, 
hostile Powers have from early times sought to possess 
those coasts whence an invasion of our shores can most 
readily be attempted. 

To resume: the following facts are clear and indis- 
putable: (1) Belgian neutrality had never yet been 
violated ; (2) apart from sinister plans in 1866 and 1875, the 
signatories to the fundamental pact of 1839 had always 
been prepared to fulfil their obligations to Belgium ; (3) the 
defence of the Low Countries against aggression by any 
Great Power is the most prominent and persistent feature 
of British foreign policy from the time of Edward I to that 
of George V. The events leading to the many battles 
fought in the Netherlands, from Sluys to Waterloo, were 
manifestations of the same motive, which led us to protest 
against the construction of Dutch forts dominating the 
Scheldt estuary, while Holland did not defend her eastern 
frontier against G ermany . This guiding principle of Britist 
policy is, I repeat, so obvious, so well known to every his- 
torical student, that it cannot be unknown to statesmen 
and publicists in Germany. Accordingly, we are justified in 
branding as hypocritical the clamour which has there been 
raised against us for taking a step which honour and 

r. l. 12 



178 LECTURE VIII 

sound policy alike prescribed 1 . That German professors 
should take the lead in these outbursts of malice is not 
the least extraordinary incident amidst all the mad events 
of this annus mirabilis. Further, that the German 
Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, should ever have made to 
a British ambassador the cynical proposals of July 29 is 
to be explained by his total inexperience in diplomatic 
affairs, for which Professor Lamprecht vouches 2 . 

As to the stories of the violation of Belgian neutrality 
by British or French troops, or aviators, whereby German 
officials and journalists sought to excuse Germany's pro- 
ceedings towards Belgium, they are sufficiently refuted, 
firstly, by the bewildering inconsistencies of the stories 
themselves 3 , and secondly, by the action of the Chancellor, 
who, when those inconsistencies were patent even at Berlin, 
took refuge in the statement that necessity knows no law, 
and that it was absolutely essential for Germany to " hack 
"her way through," i.e. to Paris. Here at least there 
was no pretence. Bethmann-Hollweg may at least claim 
the merit of having stated the usual Prussian procedure 
with the usual Prussian frankness. But the measure of 
his political intelligence may be grasped by the incoherent 
fury which he displayed towards Sir Edward Goschen at 
their final interview. A statesman who had the faintest 

1 The Chancellor's speech to the Reichstag on December 2 is a tissue 
of falsehoods as will be seen by the British, French, and Russian State 
Papers. How can he maintain that the British, unprovoked, suddenly 
attacked unsuspecting Germany, when, on July 26, she suddenly re- 
called her fleet from Norway, a step which led to our countermanding, 
on July 27, the demobilization of the British fleet ? The Konigin 
Luise began mine-laying off Felixstowe within fourteen hours of the 
declaration of war. 

2 Lamprecht, p. 110. 

3 e.g. Belgian Grey Book, Nos. 21, 22. 



THE RUPTURE t 179 

consciousness of the blunders which had brought Great 
Britain into the field, would have sought to retrieve those 
blunders and render an accommodation possible at an 
early date. 

Perhaps the explanation of this inconceivable folly may 
be found in the priority accorded to military considerations 
at that time. It is probable that, during the Kaiser's 
cruise, those considerations triumphed over the dictates 
of complaisance towards an ally (Italy) and neutrals, 
which diplomacy enjoins. The international situation 
was sufficiently complex to call for prudence and self- 
restraint. But a decision in favour of rapid and aggressive 
action at all costs was evidently formed by the close 
of July. The Kaiser on his return threw in his lot 
with the forward party and used his influence to cajole 
Russia while his western army dealt a smashing blow at 
Paris. The Meuse Valley via Namur had long been 
approved by soldiers as the quickest and easiest line of 
advance to the French capital. The 16-inch howitzers 
which Krupp had kept secret were with reason expected 
to demolish all fortifications except the very few of the 
most modern type. If, therefore, Belgium resisted, she 
would easily be trampled down ; and the estimate of three 
weeks for the victory over France was not extravagant 
in view of the complete equipment and vast numbers of 
the German forces of the west. Everything had been 
provided — maps of Belgium for the soldiery, concrete 
foundations outside the Belgian fortresses, while Krupp 
had withheld from Antwerp some of the heavy guns long 
before ordered for the completion of its defences. On 
the River Scheldt above Antwerp had been erected a 
large and solidly built German factory, which proved at 

12—2 



180 LECTUEE VIII 

the crisis to be furnished with abundance of heavy timber 
and other appliances that enabled the invaders rapidly to 
cross the river and thus harass the retreating Belgian and 
British forces 1 . Other proofs might be cited as to the 
careful preparations for invading the whole of Belgium, 
not merely the Meuse Valley as was at first supposed. 
The project was, not merely to strike at Paris, but to 
acquire Antwerp, Ostend, and the northern ports of 
France. 

This fact, which is now obvious enough, is referred to 
here because it throws light on the procedure of Bethmann- 
Hollweg on July 29 in the interview already described. 
He then offered to Sir Edward Goschen that Belgium 
should recover her independence if she had not opposed 
the Germans during their march. That a brave people 
should not at some points oppose the invaders, if the 
due amount of rigour be adopted, is inconceivable; but, 
even supposing that the Belgians had not res" ed, their 
doom was sealed; for the custom of nation:; loes not 
recognize a neutrality which its possessor does n t uphold. 
Therefore the German Chancellor's proposals could have 
but one end in view, annexation. 

His proposals were assessed by the British Government 
at their due value, and on July 30 were decisively rejected. 
So, too, was his proposal of a general neutrality agreement 
between the two Powers; and the revelations made by 
Mr Asquith on October 2 as to the manner in which 
Germany had previously used that expedient so as to tie 
our hands in face of all eventualities, sufficiently explain 
the motive underlying the not dissimilar proposal of 

1 Figaro, Nov. 7, 1914. 



THE RUPTURE 181 

July 29. It was evidently a bait wherewith to hook us 
while Germany worked her will on Belgium 1 . 

Sir Edward Grey now requested both the French and 
German Governments to give assurances of their respect 
for Belgian neutrality. The reply of France was so 
frank and complete as to refute the stories of French 
aggression. That of Germany to both the Belgian and 
British ambassadors was unsatisfactory. On July 31 
von Jagow, the Foreign Secretary, declared to the former 
that Germany had no intention whatever of violating 
Belgian territory, but he could not make a declaration to 
that effect without prejudicing the chances of Germany 
in the event of war ensuing 2 . (It was the day of her 
ultimatum to France.) To Sir Edward Goschen he replied 
thus : He thought that any reply the German Ministers 
might give "could not but disclose a certain amount of 
"their plan of campaign, in the event of war ensuing, 
"and he was therefore very doubtful whether they would 
"return any answer at all." His surmise was correct. 
True, on August 1, Prince Lichnowsky made to Sir Edward 
Grey certain offers, to which some importance has been 
attached in certain quarters, but, as they contradicted 
the declarations of his chiefs at Berlin, they must be dis- 
missed as possessing no official character. The divergence 
between his statements and that of his Government had 
previously been noticeable. On August 1 it was most 
marked 3 . 

During that interview with Prince Lichnowsky, 
Sir Edward Grey stated that the British Government 

1 British White Paper, Nos. 85, 101. 

2 Belgian Grey Book, Nos. 9, 11-13. 

8 British White Paper, Nos. 43, 46, 122, 123. 



182 LECTURE VIII 

was not committed to any course of action, an assertion 
consonant with his previous declarations, that the Austro- 
Serb dispute in no way concerned us 1 . It is also worthy 
of notice that, on August 2, Sir Edward Grey, in giving to 
the French envoy, M. Cambon, the promise of our naval 
support in case the French fleet were attacked by that 
of Germany, was careful to add that that offer was subject 
to the assent of the British Parliament. The fact proves 
that the Entente with France, which is believed to refer 
almost entirely to naval affairs, does not and cannot 
override the authority of Parliament 2 . 

Matters now came swiftly to the climax. On August 2 
Germany sent her troops into Luxemburg; but, as she 
represented that act as prompted solely by administrative 
reasons so as to prevent the French making use of the 
railway through the Grand Duchy, Great Britain did 
not treat that infraction of neutrality as constituting a 
casus belli. Further, it did not vitally affect the safety 
of France, as was the case when Germany proceeded to 
violate Belgian neutrality 3 . On August 3 she demanded 
permission from Belgium to despatch troops into that 
land. Her pretext now was that this proceeding would 
help Belgium to prevent the violation of her territory. 
But, as by this time France had given an explicit promise 
to respect Belgian neutrality (a fact which was already 
perfectly well known at Berlin 4 ), the Government of 
Brussels at once detected the hollowness of the pretext; 

1 British White Paper, Nos. 87, 116, 119. 

2 Ibid. No. 148. 

3 As Prussia in 1867 withdrew her troops from Luxemburg (where 
she had them since 1815) she had some slight claim to reoccupy it in 
time of crisis. (See Descamps. p. 73.) 

4 British White Paper, No. 122. 



THE RUPTURE 183 

and it is in the light of this monstrous demand on Belgium 
that we must view the eager appeal of the German Chan- 
cellor to Great Britain on August 4th, to remain neutral, 
while German troops overran Belgium 1 . His despatch 
was preceded by one from King Albert containing a manly 
appeal for the support which Great Britain had always 
accorded, especially in 1870 during the Franco-Prussian 
War. British support was, of course, forthcoming; but 
Sir Edward Grey made one more effort to convince the 
German Government of the seriousness of the step which 
it was then contemplating. On hearing that German 
troops had entered Belgium, he despatched an ultimatum, 
demanding that Germany should respect the neutrality 
of Belgium, on pain of encountering the hostility of the 
United Kingdom. As the Court at Berlin refused to draw 
back, war ensued at the end of August 4. 

It has been suggested that he should have declared 
more emphatically at an earlier stage what our conduct 
would be in such a crisis. To this it will suffice to reply 
that any declaration on bis part which assumed that 
Germany was about to violate Belgian soil, while she was 
hotly disclaiming any such intention, would have aggra- 
vated the crisis, instead of averting it. He made it as 
clear as diplomatic procedure admits, that Great Britain 
regarded the Belgian Question as one of extreme gravity, 
on which we must, at the worst, take decisive action. 
Moreover, the fact that the British fleet was kept to- 
gether, instead of dispersing for the manoeuvres, was 
a circumstance calculated to make more impression on 
the statesmen at Berlin than any number of diplomatic 
representations. They therefore have no ground for 
1 British White Paper, No. 157. 



184 LECTURE VIII 

complaining that they were not duly warned. On the 
whole, British diplomacy may be pronounced to have 
steered steadily a middle course such as ought to have 
averted a collision. If it failed, it was because the men 
at Berlin were resolved at all costs to carry out their plans 
as regards Belgium. Again, the final verdict on British 
versus German diplomacy came from Rome. The Italian 
statesmen were far better judges of the merits of the 
dispute than any outsiders can be; and their action 
tells decisively in favour of the conduct of the United 
Kingdom 1 . 

In view of the facts set forth in this and former lectures, 
and still more in those of the French, Belgian, and Russian 
despatches, which I have been unable to compress into 
these lectures, no reasonable person can entertain any 
doubt as to the aggressive designs of Germany. She 
intended first to crush France, then to repel the Russian 
forces and wage defensive campaigns in East Poland 
which would wear out Russia. The Kaiser's telegrams to 
the Tsar may have been designed to postpone the Russian 
mobilization, which he expected in any case to be slow 
owing to the strike. That he desired to avert war with 
Russia is inconceivable in view of his action in sending 
the imperious ultimatum of July 31. Russia was bound 
by honour to succour France, who was known to be in 
deadly danger 2 . She was equally bound to try to save 
Serbia from the Austrian forces then at her gates. There- 
fore the Kaiser must have counted either on disgracing 
Russia in the eyes of the world, or on compelling her to 

1 See speech of Italian Premier in Times of Dec. 5, 1914. 

2 British White Paper, Nos 99, 105 ; French Yellow Book, Nos. 106, 
114, 118, 127. 



THE RUPTURE - 185 

fight at a time equally favourable to himself and unfavour- 
able to the Tsar. 

His conduct towards Great Britain was somewhat of 
the same nature. If his Chancellor's proposals of July 29 
had been accepted, Great Britain would forthwith have 
felt the paralysing sense of shame which is more deadly 
than fifty defeats. Disgraced in the eyes of the world, 
stricken in all probability with civil war, she would 
easily have succumbed in the final round of the world- 
conflict. For it is inconceivable, having regard to the 
Kaiser's lengthy and laborious intrigues in Turkey 1 and 
South Africa that he was not seeking for an opportunity 
to overthrow his chief antagonist. The British Empire 
met him everywhere ; and his restless spirit, like that of 
his far greater exemplar, could not brook a state of things 
in which the British race occupied the best lands of the 
world. From the standpoint of a German Chauvinist 
the conflict between the two Empires was inevitable ; but 
the eager precipitation of Germany in clutching at 
Antwerp and Ostend, disclosed her ulterior designs and 
brought into the field the Island Power which, up to the 
end of July, steadily refused to believe in the imminence 
of war. 

If all Germans are Chauvinists then the war was 
unavoidable ; and it is now known from the Secret Report 
of the German Government that in the spring and summer 
of 1914 official influence was used in order to excite public 
opinion to the state of exaltation in which war was 
acclaimed as ushering in the hour of Germany's greatness. 
If, I say, this is the permanent conviction of the German 

1 Note the naive admission of the German Chancellor in his speech 
of December 2, that the Turks were obliged to join in the war. 



186 LECTURE VIII 

people, then war will possibly be the occupation of the 
human race during as long a period as occurred under the 
baneful sway of Napoleon I. 

But surely defeat must bring calmer thoughts. The 
Germans must cease to plan a WelipolitiJc that endangers 
the existence of Great Britain, France, Belgium, Holland, 
Russia, the Balkan States, and Japan, probably, also, of 
the United States. In Talleyrand's famous phrase they 
must cease to be world-conquerors and become "good 
"Europeans." They will, before long, realize that the 
regime of force, which three triumphant wars have taught 
them to acclaim as the chief factor in German progress, 
must lead to disaster. In the nature of things, force 
begets force; and the vaster and more aggressive the 
schemes championed by their War-Lord, the more certain 
is it that other nations will unite to resist them to the very 
death. That is the outstanding lesson of the events of a 
century ago in which Prussia bore her part nobly against 
schemes of universal domination. The songs of Arndt and 
the exploits of Bliicher, to which she now appeals on behalf 
of her war of conquest, ought to recall her to the ideals 
of national independence and of resistance to an aggressive 
imperialism, for which a century ago she strove shoulder 
to shoulder with the British and Russian soldiery. Of 
late she has been maddened by the lust of conquest which 
brought ruin to Napoleonic France. Let her hark back 
from Treitschke to Niebuhr, from Nietzsche to Fichte, 
from 

" Deutschland, Deutschland, iiber alles, iiber alles in der Welt," 
to Die Wacht am Rhein. 

In that happier day, which is surely ahead after these 
horrors are past, Germany will, it is to be hoped, discover 



THE RUPTURE 187 

that international law, on which she has insanely trampled, 
may prove to be her safest support. For when the din 
of war dies down, we shall realize that behind the 
lust of conquest there was an elemental force impelling 
the German people forward. Their population is ever 
increasing ; and they must have more elbow-room in some 
of the sparsely inhabited lands. On this occasion they 
have sought the disastrously wrong method of war. 
Just as Napoleon the Great mercilessly exploited the 
nascent strength of French democracy, so, too, his imi- 
tator has now made use of the natural desire of his people 
for expansion to bring about conflicts of even wider 
extent and greater fury. In both cases the methods 
employed were disastrous; *but we must recognize the 
naturalness of the impelling force behind both Emperors. 
A century ago there was no Supreme Court of Appeal as 
to the vital interests of nations. To-day there is such a 
Court, the Hague Tribunal. The wiser and better course 
for Germany would have been to seek to enlarge its 
powers so as to include the consideration of her important 
vital problem, and the adoption of some scheme which 
promised a peaceful solution. 

In the course of the reaction in favour of inter- 
national law, to which its insane violation must lead, 
the Hague Tribunal will surely acquire an added dignity, 
a wider scope, and surer guarantees, in the discharge of 
its beneficent functions. The task will, doubtless, prove 
to be difficult ; and cynics will point to the Holy Alliance 
of the monarchs as a warning example. But, though 
three or four monarchs failed ninety years ago, may not 
the collective wisdom of all the nations now succeed? 
For my part I cannot believe that the ingenuity of the 



188 LECTURE VIII 

human race, which has lately gone so largely towards 
perfecting the means of slaughter, must always fail in 
providing a remedy for slaughter. The enlarged and 
strengthened Areopagus of the nations must and will 
discuss such questions as the excessive pressure of popu- 
lation in one State, and it will seek to direct the surplus 
to waste or ill-cultivated lands. In that more intelligent 
and peaceful future Germans will not need to " hack their 
way through." The flat of mankind will, I hope, go 
forth that they shall acquire, if need be, parts of Asia 
Minor, Mesopotamia, and South Brazil. America will 
realize that the world cannot for ever bow down to the 
Monroe Doctrine, especially as the United States have 
become a colonising Power, but that parts of South 
America may safely be thrown open to systematic coloni- 
sation by a nation like Germany. Above all, the Council 
of the Nations will decide that an effete rule like that of 
the Turks must give way before that of more progressive 
peoples. If this is the outcome of the present awful 
conflict, it will not have been waged wholly in vain. 

Note. On December 5, 1914 the Italian Premier, Signor 
Giolitti, declared that Austria, on August 9, 1913, announced 
privately to Germany and Italy her intention of proceeding against 
Serbia. Italy refused to co-operate. It is clear, then, that Austria's 
coup of July 23, 1914 had long been planned, and that the murder 
of the Archduke afforded the pretext. 



CM 

i— ( 

1 

i— l 

p-H 

as 
r— i 


&J 


CO 






o 


O 




*-• 


d 


tH 






CM 

l-H 


I - 


H 


»o 






«5 


© 

CM 


<?-. 


i— 1 

i-H *™ 
1 

o 

rH 

os 

i-H 


ri 


CM 






O 


GO 


CM 


l>« 


d 


<* 






CM 


CM 

i-H 


O 


9* 


s 


I> 






lO 


o 

CM 


O °- 


o 

l-H 

1 

OS 
© 

3a 

F— 1 


?=; 


<N 






O 


r-» 




o 


d 


"# 






CM 


CM 

i-H 




-* 


H 


00 




to 


CM 




«o 


OS 
1 

oo 

© 

OS 
i-H 


ptj 


o 






© 


l> 


»o 


d 


T* 




1 CM 

1 


CM 

i-H 


T# 


h 


CM 




co 


CO 

i-H 




>o 


00 

1 

o 

OS 
l-H 


ri j ° 


tH 


O 


lO 


o 


o 


d M 


o 




CM 


CM O 

i-H 


CO 


H 


CO 


O — 1 


lO CM CM 

l-H i-H 


1 

CO 

o 

OS 
i-H 


Psj 


o 


CM rH 


O 00 


o 


CM 


d 


CM 


© 


— I CM CM O 

i-H 


l-H 


w w 


o o 


o 


CM 


i-H 


00 


CO 

o 
os 

i-H 


^ 


o 


H 


o 


CO 


o 


o 

i-H 


d 


CM 


p-l 


CO 


CO 


© 


o 


H 


"# 


o o 


CO 


CM 

i-H 


o 

i-H 


1 

o 
os 

i-H 


^ 


O O 


© 








d 


o 


TtH 


l-H 










w 


<M O 00 






1903-4 


ti 




^ i-H 










d 




l-H l-H 










w 




IQ 


^ 










3 
5 


o 

O 


03 

3 o. O 

§ 5 J 


73 

& bD 
0) o 


2-1 


t3 

c6 
Id w 

8.9'S 

-J3 3 O 

O tH O 

PL| 


CO 

>> 

o 
u 
ip 

03 
CO 

A 


03 

c3 

O 

PQ 
o 

T3 
CD 
Ph 
h 
O 

H 


Q3 

a 

eg 

a 

3 



APPENDIX II 

GERMAN PLANS IN SOUTH-WEST AFRICA 

(Extracts reprinted by permission from the London Weekly Journal, 

"South Africa.") 

(By the Special Commissioner of the Transvaal Chronicle, in the autumn 

of 1912.) 

No. 6. 

It is common knowledge amongst all Germans on the spot 
that Bismarck's aim and desire was to effect a footing in South 
Africa — i.e. the Transvaal, even if at the risk of insult to the 
Boer Government in the days long gone b}^. Baulked, however, 
by the fact of the Bechuanaland annexation, the scheme to 
construct a strategical railway from the Swakop via Windhoek 
to Johannesburg failed. So did a further scheme by which 
"a few regiments of Prussian soliders could be landed at 
Delagoa Bay to force a passage into the Transvaal!" (vide a 
Transvaal Secret Service document). The amount of ammuni- 
tion near Angra Pequena in 1883 gave rise to grave suspicion 
at the Foreign Office in Downing Street, for the country had 
once been British, and movements of troops, etc., in 1885 were 
watched by British officers after the quitting of Palgrave at 
the outbreak of the Hottentot and Herero wars in 1887. 

No. 7. 

There are ten thousand trained German soldiers in German 
South- West Africa. Arms, ammunition, military supplies, 
and stores to last an army of 10,000 men, fully equipped, for 
six years, are now being rushed into the country. Five 
thousand trained soldiers, with military equipment and stores 
for two years, are now concentrated within 150 miles of the 
Union border. German official statistics show that there are 



GERMAN PLANS IN SOUTH-WEST AFRICA 191 

only 8000 native males above the age of 15 in the whole 
southern portion of the country, and nearly all north of the 
area where the troops are concentrated. These natives possess 
no rifles, and two-thirds are in military camps under constant 
police supervision. There are about 30,000 adult native 
males in the northern portion of the country. The Germans 
assert that they are afraid of outbreaks among these natives 
of the north. It would take two days at the most to bring a 
strong German force to the Union frontier. It would take 14 
days to bring a similar force from where they are concentrated 
to this "dangerous" area. The force concentrated near the 
Union border is therefore not intended for such native disturb- 
ances. What is it there for ? 

Recently several inspired German papers have demanded 
an increase in the South-West African naval squadron and 
garrison. At present the number of men serving with the 
regular forces in German South- West Africa is 2300. But we 
must not forget that nearly 2000 German men enter the country 
annually, of whom a large number are officials. Every one of 
these is a trained soldier. Recently there has been a particu- 
larly keen official search through the country for all German 
subjects fit for instant military service. In fact, unusual 
activity prevails. Many young fellows are trying to get out 
of liability for service by escaping to the Cape 

The white population of German South-West Africa in 
January, 1910, according to official statistics, was 11,791 ; of 
these 8960 are males, an increase of males of 2996 as compared 
with the year previous. There has been an equally great 
increase since. The numbers given include the military. 
About 10,000 men can now take the field, and provision is 
made for 10,000 in guns, ammunition, supplies, and provisions 
now being stored in the country. 

A glance at the bills of lading for 1910 shows that to every 
white man, woman, and child provisions equal to five and 
three-quarter tons are imported into the country. These 
bills of lading are guarded almost sacredly, and access to them 
is only possible by scheming and bribing the officials in charge 
of them. Why? Because the military supplies are not 
published under the heading of imports, but only what is 
being imported by the civil population. This is significant, 
and must be borne in mind when speaking of military supplies. 



192 APPENDIX II 

At the present moment a six years' supply of provisions 
and other stores is stored at a point north of Aus, 180 miles 
from the coast, 400 miles travelling from Raman's Drift, on 
the Union frontier. The idea is that should a foe land at 
Liideritz Bay the population could be brought up within a day, 
some 120 miles of railway blown up, the condensers destroyed, 
thus leaving the enemy a long time without water in the 
desert sands around Angra Pequena 

Now, German officers and civilians, when questioned, tell 
one, with an ominous smile, that the concentrating of troops, 
etc., enormous supplies in arms and ammunition, are directed 
against the Ovambos. If that is so, then why are they distant 
over 1000 English miles from Ovamboland proper, as the crow 
flies? Placed, in fact, at the extreme opposite corner to the 
scene of the alleged unrest. As a matter of fact, on visiting 
the farthest point in southern Ovamboland where the authori- 
ties would allow me to go, I found that the Ovambos are by 
no means a warlike people. All this talk of trouble with the 
Ovambos is the merest moonshine. Again, not a single black 
man is allowed the retention of firearms of any kind. All 
these natives are absolutely unarmed. Police activity is by 
no means slack, every effort being made to locate any hidden 
firearms, but nothing is ever found. 

A N.C.O. I spoke to declared that a portion of the Ovambos 
at the extreme northerly part of Amboland, hitherto a mere 
protectorate whose boundary to this day is undefined, was 
inhabited by a chief who took a large number of rifles from the 
Portuguese during the skirmishes in Southern Angola, prior 
to the Herero trouble with the Germans. But on making 
official inquiries upon my return to Windhoek later, no one 
could verify the report. If the Ovambos were really the cause 
of all this arming to the teeth on the part of the Germans, 
how is it that the Portuguese trading stations south of the 
Kunene River are not molested? To-day Portuguese traders 
may be seen peacefully at work, single-handed, in what is 
called German territory, and conquering the country by 
peaceable means. I have had several conversations with both 
Ovambo leaders and police patrols whilst at Grootfontein 
North during September of last year. There was nothing 
which led me to believe that trouble of any sort was brewing. 



GERMAN PLANS IN SOUTH-WEST AFRICA 193 

No. 8. 

Windhoek is the capital of German South- West Africa, 
and one would have thought that there — and not right away 
down south near the British border — the military centre with 
supplies would be infinitely greater and on a larger scale. 
Especially should this be the case when one remembers that it 
lies some 400 English miles near the "dreaded" Ovamboland. 
Principally from my own observations conducted on the spot 
and from information supplied from a trustworthy official 
source and the ready assistance afforded me by my friend, I 
found that at the time of my visit a few months since, smiths, 
farriers, painters, carpenters, and saddlers had more than their 
hands full in coping with the amount of work thrust on them ; 
saddlers and harnessmakers were, in fact, working overtime 
at night to satisfy the officers from the various depots mentioned 
in the last article, and to supply their wants 

When completed a great network of railways for strategical 
purposes leading out to the Union border will be available. 
To-day mails, say from Luderitz Bay to Windhoek, are carried 
by steamer only, a most irregular service. Telegraphic com- 
munication, of course, is long established, and many more 
new branch lines are under construction, under this head. 
The railway is constructed throughout on the Union pattern, 
or what is still called the Cape gauge, except the Otawi line, 
which is narrow gauge, and a small section between Swakop- 
mund and Karibib, half-way to Windhoek, all of which is 
about to be altered to Cape gauge. Work already has been 
commenced from the Windhoek side. The Germans hope 
one day to link up with the South African railways from Kalk- 
fontein South via Warmbad, to a point at the border presum- 
ably. Thus their troops could be hurried, on the completion 
of the railways now building, a thousand miles by rail from 
the north through to the south to the Union border in the 
space of a few days. 

No. 9. 

Let me quote a passage which appeared in the columns of 
the London Magazine of March, 1910, signed by "Anglo- 
German." The writer says, inter alia : "During a recent stay 
in Germany, I was introduced, by a man whom I knew to be 
r. l. 13 



194 APPENDIX II 

one of the chief functionaries of the institute known as the 
'Commerce Defence League,' to a friend of his who had just 
returned from German South- West Africa. On a subsequent 
meeting I entered into conversation with this gentleman, and 
made some inquiries concerning the country. He said little 
headway was made, and little was looked for. Men and money 
were being freely expended, without present return. The 
only good harbour was in the hands of the British (Walfisch 
Bay), as were all the islands on the coast. 

"Why, then," I asked, "do the Germans persist in their 
occupation of the country?" 

He answered frankly, smiling craftily : "We Germans look 
far ahead, my friends. We foresee another debacle in South 
Africa, and we are on the spot. Thanks to the pioneers of our 
League, our plans are all matured. The League finance the 
scheme, and the Government supplies the military forces. 
Walfisch Bay will before long be German territory, by cession 
— or otherwise (?), but in the meantime British free trade 
opposes no obstacles to us, and we can pursue our purpose 
unmolested." 

"What is that purpose?" 

"Surely you are not so blind as to need enlightenment?" 
was his reply. "Germany has long since regarded South 
Africa as a future possession of her own. When the inevitable 
happens, and Great Britain finds her hands full elsewhere, we 
are ready to strike the moment the signal is given, and the 
Cape, Bechuanaland, Rhodesia — all the frontier States — will 
fall like ripe apples into our grasp." 

I might here state that the Germans are apt to count the 
unhatched chickens, flushed with the success of their intrigues. 
Frequently I have heard it stated, whilst in the country, even 
from Marines, that one day the German ensign would "fly on 
the Lion's Head," and that in the event of trouble between 
England and Germany the Boers would side with the invading 
forces into the Union of South Africa. 



INDEX 



Abdul Hamid 11. 83, 86. 99, 119, 

127, 130 
Adriatic 121 
JEge&n 118 
Aehrenthal (Baron von) 125. 

136 
Afghanistan 12, 77, 88. 156 
Agadir 69, 75, 80, SI, 140. 149 
Aix-la-Chapelle 31 
Albania 119, 124, 131, 132 
Albert, King 183 
Alexander of Battenberg 26 
Alexander, King 121. 130, 169 
Alexander II 8 
Alexander III 104 
Alexandretta 88 
Algeria 69 
Algesiras 77, 78, 125 
Algiers 144 
Alsace Lorraine 5, 47. Lecture V, 

92, 157 
America 41, 188 
Ampthill (Lord), see Russell, Odo 
Anatolia 88 
Angra Pequena 13, 14 
Antwerp 49, 64, 84. 175. 179. 180. 

185 
Arabi Pasha 11 
Argentina 55 
Argyll (Duke of) 12 
Armenia 121, 122 
Arndt 186 

Arthur (Port) 52, 123 
Asia Minor 82, 84, SS, 122. 126. 

132, 188 
Asquith (Mr) 180 
Athens 101, 133 
Australia 143 



Austria, see also Central Powers 
10, 11 74, 78. 85, 97, 105, 115, 
118, 119, 120, 121, 123, 124, 
126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 
132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 
147, 152, 160. 162, 163, 164, 
165, 166, 168, 172, 173, 177 

Bagdad Lecture IV. 82, 83 84, 
85, 87, 88, 89, 121. 122 

Balbo (Count) 118 

Balfour (Arthur) 83 

Balkan Peninsula 85, 114, 118, 
121, 186 

Barclay (Sir T.) 100 n, 111. 112. 
113 n 

Basra 84 

Beaconsfield (Lord) 78 

Bebel (Herr) 73 

Bechuanaland 16 

Belfort 93, 94, 95 

Belgian Congo 176 

Belgium 5, 8, 23, 24, 91, 154, 
161, 166, 174, 175, 176, 177, 
178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 
184, 186 

Belgrade 133 

Beowulf 21 

Berlin 4 n. 5, 8, 13, 15, 26, 57. 58, 
75, 76, 77, 78, 80, 86, 87. 90, 
98, 99, 102, 111, 113, 114, 119, 
121, 123, 130, 132, 133, 134, 
141, 143, 144, 151, 155, 157, 
159, 162, 164, 165, 166, 173. 
175, 178, 181, 183, 184 

Bernhardi (F. von) 39, 63, 114. 
137, 145, 152, 157, 159, 162 

Bessarabia 135 



196 



INDEX 



Betham-Edwards 105 n 

Bethmann - Hollweg (Chancellor) 
178, 180 

Bieberstein (Baron Marschall von) 
85, 127 

Bismarck 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 
13, 14, 20, 21, 25, 26, 27, 40, 
44, 50, 66, 87, 92, 93, 94, 95, 
96, 97, 98, 99, 101, 102, 103 n, 
104, 106, 110, 130, 131, 153, 
155, 156, 157, 175 

Bloemfontein 60 

Blowitz (H. S. de) 8, 98 n 

Bliicher 3, 21, 186 

Blumenthal (Count von) 93 n 

Boer Republic 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 71 

Bonn University 33 

Bordeaux 94 

Bosnia-Herzegovina 85, 115, 119, 
124, 129, 158 

Bosphorus 84 

Botha (General) 60 

Boulanger (General) 100 

Bourgeois (M.) 58 

Brazil (South) 54, 55, 75, 188 

Bremen 12, 13 

Brittany 93, 116 

Broglie 4 n 

Brussels 148, 182 

Buchanan (Sir George) 167, 169 

Bucher 11, 12, 17 

Bucheron (Dr) 37 

Bug 160 

Bukharest 133, 158 

Bulgaria 116, 120, 122, 129, 131, 
132 135 

Biilow '(Prince) 59, 72, 128 n 

Bundy (Mr) 59 

Bunsen (Sir M. de) 164, 165 

Burgers (President) 12 

Busch 11, 26, 50, 93, 103 

Caillaux (Mme.) 140, 165, 166 

Calmet (Dom) 110 n 

Cambon (Jules) 159, 173, 182 

Cameroons 17, 75 

Canada 143 

Cape Colony 14, 68 

Cape Town 17, 143 

Carlsbad 127 

Carlvle (Thomas) 3, 154 



Carthage 142 
Cassavetti (Signor) 120 n 
Cassel 33 
Catherine II 117 
Caucasia 82 

Central Powers, see also Germany 
and Austria 3, 50, 134, 160, 162, 
167, 168, 169 
Ceuta 69 

Chamberlain (J.) 19, 58 
Charlemagne 103 
Charles XII (of Sweden) 44, 139 
China 52, 54, 100 
Churchill (Winston) 148 
Class (Heir) 80 n 
Clausewitz 155 
Clemenceau 100 
Colmar 108 
Cologne 77 

Congo Free State 52, 147 
Constantinople 85, 89, 90, 98, 116, 

117, 121, 126, 127, 133, 172 
Crispi 59, 98 n, 131 n 
Cromwell (Oliver) 177 
Cronstadt 165, 166, 172 
Crown Prince 6, 39 
Cuba 51 
Cyprus 121 

Dalny 123 

Damascus 88 

Daneff 132 

Daniell (Herr) 64 

Danube 118, 119 

Dauphine 93 

Davin (Commandant) 147 

Debidour (Mons.) 120 n 

Delagoa Bay 13, 15, 57 

Delarey (General) 60 

Delcasse (Mons.) 69, 70, 71, 77 

Demolins (Mons.) 108 

Denmark 3 

Derby (Lord) 7 

Descamps (E.) 176 n 

Deschanel (Mons.) 71 

Dicey (Edward) 29 

Diebitsch 117 

Disraeli 66 

Doberitz 32 

Drasa, Queen 136, 170 

Durham (Miss Edith) 123, 130 



INDEX 



197 



East Africa 17 

Edward I 176, 177 

Edward VII 23, 61, 62, 70, 80, 86, 

112, 113, 120, 141 
Egypt 11, 14, 33, 41, 70, 82, 
88, 90, 99, 112, 121, 126, 134, 
144 
Eliot (Sir C.) 126 n 
Elkind (L.) 30, 83 n, 104 n 
Ems (River) 65 
England, see Great Britain 
Esthonia 64 

Fashoda 69, 71 

Ferdinand of Bulgaria 129, 132 

Ferry (Mons.) 99 

Fez 70, 80 

Fichte 186 

Fitzpatrick 56 

Flanders 177 

Flushing 175 

France 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 23, 43, 
59, 66, 72. 74, 75, 76, 77, 80, 81, 
91, 93, 96, 97, 98, 99, 101, 103, 
107, 108, 109, 111, 112, 121, 
123, 127, 130, 131, 139, 140, 
141, 144, 147, 157, 158, 160, 
162, 166, 167, 168, 169, 172, 
174, 179, 181, 182, 184 

Francis Ferdinand (Archduke) 91, 
115, 136, 160 

Francis Joseph 124, 127, 137 

Frankfurt 12, 40 

Frankfurt on the Oder 104 

Frederick the Great 21, 22, 23, 26, 
27, 96, 104, 153, 155, 157 

Frederick William I 102 

Frederick William II 22, 153, 
156 

Frederick William III 29, 153, 
156 

Frederick William IV 21, 23 

Frederick-Charles (Prince) 104 

Frederick (Empress) 26 

French Congo 131 

Frere (Sir Bartle) 12 n, 13 

Freycinet (Mons. de) 98, 99 

Frobenius 142, 159 

Gambetta 69 
Gambia 68 



Gardiner (Dr S. R.) 2 

Gavard (C.) 7 

Geffcken (Prof.) 5 

George V 177 

German East Africa 17, 51 

German New Guinea 17 

German South West Africa 15, 16, 
51, Appendix II 

Germany, see also Central Powers 
Lecture III, 6, 10, 11, 13, 75, 
77, 78, 80, 81, 83, 86, 88, 89, 
92, 96, 97, 100, 103, 106, 107, 
109, 111, 112, 113, 123, 126, 
127, 130, 131, 133, 140, 141, 
144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 150, 
153, 155, 156, 157, 159, 163, 

165, 166, 167, 168, 173, 174, 
176, 177, 178, 181, 184, 187 

Gibraltar 18, 68, 69 

Gladstone (W. E.) 12, 15, 19, 
155, 175 

Gneisenau 21 

Goethe 157 

Goltz (General von der) 83 

Goluchowski (Count) 125 

Gontaut-Biron (de) 4 n 

Gortschakoff (Prince) 6 

Goschen (Sir Edward) 8, 166. 174, 
178, 180, 181 

Granville (Lord) 14, 18, 19, 51 

Great Britain 3, 5, 8. 9, 11, 12, 
13, 16, 18, 50, 59, 68, 69, 72, 
74, 75, 76, 79, 81, 82, 85, 98, 
100, 112, 113, 114, 121, 123, 
125, 127, 142, 144, 145, 157, 
161, 162, 166, 167, 168, 172, 
174, 175, 176, 179, 182, 183, 
185, 186 

Great Elector, The 21 

Grey (Sir Edward) 79, 86, 113, 

166. 167, 168, 173, 181, 182, 
183 

Guinea Coast 17, 68 

Hague Conference 153, 175, 187 

Hamburg 12, 13 

Hapsburgs 118, 120, 146, 164, 

166 
Harden (M.) 105 n 
Hardinge (Sir Charles) 79 
Hayti 51 

13—3 



198 



INDEX 



Headlam (J. W.) 98 n 

Hedjaz 121 

Hegel 46 

Heligoland 18, 19, 51 

Henckel von Donnersmarck( Prince) 

76 
Hinzelin (E.) 101 w, 105 n, 

108 n 
Hinzpeter (G.) 33 n, 34 
Hohenlohe (Prince) 19 n, 53, 

103, 110 
HoUand 5, 142, 174, 177, 186 
Holy Land 82 
Hungary 136 

Iberian Peninsula 116 

India 41, 88, 126, 134, 143 

Indus 144 

Ischl 127 

Italy 11, 70, 74, 78, 98, 99, 116, 
123, 128, 130, 131, 137, 147, 
152, 159, 166, 167, 168, 169, 
179 

Jagow (von) 165, 166, 181 

Jameson (Dr) 57 

Japan 52, 54, 66, 123, 157, 186 

Jerusalem 83 

Johannesburg 59 

Jonescu (Mons.) 135 

Joubert (Piet) 15 

Kaiser, see William II 

Kant 157 

Kazan 170 

Kellermann 93 

Kiao-Chao 36, 53, 54 

Kiderlen-Wachter (Herr) 80 

Kieff 170 

Kiel 18, 19, 52, 82, 105. 106, 145, 

146, 147 
Kirke 17 
Kleber 93 

Klein (Herr) 101, 102 
Kochani 131 
Koniggratz 3 
Korea 123 
Kossovo 116 
Koweit 84, 86 

Kriiger (Paul) 13, 16, 56, 57, 59 
Krupp 132, 157, 159, 179 



Lamprecht (Prof.) 32, 33, 36, 38, 

171, 178 
Lansdowne (Lord) 70, 86, 112 
Laurent (Mons.) 113 ?i 
Leipzig 108 
Lemaitre (Jules) 113 
Leroy (Mons.) 103 n, 108 n, 

113 n 
Leudet (Mons.) 33 n, 34, 37 n 
Levant 54 
Leyds (Dr) 57 
Liao-tung 52 

Lichnowsky (Prince) 106, 181 
Lisbon 57 

Lloyd George (Mr) 81 
London 14, 18, 44, 66, 86, 87, 

96, 113, 126, 132, 151, 164 
Lorraine 140 
Lothringen 111 

Louis XIV and XV 38, 47, 79, 92 
Lowe (Mr) 92 n 
Liideritz (Herr) 13, 14, 15 
Luxemburg 65, 176, 182 

Maas (Herr) 108 
Macaulay (T. B.) 22 
Macedonia 119. 120, 121, 122, 123, 

124, 125, 126, 131, 132, 135 
Machiavelli 98 
McMahon (Marshal) 174 
Madagascar 70, 100, 112 
Madrid 70 
Magyars 136 
Majuba 12, 156 
Manchuria 77, 114, 125 
Maria Theresa 154 
Marlborough (Duke of) 177 
Marschall von Bieberstein (Baron) 

85, 127 
Maximilian I 32 
Mecca 88 
Merv 12 

Mesopotamia 82, 84, 85, 88, 188 
Metz 92, 93, 101, 110, 111, 112 
Meuse 118, 179, 180 
Mexico 140 
Milan. King 120 
Minchin (J.) 120 
Mitrovitza 120 
Mogador 69, 75 
Moltke 21, 93, 94, 95, 157 



INDEX 



199 



Mommsen (Prof.) 61 

Montenegro 120, 158 

Morel (E. D.) 71 n, 74 n, 82 n 

Morier (Sir R.) 5, 6, 92 n, 101, 
102w 

Morocco Lecture IV, 68, 69, 70, 
71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 79, 80, 
131, 140, 141, 144, 146, 158 

Moscow 44, 170 

Moselle 65 

Miihlhausen 103 

Mukden 73 

Munich 5, 6, 111, 163 

Munster (Count) 18, 51 

Miirzsteg 123, 125 

Namur 179 

Nachtigal (Dr) 17 

Napoleon I 7, 22, 32, 41, 42, 43, 
47, 68, 79, 89, 106, 117, 137, 
139, 140, 142. 160. 171, 186, 187 

Napoleon III 3, 156, 175 

Navies Appendix I 

Newfoundland 70, 112 

New Hebrides 70 

New Republic 15 

Ney 93 

Niebuhr 186 

Niemen 160 

Nietzsche 186 

Niger 68, 112 

North Africa 11 

North Sea 118 

Norway 178 n 

Novi Bazar 120, 125, 128, 159 

Nyassaland 51 

Odessa 170 
Oppert (Mr) 98 
Orange Free State 56 
Ostend 49, 84.. 180, 185 
Ovambos 143 

Paris 44, 58, 66, 75, 76, 77, 86, 
87, 98, 100, 126, 130, 160, 165 ; 
178, 179. 180 

Paulsen (Prof.) 47 

Pechmann (Baron von) 111 

Persia 79, 85, 87, 88, 133 

Peter, King 129 

Peter the Great 116 



Peters (Dr) 17 

Petrograd 8, 44, 72, 79, 100, 105, 

123, 126, 127, 133, 138, 166, 

167, 168, 173 
Philip II 78 
Pigeon (Amedee) 33 
Pinon (R.) 69 n, 71 n 
Pitt (W.) Junr. 2 
Plevna 119 
Poincare (President) 140, 165, 

172 
Poland 174, 184 
Portugal 15, 142, 157 
Posen 103 
Potsdam 27, 36, 86, 87, 122, 158, 

172 
Pretoria 16, 56, 58 
Prussia 83, 102, 104, 153, 155.. 156, 

186 

Quesnay 142 

Rachfal (F.) 74 n, 80 n 

Ramsay (Sir W.) 127 n 

Rapp 93 

Rasch (E.) 101, 103 

Reval 126, 127 

Reventlow (Count) 33 n, 58, 59, 
69 n, 72 n, 80 n, 100 n, 113, 
114 n, 123 n, 127 n, 128 n, 
141. 142 

Rhine 77. 118 

Rohlfs (Herr) 17 

Rohrbach (Dr P.) 54, 84 ; 85, 88, 
139, 142, 143, 144 n 

Rome 70, 99, 128, 131, 159, 168, 
172, 184 

Roon 21, 157 

Roosevelt (Theodore) 78 

Rosebery (Lord) 112 

Rouen 96 

Roumania 119, 135 

Rouvier (Mons.) 96 

Rumbold (Sir Horace) 4, 83 n 

Russell (Arthur) 6 

Russell (Odo) 6, 7, 10 

Russia 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 20, 58, 66, 
73, 77, 78, 79, 82, 84, 86, 87, 
89, 91, 97, 98, 105, 106, 114, 
117, 118, 119, 121, 122, 123, 
124, 125, 128, 135, 138, 139, 



200 



INDEX 



144, 147, 154, 157, 158, 159, 
161, 164, 166, 167, 168, 169, 
170, 172, 173, 174, 179, 184, 186 

St John (Frederick) 129 n 

St Lucia Bay 15 

St Petersburg, see Petrograd 

Salisbury (Lord) 10, 19, 20, 51 

Salonica 49, 119, 120, 126, 128, 

172 
Samoa 17 
Sanjak of Novi Bazar 120, 125, 

128, 159 
Saxony 154, 155, 183 
Sazonoff 138, 167 
Scheldt 175, 177, 179 
Schierbrand (W. von) 37 n, 

53 n 
Schiller 157 
Schleswig-Holstein 156 
Schnabele (Herr) 104 
Sedan 3, 65, 174 
Seine 3, 96 
Serajevo 137, 163 
Serbia 115, 116, 120, 121, 122, 

128, 129, 131, 132, 135, 136, 

138, 152, 158, 162, 163, 164, 

166, 167, 170, 171, 172, 184 
Seton-Watson (Mr) 136 
Shantung Peninsula 53 
Siam 112 
Siberia 48 

Sidney (Sir Philip) 177 
Silesia 154 
Sinaitic Peninsula 90 
Skertchley (Mr) 53 
Skiernewice 1 1 
Sluys 176, 177 
Sofia 132, 133 
Somaliland 51 
Soudan 70 

South Africa 16, 56, 147, App. II 
Spain 18, 68, 69, 72, 79, 80 
Spice Islands 51 
Steed (W.) 125 n, 126 n. 128 n, 

136 
Stockmar (Baron) 23, 24 
Strassburg 92, 101, 111, 157 
Sublime Porte, see Turkey 
Suez Canal 88 
Suvaroff 117 



Switzerland 65, 176 
Syria 88, 90, 98 

Tacitus 21, 47 

Talleyrand 43, 78, 186 

Tangiers 68, 69, 73 

Tardieu 71 n, 73 n, 79 n 

Tchaikowsky 117 

Tetuan 69 

Thibet 79 

Thiers (Mons.) 94, 96 

Thionville 110 

Tirpitz (Admiral von) 59 

Tittoni 120 n, 128 n 

Togoland 75 

Tokio 44, 66, 123 

Tongaland 15 

Tonquin 100 

Transvaal Republic 12, 13, 14, 

15. 16, 56, 57 
Treitschke 45, 49, 109, 112, 114, 

142, 152, 153, 157, 186 
Tripoli 70, 99, 121, 130, 131 
Tsar 7, 26, 86, 165, 170, 171, 

184, 185 
Tschirsky (von) 165 
Tunis 11, 98, 99, 130, 144 
Turkey 83, 84, 88, 89, 90, 98, 

119, 122, 125, 126, 129, 130. 

132, 134, 185 
Tyre 142 

United States 78, 157, 186 

VaUona 131 

Venice 142 

Victoria, Queen 6, 20, 27, 175 

Victoria (sister to William I) 26, 
27 

Vienna 40, 90, 105, 118, 120, 124, 
126, 130, 132, 133, 134, 135, 
136, 137, 138, 159, 164, 166, 173 

Waag (Herr) 108 
Wales 116 
Walfisch Bay 13 
Warren (Sir Charles) 16 
Warsaw 160 
Washington 66 
Waterloo 3, 176, 177 
Wei-hei-wei 53 



INDEX 



201 



Wellington (Duke of) 177 

West Africa 70 

Westlake (Prof.) 176 n 

Wet (General de) 60 

Wilcocks (Sir W.) 85 

Wilde (Oscar) 78 

Wilhelmshafen 146 

William I 6, 8, 19, 21, 23, 25, 35, 
95, 97, 105, 153 

William II 3, 19, Lecture II, 25, 
26, 27, 29, 32, 35, 40, 43, 49, 
50, 56, 57, 60, 65, 73, 79 83, 



86, 89, 90, 104, 105, 106, 107. 
109, 110, 112, 122, 125, 130, 
131, 137, 142, 154, 157, 165, 
169, 170, 171, 172, 176, 179, 
184, 185 

Ypres 67 

Zabern 157 
Zambesi 16 
Zanzibar 17 
Zululand 15 



(Eambritip : 

PRINTED BY JOHN CLAY. M.A. 
AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS 



BY THE SAME AUTHOR 

The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era 

1789-1815 

Sixth edition, revised. Crown 8vo. With 6 maps and plans. 
Price 3s 6d net. Cambridge Historical Series 

"It is not too much to say that Mr Rose's treatment of this difficult 
and complicated subject shows a grasp of essentials and a soundness of 
judgment that are decidedly uncommon. Nor is it easy to overpraise 
the nicety of judgment in the selection of authorities which is a 
remarkable feature of Mr Rose's book." — Saturday Review 

"In dealing with this vast subject Mr Rose has read widely, and 
has used his reading well ; his information is considerable ; his writing 
is accurate and thoughtful ; and his volume contains a trustworthy 
summary of the history of the times based on the most recent knowledge 

at our command Mr Rose's narrative is of great interest, and it 

gains in space and freedom as it proceeds." — Guardian 

UNIFORM WITH THE ABOVE 
The Expansion of Russia, 1815 — 1900. By F. H. Skrine, 

F.S.S. Second edition. Crown 8vo. With 3 maps. 4s 6d net. 

Slavonic Europe. A Political History of Poland and Russia 

from 1447 to 1796. By R. Nisbet Bain. Crown 8vo. 5s 6d net. 

Scandinavia: A Political History of Denmark, Norway and 

Sweden from 1513 to 1900. By R. Nisbet Bain. Crown 8vo. 
With 5 maps. 5s 6d net. 

The Ottoman Empire, 1801 — 19 13. By W. Miller, M.A. 

(Oxon.), Hon. LL.D. Crown 8vo. With 4 maps. 7s 6d net. 

Europe and the Far East, 1506 — 1912. By Sir R. K. 

Douglas. Revised and corrected with an additional chapter 
(1904 — 1912) by Professor J. H. Longford. Crown 8vo. With 
5 maps. 6s 6d net. 

A History of the Colonization of Africa by Alien Races. 

By Sir Harry H. Johnston, K.C.B. New edition, revised 
throughout and considerably enlarged. Crown 8vo. With 8 maps. 
8s net 

A History of the Australasian Colonies, from their foundation 

to the year 191 1. By Edward Jenks, M.A. Third edition. 
Crown 8vo. With 2 maps. 6s net. 

Cambridge University Press 

C. F. Clay, Manager : Fetter Lane, London 



THE 

CAMBRIDGE 
MODERN HISTORY 

PLANNED BY THE LATE LORD ACTON, LL.D. 

Edited by 

Sir A. W. Ward, Litt D., F.B.A. ; G. W. Prothero, Litt.D., 
F.B.A. ; and Stanley Leathes, MA., C.B. 

Complete in Fourteen Volumes. Royal 8vo. 



I 


The Renaissance 


VIII 


The French Revolution 


II 


The Reformation 


IX 


Napoleon 


III 


The Wars of Religion 


X 


The Restoration 


IV 


The Thirty Years' War 


XI 


The Growth of Nationalities 


V 


The Age of Louis XIV 


XII 


The Latest Age 


VI 


The Eighteenth Century 


XIII 


Tables and Index 


VII 


The United States 


XIV 


Atlas 




PRI 


CES 


I s. d. 


Bound in Dark Blue Buckram 


. 


8 15 net 



„ ,, Brown Persian Sheepskin 

Leather back, cloth sides . . . 900 net 

,, ,, Green Morocco 

Leather back and corners, cloth sides . 1 1 o o net 
,, ,, Red Morocco 

Full bound . . . . .1500 net 

The twelve volumes of text, bound in buckram, may be obtained 
for £7 1 os od net; separate volumes of the work, in the same binding, 
are sold at the following prices: — Text volumes, 16s net each; Tables 
and Index, 16s net; Atlas, 25s net. 

THE ATLAS VOLUME 

The general idea of the Atlas, which forms the fourteenth volume of 
the History, is to illustrate, in a series of maps of Europe and of its 
different countries, as well as of other parts of the world associated 
with the progress of European history, the course of events by which 
the Europe of the fifteenth century has been transformed into the 
Europe of the present day. The Ottoman advance in Europe and Asia 
Minor, and the subsequent shrinkage of the Ottoman Empire, for 
instance, are clearly shown by reference to certain of the maps. An 
historical introduction by Mr E. A. Benians traces the course of the 
territorial changes and explains the purposes of each map. The 
volume contains 141 maps, the majority of which are coloured, and 
a full index. Price 25s net. 

Prospectuses will be sent on application 

Cambridge University Press 

Fetter Lane, London : C. F. Cla}^ Manager 



c^, • 









^<- 






4 









r ■ 



s 



V 5 ^ 



vV </- 



/>. 












•7* 






<*> 



,0 o 






^ ^ 



■A-- 



&* ' 



%<£ 









** 






• a. ' ii' 



c*« 













^ ^ 






.v ^* 






v* .^' * 










•^ 


s 




*s V 


~ ^ 




H 


<r- 




x 






iCmi- 










^°, 












^ 



0g 



■> -Q- 






,x^ v <V 












^ 



^ <v 



r4- 



V , 


































































-v. 


































































* 









^ 

























































































LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 

018 497 490 







